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Abstract 
Assessing the risk of malevolent attacks against large-scale critical infrastructures 
requires modifications to existing methodologies that separately consider physical 
security and cyber security.  This research has developed a risk assessment 
methodology that explicitly accounts for both physical and cyber security, while 
preserving the traditional security paradigm of detect, delay, and respond.  This 
methodology also accounts for the condition that a facility may be able to recover 
from or mitigate the impact of a successful attack before serious consequences 
occur.  The methodology uses evidence-based techniques (which are a generaliza-
tion of probability theory) to evaluate the security posture of the cyber protection 
systems.  Cyber threats are compared against cyber security posture using a cate-
gory-based approach nested within a path-based analysis to determine the most 
vulnerable cyber attack path.  The methodology summarizes the impact of a 
blended cyber/physical adversary attack in a conditional risk estimate where the 
consequence term is scaled by a “willingness to pay” avoidance approach. 
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Executive Summary 
Protecting critical infrastructure facilities against malevolent attacks is a major challenge for 
facility operators.  Traditional security threats from vandals seeking to deface property or cause 
inconsequential damage have been managed by basic security principles, such as perimeter pro-
tection and periodic surveillance.  However, an emerging adversary with a philosophical intent 
to destroy American society may consider more sophisticated attacks and cause widespread 
damage to critical infrastructures.  As the critical infrastructure business practices leverage more 
system automation, security assessment technology must also be able to evaluate the relationship 
between cyber and physical security and its implications for unidentified vulnerabilities.   
 
Most of the critical infrastructures deliver a commodity such as water, power, or natural gas to 
an end user.  An infrastructure facility comprises “assets,” such as systems, subsystems, or com-
ponents that must operate properly in order for the facility to perform its intended function.  The 
facilities include commodity delivery assets (e.g., pumps, valves, transformers, etc.) and cyber 
elements that can control set-points, actuation, or other operating functions for the commodity-
delivery assets.   
 
The facilities will have some form of physical protection (e.g., fences, locks, alarm systems, etc.) 
and some form of cyber protection (e.g., firewalls, administrative access controls, etc.).  Some of 
the physical protection system (PPS) elements may be controlled or monitored by cyber means.  
Interactions between physical and cyber security are recognized in the popular media (such as 
the Oceans 11 movie) and the security community.  However, most risk and vulnerability 
assessment research has focused on either physical or cyber security.  This effort first explored 
various historic approaches to either physical or cyber security assessment methods.  Upon 
finding no satisfactory existing method that considered both physical and cyber attacks, a new 
approach was developed to evaluate “blended attacks” where the adversary makes use of both 
physical and cyber attack tactics. 
 
The purpose of this LDRD project was to develop a risk assessment methodology that supports 
analysis of integrated physical and cyber security elements within critical infrastructure systems. 
The most important outcomes of this work were to achieve a better understanding of these 
cyber/physical interfaces and their implications for unidentified vulnerabilities and to provide 
decision makers with integrated and comprehensive risk results for “blended” security systems 
that can contain both cyber and physical elements.   
 
Through this LDRD project, the physical security and cyber security team members researched 
historical approaches and retained valuable aspects of past methods, and then added new 
elements to develop a truly integrated cyber/physical security assessment methodology.  Within 
this report, we have attempted to communicate the most important outcomes of this work, which 
were  
y to achieve a better understanding of the cyber/physical interfaces and implications for 
unidentified vulnerabilities, and  
y to provide a tool for decision makers that shows integrated and comprehensive risk 
results for “blended” security systems that can contain both cyber and physical 
elements.   
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The project team recognized that not all security systems are of similar sophistication, nor should 
they be.  Security systems for low consequence impacts or where mitigation might provide 
adequate risk management could be evaluated with a best practices or screening analysis method. 
A best practices questionnaire analysis tool (CICSTART) was developed to evaluate both 
physical and cyber security practices.  Conversely, high consequence impacts or difficult to 
mitigate risks often have more sophisticated security systems, which require functional or 
engagement style security systems analysis.  This project created a functional style security 
assessment method (CPSAM) that integrates cyber and physical security systems as a software 
application.  
 
The CPSAM functional risk assessment methodology combines the fundamentals of physical 
protection systems (e.g., detect, delay and respond) with cyber protection system primitives that 
are based on opportunistic pathway analysis.  The methodology begins with a fundamental risk 
principle where the analyst selects specific consequences of concern (CoC) so resources are not 
wasted looking at inconsequential impacts.  Specific key asset failures that could lead to those 
consequences are identified by external analysis methods as these are often tailored to the 
complexities of the specific infrastructure.  The capabilities of the adversary attacking the facility 
are contrasted with the protective features at the facility to estimate the likelihood of adversary 
success.  The key cyber-physical security integration step occurs in the portion of the 
vulnerability assessment model, where the performance of protection elements that are cyber-
controlled are turned off to account for the likelihood that an attacker could penetrate the cyber 
protection system.  Since there is insufficient data to support a probabilistic approach to cyber 
security assessment, a novel application of a broader mathematical tool (Belief and Plausibility) 
was developed to support vulnerability estimates for attacks that include cyber elements. 
 
While the CPSAM is an operational alpha-version software product, additional developments of 
the methodology and software features were identified.  These include: 1) development of user 
interfaces to elicit data, 2) development of graphics to display differences in risk values, 
3) development of multiple target applications, 4) links to engineering process models to 
automate target set identification, 5) improved methods to assess mitigation, and 6) improved 
techniques to evaluate cyber protective system effectiveness. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
Protecting critical infrastructure facilities against malevolent attacks is a major challenge for 
facility operators.  Traditional security threats from vandals seeking to deface property or cause 
inconsequential damage have been managed by basic security principles, such as perimeter 
protection and periodic surveillance.  However, an emerging adversary with a philosophical 
intent to destroy American society may consider more sophisticated attacks to cause widespread 
damage to critical infrastructures.  As the critical infrastructure business practices leverage more 
system automation, security assessment technology must also be able to evaluate the relationship 
between cyber and physical security and its implications for unidentified vulnerabilities.   
 
Most of the critical infrastructures deliver a commodity such as water, power, or natural gas to 
an end user.  An infrastructure facility comprises “assets,” such as systems, subsystems, or com-
ponents that must operate properly in order for the facility to perform its intended function.  The 
facilities include commodity-delivery assets (e.g., pumps, valves, transformers, etc.) and cyber 
elements that can control set-points, actuation, or other operating functions for the commodity-
delivery assets.   
 
The facilities will have some form of physical protection (e.g., fences, locks, alarm systems, etc.) 
and some form of cyber protection (e.g., firewalls, administrative access controls, etc.).  Some of 
the physical protection system (PPS) elements may be controlled or monitored by cyber means.  
Interactions between physical and cyber security are recognized in the popular media (such as 
the Oceans 11 movie) and the security community.  However, most risk and vulnerability 
assessment research has focused on either physical or cyber security.  This effort first explored 
various historical approaches to either physical or cyber security assessment methods.  Upon 
finding no satisfactory existing method that considered both physical and cyber attacks, a new 
approach was developed to evaluate “blended attacks” where the adversary makes use of both 
physical and cyber attack tactics. 
 
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this LDRD project was to develop a risk assessment methodology that supports 
analysis of integrated physical and cyber security elements within critical infrastructure systems.  
 
The most important outcomes of this work were to achieve a better understanding of these cyber/ 
physical interfaces and their implications for unidentified vulnerabilities and to provide decision 
makers with integrated and comprehensive risk results for “blended” security systems that can 
contain both cyber and physical elements.   
 
1.3 Approach 
Physical and cyber security have fundamentally distinct foundations, which challenged the team 
first in understanding each domain, and then in finding a general construct where both physical 
and cyber security assessment methods could be functionally integrated.  Physical security 
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assessment is founded on a time sequence race (called “detect, delay, and respond”) for the 
adversary to defeat security systems (e.g., fences, locks, etc.) and overcome a response force.  
Physical protection systems include perimeter defense, active detection technology, and access 
controls to allow privileged entry.  Cyber protection systems also include “perimeter” defense 
such as firewalls and access controls.  However, they typically do not rely on active detection 
technology to summon a response force because once a perimeter is penetrated, an attack 
typically proceeds faster than a cyber response force can act.  Cyber security assessment 
methods are typically either checklist-based to compare current capabilities with best practices 
or use a red team approach that actively engages the cyber security system with custom-designed 
exploits. 
 
To address this problem, this research developed a functional risk assessment methodology that 
combined the fundamentals of physical protection systems (e.g., detect, delay, and respond) with 
cyber protection system primitives that are based on an opportunistic pathway analysis [Young 
et al. 2004].  The methodology begins with a fundamental risk principle where the analyst selects 
specific consequences of concern (CoC) so resources are not wasted by evaluating incon-
sequential impacts.  Specific key asset failures that could lead to those consequences are 
identified by external analysis methods as these are often tailored to the complexities of the 
specific infrastructure.  The capabilities of the adversary attacking the facility are contrasted with 
the protective features at the facility to estimate the likelihood of adversary success.  The key 
cyber-physical security integration step occurs in the vulnerability assessment portion of the 
model, where the performance of protection elements that are cyber-controlled are turned off to 
account for the likelihood that an attacker could penetrate the cyber protection system.  Since 
there are insufficient data to support a probabilistic approach to cyber security assessment, a 
novel application of a broader mathematical tool (Belief and Plausibility) was developed to 
support vulnerability estimates for attacks that include cyber elements.  Appendix A provides a 
short tutorial on the theory of evidence that underlies this assessment approach. 
 
1.3.1 Attack Types 
Attacks may be physical or cyber, or some combination of the two.  This research considered 
four types of attacks against critical infrastructure assets: 
• physical-only 
• cyber-enabled physical  
• cyber-only 
• physically enabled cyber 
 
Each of these attack types is defined below and in Figure 1. 
 
Physical-only attacks — The attacker gains physical access to the asset under attack in order to 
damage or disable it.  In this case, asset failure is induced by actions taken at the asset location.  
The two general types of physical attacks are physical-only attacks and cyber-enabled physical 
attacks.  Physical-only attacks involve no cyber activities.   
 
Cyber-enabled physical attacks — The attacker uses cyber means to facilitate physical access to 
the asset.  In a cyber-enabled physical attack, the attacker disables cyber-controlled elements of 
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the PPS (for example, magnetic locks or detection systems) that can be turned off by cyber 
control.  Cyber-enabled physical attacks can occur if (and only if) one or more elements of the 
PPS are cyber controlled.   
 
Cyber-only attacks — The attacker induces failure of the commodity delivery asset without 
gaining physical access to that asset.  Cyber attacks are of concern only if: 1) the physical asset 
is cyber controlled; and 2) failure of the asset can be caused by cyber manipulation.  In this 
context, the failure of the commodity delivery asset means it is damaged, disabled, or 
manipulated in a way that leads to a “Consequence of Concern” (CoC).  The fact that a 
commodity delivery asset is cyber-controlled does not necessarily mean that it can be caused to 
“fail” (e.g., cause a physical action that leads to a CoC) by cyber means.  A cyber-only attack is 
launched without gaining physical access to the facility at which the commodity delivery asset is 
located or controlled.  For example, an attack may be launched from a “Cyber Access Point” 
(CAP) that is attached to the public Internet.  In that case, the system owner has no control over 
the physical protection at the CAP.   
 
Physically enabled cyber attacks — The attacker gains physical access to an on-site location 
from which the cyber attack is then launched.  This type of attack involves a physical attack to 
gain access to an on-site location.  A cyber attack is then launched from that physical location, 
which is under the control of the facility operator.  The difference from the cyber-only case is 
that the attacker must first circumvent the physical protection for that CAP before the attacker 
can then use that physical location’s cyber elements (e.g., network terminal or control system 
element, for example) to launch a cyber attack.  A simple example would be a malicious insider 
who has access to the industrial process control room.  A more complex example would be a ter-
rorist team comprised of several large, well-trained paramilitary forces and one cyber specialist 
assaulting a physically protected control room.   
 
 
Figure 1.  Functional Breakdown of Singular and Blended Physical and Cyber Attacks 
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2. Assessment Method Review 
2.1 Existing Methods 
In the initial stages of this effort, the project team recognized that many risk assessment methods 
had been developed.  These methodologies provided certain insights into the complex phenom-
ena of risk analysis, which the team sought to understand and then determine their potential for 
analysis of a blended cyber and physical attack.  The following sections provide a brief des-
cription of select methods categorized into inductive methods, deductive methods, and other 
types of logical models.   
 
2.1.1 Inductive Methods 
Inductive risk assessment methods start with the definition of potential risk scenarios followed 
by identification of risks or consequences that might occur as a result of that scenario.  The risk 
scenarios are identified through both formalized methodologies and imaginative thinking, and 
are based on component failures, subsystem failures, human actions, and/or natural and human-
made phenomena.  While there are many inductive methods, this section focuses on two classes: 
failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) and event tree analysis. 
 
The most important limitations of inductive techniques are related to a reliance on “bottom-up” 
problem-solving method – that is, the sources of risk are identified at the beginning of the 
analysis, instead of being inferred by a systematic deductive “top-down” approach.  If the analyst 
does not envision a particular scenario, then that scenario will remain unanalyzed because a list 
of scenarios is the starting point for an inductive analysis, not its result.   
 
2.1.1.1 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
The FMEA technique [McCormick 1981), along with its close cousins, failure modes, effects 
and criticality analysis (FMECA), and HAZOP [Greenberg and Cramer 1991), are generally the 
first systematic risk and reliability analysis techniques applied to a system.  The purpose of an 
FMEA is to examine individual components and assess the effect of their failure on the system in 
which they are used (and on other systems and subsystems).  FMEA is a qualitative method that 
is typically documented in a tabular format.  To accomplish an FMEA, the analyst examines the 
components of a system one by one, and for each component, considers every known failure 
mode individually.  The analyst writes a description of the failure mode, the method by which 
that failure would be detected, the effect of the failure, and the expected response of operators or 
automatic controls to the situation.   
 
A HAZOP study is related to an FMECA in that it assesses predefined scenarios to determine 
their probable causes, consequences, and possible remediation actions.  The HAZOP method 
focuses on qualitative deviations of key system operating parameters from their nominal, normal, 
or design values.  The fundamental philosophy here is that normal operations are generally safe, 
and deviations from these normal operations are the source of unexpected or unrecognized 
problems.  The objective is to find the “weak link” in the system, and to provide a basis for 
developing procedural or engineering controls to reduce any risks so identified.  The one-by-one 
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nature of parameter variation in a HAZOP study and failure consideration in an FMEA can 
neglect the effects of multiple concurrent failures or variations, which may have both significant 
likelihood and high criticality.   
 
2.1.1.2 Event Tree Analysis 
Event tree analysis (ETA) is an inductive risk assessment technique that represents an undesired 
occurrence as a sequence of events [Cramond 1985].  Event trees are similar in form to decision 
trees and are used to represent the spectrum of possible outcomes given a particular initial condi-
tion.  The method is inductive in that it begins with a particular set of initial conditions and uses 
inductive logic rather than deductive logic to infer its results. 
 
The events within an event tree may include the status of physical systems, operator actions, the 
activities of automated control systems, and random (stochastic) events both internal and 
external to the system.  The events may or may not be independent of one another, but if they are 
not independent, then the interdependencies are explicitly included within the logical structure of 
the tree.  A path through the event tree is constructed by selecting a unique outcome for each 
event within the event tree model.  Thus, the path physically represents a unique sequence of 
events so that outcome O1P occurs for event 1, and outcome O2P occurs for event 2, and outcome 
O3P occurs for event 3, and so forth. 
 
If the event tree model is properly constructed, the set of all paths through the model represents 
the complete set of possible outcomes that can occur as a result of the given initial condition (but 
typically only the outcomes relevant to the analyst’s needs are modeled).  The results of an event 
tree analysis are initially qualitative descriptions of individual scenarios.  If, however, one 
assigns conditional probabilities to the individual event outcomes, then one can also obtain 
quantitative results consisting of the scenario (path) definition and its probability of occurrence. 
 
In contrast, the principal limitation of the event tree method is that an event tree is by definition 
an acyclic graph.  Because cycles are prohibited, it can be difficult to represent the behavior of 
systems that embody feedback loops in an event tree model.  
 
An event-tree-based analysis tool developed the American Society of Mechanical Engineers is 
the Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP) [ASME 2004] 
developed to provide a homeland security risk analysis and risk management decision-making 
tool for government and private industry.  The Critical Asset Risk Analysis (CARA) methodol-
ogy includes a screening analysis of assets that precedes the detailed analysis modeled after 
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods.  The challenge to using PRA methods in counter-
terrorism analysis is that the available data are sparse for probability of attack, probability of 
failure given an attack, and probability of consequence occurrence given a failure.  The proba-
bilistic mathematics can provide quantitative estimates for these variables, but these estimates 
often over-represent the degree of knowledge and confidence in the results than is warranted.  
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2.1.2 Deductive Assessment Methods 
While inductive risk assessment methods start with the definition of potential risk scenarios, 
deductive risk assessment methods start with the identification of consequences that are possible 
for a specific system.  Deductive reasoning is then used to identify whether there are 
mechanisms by which those consequences can be achieved, and if so, to identify the scenarios or 
combinations of events that can cause those consequences to be realized.  Deductive methods are 
by nature systematic “top-down” methods, which, if exercised in a disciplined manner, will 
coach the analyst into deductively identifying the complete list of possible causes for the 
analyzed consequence. 
 
2.1.2.1 Fault Tree Analysis 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) [Roberts et al. 1981] is the most common deductive logic-based risk 
assessment technique.  FTA uses deductive reasoning, as expressed by logic diagrams, to 
determine how a particular undesired event can occur.  The purpose of the logic diagram is to 
illustrate the individual steps in the deductive reasoning process so that others can understand 
not only the results (how and why things fail), but also the method by which those results were 
obtained (why these elements contribute to system failure).  The logic diagram is constructed 
using the method of immediate cause in which one finds the immediate, necessary, and sufficient 
conditions for each deductive logical step to be satisfied.  This method, also known as the “rule 
of small steps,” helps ensure the logical completeness of the fault tree model by ensuring the 
completeness of the logic at each small step.  The premise is that by being logically complete at 
each small logical step, and allowing the overall logic of the fault tree model to dictate the 
assembly of these individual logical statements, one has some confidence in the completeness of 
the overall logical model. 
 
Once the fault tree logic diagram is constructed, it is generally solved to find the minimal cut 
sets.  Each minimal cut set represents one set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
occurrence of the undesired event that the fault tree was constructed to investigate (system 
failure, for example).  It is, in essence, a definition of one scenario that results in system failure.  
The overall group of minimal cut sets then represents the universe of possible scenarios that will 
lead to this undesired event (subject to the limited scope of the analysis).  These qualitative 
results can then be used to provide quantitative insights because, when a probability of 
occurrence is associated with each basic event in each cut set, one can determine an overall 
probability for each cut set scenario and rank them accordingly.  Furthermore, one can dissect 
the cut set results using simple mathematical manipulations to determine the importance of 
individual basic events to the overall risk performance of the system. 
 
While FTA is a very structured and systematic way to assess a single system; it can also 
accurately represent the interactions among multiple systems.  It is not unusual to model 
complex interactions among systems using event trees and let the causes for each event tree 
event be defined using FTA.  In addition, FTA is one of the few techniques that adequately treat 
common mode and common cause failures.  FTA also allows the analyst to consider the effects 
of human operators and automatic control systems on these individual failure scenarios through 
the application of “recovery events” to cut sets on a case-by-case basis. 
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The principal drawback to FTA is that it often represents time-dependent scenarios poorly.  In 
addition, because a fault tree is an acyclic graph, it can be difficult to represent the behavior of 
systems that contain feedback loops or other circular dependencies in a fault tree model.   
 
One variant of the FTA is Logic Evolved Decision (LED) analysis that is based on linked logic 
models, where each logic model is a directed graph called a process tree [Eisenhawer et al. 
2003].  Two process trees are used for the decision analysis:  a possibility tree that represents 
alternative attack scenarios, and an inference tree that defines how risk will be used to rank order 
the possibility tree scenarios.  The risk evaluation uses approximate reasoning (fuzzy sets) for 
comparison of qualitative factors. 
 
2.1.3 Other Types of Logical Models 
2.1.3.1 Influence Diagrams 
An influence diagram is an acyclic probabilistic network that consists of nodes and arcs [Jae and 
Apostoklakis 1992].  The nodes can represent system states, decisions, or chance or deterministic 
occurrences, while the arcs represent the conditional dependencies among these occurrences.  
The nodes ultimately influence a “value node” that quantifies the consequences for each possible 
combination of occurrences and system states.  Conditional probabilities can be applied within 
the model nodes to represent the probability that a particular event happens given specific 
conditions in the other nodes to which it is connected (i.e., the states, decisions, or events that 
influence this node).  Thus, an influence diagram consists of four distinct parts: the nodes, the 
influences upon the nodes (the dependencies among the nodes, as represented by the arcs), the 
conditional dependencies within each node upon other nodes in the model, and the conditional 
probabilities themselves. 
 
The influence diagram method is conceptually similar to the event tree, decision tree, and fault 
tree methods described earlier.  It can be applied as both an inductive and a deductive modeling 
tool in that one can begin either with the value node (the objective, as is done with fault tree 
analysis) or with a suitable initial condition (as is done with event tree and decision tree 
analysis).  One could even begin with some of each and work both inductively and deductively 
as necessary until the model is complete.  In addition, the method is not limited to simple binary 
events as is FTA.  This flexibility makes the influence diagram an important tool to the risk 
analyst.  Recent methods for solving influence diagrams [Jansma et al. 1996], which emphasize 
the development of “paths” (similar to ETA), have enabled influence diagrams to produce highly 
valuable risk assessment results.   
 
2.1.3.2 Markov Models 
Another type of logical model, the Markov model [McCormick 1981) is a directed graph that 
captures the concepts of system states and probabilistic transitions between states.  To build a 
Markov model, an analyst examines every relevant configuration of a system – both functional 
and nonfunctional configurations – and defines them to be states of the system.  The analyst then 
defines the probability of transition from each state to every other state (as a function of time and 
LDRD—Critical Infrastructure Systems of Systems Assessment Methodology 
 
 20
other factors) to complete the model.  State transitions that are precluded for physical reasons are 
assigned a transition probability of zero. 
 
Markov models provide a natural, direct representation, through the use of cycles, of systems 
that embody feedback loops, systems whose components are repairable, and systems in which 
component failures interact.  Recall that fault trees and event trees are acyclic graphs and, hence, 
do not readily accommodate these system characteristics.  The two basic forms of Markov 
models are chains and processes.  A Markov chain uses matrix multiplication in discrete time to 
obtain state transition probabilities.  A Markov process uses a set of differential equations over 
continuous time.  Relative to the other techniques discussed, Markov processes require a more 
sophisticated understanding of mathematics for their solution.  In fact, most Markov models of 
real systems suffer from “state explosion” and hence are difficult to solve, requiring simulation.  
Complete path or scenario information is not a natural output of a Markov model. 
 
An interesting application of Markov modeling is found in the continuous event tree 
methodology [Devooght and Smitds 1992a, Smitds and Devooght 1994].  In this method, the 
branching operations within an event tree model are viewed as state transitions within the 
framework of a Markov model.  This allows the analyst to determine the population of each state 
(and, hence, of each branch within the event tree model) as a function of time.  The method has 
been extended to a semi-Markov process to allow for the state and branch transition probabilities 
to vary as a function of the length of time the system has spent in that state [Devooght and 
Smitds 1992b].   
 
Another approach uses Markov Latent Effects (MLE) to quantify imprecise subjective metrics 
through possibilistic or fuzzy mathematics, which are then aggregated using weighted sums to 
rank the credibility of various threat scenarios (Tidwell et al., 2004).  The latent effects represent 
the influence that one decision element has on another.  This approach explicitly evaluates the 
threat potential, recognizing that full probabilistic assessment is not possible due to a lack of 
experiences to provide probabilistic data sets.   
 
2.1.3.3 Object-Based Methods 
Another class of logic-based risk assessment methodologies owes its origins to object-oriented 
modeling methods developed for computer science.  In an object-based risk assessment model 
[Wyss et al. 1999, Wyss et al. 2001, Wyss et al. 2004], one builds an object model to represent 
the behavior of the system to be analyzed (including normal and abnormal modes of operation, 
deterministic, and probabilistic behavior), and then queries this object model to extract risk 
models that have similar characteristics to those generated using the methodologies described 
above.  If the object model is built using appropriate techniques, these models can be used to 
automatically extract many inductive risk assessment results from a single object model through 
various probabilistic simulation techniques.  This feature is a great strength of the object 
modeling technique, because it does not require a human analyst to develop and verify each 
individual risk assessment model.  While the extraction of a deductive risk assessment model 
from an object model is possible, it is generally more cumbersome to build and check the object 
models than to build the needed deductive logic models from scratch, so it is rarely done. 
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2.1.3.4 Expert Judgment Methods 
Some aspects of risk assessment process are amenable to assessment by expert judgment.  The 
security analyst may enlist the services of a subject matter expert to answer specific security 
questions related to the likelihood of attack, the effectiveness of the security system, or the 
consequences that might occur because of a successful attack.  The subject matter expert 
responds with either a qualitative or a quantitative estimate of the relevant parameters. 
 
Many factors influence the quality of the information that can be elicited from subject matter ex-
perts.  Examples include the qualifications of the experts consulted and the time and resources 
available to the expert to gather and explore background information.  However, two key aspects 
of the questions asked have a profound affect on the quality of the expert elicitation results.  
[Meyer and Booker 1991]  First, experts provide far more accurate results when asked to com-
pare among two or more options or situations than when asked to evaluate a single situation or 
question in a vacuum.  Second, experts provide more accurate results to simple questions than to 
complex questions.  In fact, subject matter experts will often decompose complex questions 
and/or construct their own comparison cases during the analysis process.  Documented methods 
are available to assist in this process, some of which are described in this section. 
 
One method for obtaining information from experts is to ask the experts to place the importance 
or severity of the various options or scenarios on an arbitrary scale, which may be qualitative 
(i.e., verbal descriptors) or numerical.  For example, consequences can be ranked by placing the 
possible outcomes and/or consequences on an arbitrary scale that represents a consensus des-
cription of how “bad” one outcome is in relation to another.  One might describe consequences 
using words like “minimal,” “acceptable,” or “catastrophic,” or one might use positive numbers 
that range from zero (nothing bad has happened) to some maximum value which represents the 
worst thing that can possibly happen in the context of the analysis.  Some applications have set 
this maximum consequence to 1.0 as a matter of convenience (for many years, the DOE nuclear 
consequence scale ranged from 0.0 to 1.0), (DOE Design Basis Threat, prior to 2001) while 
others have set it to more arbitrary values (the telecommunications outage index ranges from 0.0 
to 333.33).  [ATIS 1997a, ATIS 1997b]  The actual range selected will depend more upon the 
planned uses of the resulting values than on the specifics of the risk assessment. 
 
Rankings can be assigned on an arbitrary scale using a number of different methods.  If there is 
consensus regarding the relative severity or importance of various outcomes or issues, this 
consensus can be represented numerically on an appropriate scale.  Frequently the resulting 
numerical values are rounded in order to avoid giving a false impression regarding the level of 
precision involved in the consequence specification.  Such a scale can also be imposed on 
analysts as a matter of policy by decision-makers.  Yet, even here, the actual values are often 
arrived at by consensus among the community of decision-makers. 
 
A second method for eliciting expert judgment involves performing pairwise comparisons 
among the various outcomes or issues of interest.  Pairwise comparison methods (e.g., the Vital 
Issues Process, or VIP) [Engi and Glicken-Turnley 1995, Engi 1997] require those in the 
stakeholder and/or decision maker community to compare the various outcomes or issues in a 
pairwise manner to establish a consensus ranking among them.  This process can be helpful 
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when there is not an a priori consensus regarding their relative severity or importance because it 
provides a logical framework for the discussion and resolution of differences and inconsistencies 
within the community.  The various outcomes or issues can be assigned numerical values either 
by consensus from the resultant ranking, or, when full consensus does not exist, by obtaining 
consensus values for a few of them and then grouping or interpolating the remaining outcomes or 
issues with respect to those pegged values. 
 
A third method for conducting expert judgment evaluations is somewhat more mathematically 
rigorous.  The Analytic Hierarchy Process [Saaty 1988, Saaty 1990] is a multi-objective multi-
criterion approach to the decision-making process that uses hierarchical decomposition of a 
complex consequence relationship into simpler parts and recomposition based on structured 
expert judgment.  [Meyer and Booker 1991]  The complex relationship is broken down into a 
series of independent (to the degree possible) criteria that contribute to the high-level 
consequence.  The relative weights of these criteria are established by pairwise comparison in 
which numerical values are assigned to verbal descriptors of the relative importance of each 
factor with respect to every other factor.  Examples of the verbal descriptors include “equal 
importance of both elements”, “strong importance of one element over the other”, and “extreme 
importance of one element over the other”.  Practitioners of the method indicate that pairwise 
comparison among more than nine elements is very difficult, so more complex relationships 
should be broken down into simpler relationships and using hierarchical decomposition.  The 
numerical values related to the verbal descriptors are ultimately placed into matrix form, and it is 
asserted that the principal eigenvector for that matrix represents the relative importance of each 
element to the overall result, while the eigenvalue represents a measure of the consistency 
among the verbal descriptors derived from the pairwise comparison.  Using this method, one 
develops what is essentially a hierarchical linear utility function that can be evaluated to obtain 
consequence values for the various consequence outcomes.  All resulting values are between 
zero and one.  The method has seen many applications, but can produce questionable results 
either when consequences are highly nonlinear or when the contributing criteria in the 
hierarchical decomposition are not independent. 
 
Regardless of the method selected for eliciting comparisons from experts, the decision-makers 
and stakeholders need to agree that the resultant values are a fair representation of their beliefs 
regarding the relative severity or importance of the various outcomes.  This is especially impor-
tant in relation to arbitrary numerical consequence scales because there are no objective conse-
quence values or calculations that can be used to benchmark this consequence scale. 
 
Two expert-judgment-based methods were developed to support analysis of water and waste-
water utilities, as follows: 
 
y Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool (VSAT) [Rees, D.C. and K. I. Rubin 2003] – The 
VSAT is a structured risk-based methodology and security planning software that 
provides qualitative risk estimates for users without formal background in risk 
assessment.  The software uses the risk equation (Risk = Consequence * Vulnerability 
* Occurrence) and provides qualitative comparators (low, moderate, high, very high) 
for the user to select in an expert-judgment assignment of failure for a specific 
threat/asset combination.  Consequence is also assigned in comparison tables with up 
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to five different attributes.  Risks are then established in a 2-dimensional matrix of 
Consequence and Vulnerability using the same qualitative comparators for use in 
identifying potential for risk reduction measures. 
y Risk Assessment Methodology – Water (RAM-W) [RAM-W, 2001] – The RAM-W is 
a qualitative risk assessment methodology that uses a comprehensive approach for use 
by a trained risk analyst using a set of tools that include pairwise comparisons, fault 
trees, consequence analysis and adversary path analysis.  The approach begins with a 
determination of critical/mission functions, undesirable consequences, and the specific 
assets that need to be protected.  The RAM-W included a cyber security assessment 
based on relative ranking from a best practices analysis; however, the methodology 
lacked an explicit link between physical security and cyber security.   
 
2.2 Classification Scheme for Risk Assessment Methods 
The risk assessment methods described in section 2.1 were developed principally to either 
explore the risk of functional engineering failures for complex systems or elicit perceived risk 
from expert opinion using comparison/contrast.  In the context of cyber security, most efforts 
could be categorized into principally Red Team exercises or best practice checklists.  As the 
team was seeking a method for analysis of combined physical and cyber security risk, a common 
structure to identify relationships and pattern end usage became necessary.  Campbell and Stamp 
[2004] created the classification scheme shown in Table 1 to meet this need.   
Table 1.  Classification Scheme for Risk Assessment Methods 
Approach 
Level 
Temporal Functional Comparative 
Abstract Expert Engagement Sequence Principles 
Mid-Level Collaborative Exercise Assistant Best Practice 
Concrete Owner Compliance Testing Matrix Audit 
 
The project team recognized that numerous Comparative approaches existed for cyber that could 
benefit from the addition of physical security.  This led to the development of the Screening Tool 
described in Section 3.  The Functional methods such as RAM-W [RAM-W 2001] and the 
Vulnerability Self Assessment Tool (VSAT) [VSAT; Rees and Rubin 2002] provided a com-
parative context, but lacked the quantitative basis desired to embed improved rigor in the risk 
estimates.  An alternate approach founded on deductive logic was developed with a focus on 
system level risk (instead of detailed component level phenomena) to directly embed cyber 
security within an existing physical security structure.  This concept became the basis for the 
Cyber-Physical Security Assessment Methodology (CPSAM) described in Section 4.  The 
Temporal approaches for physical security (e.g., Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation, JCATS) 
and cyber security (e.g., IDART1) were considered to be too complex for an initial effort to 
create an analysis method for blended physical and cyber security. 
 
                                                 
1 Information Design Assurance Red Team (IDART™) at Sandia National Laboratories.  http://www.sandia.gov/idart.  
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Figure 2 depicts how a facility’s existing security level helps define the type of security assess-
ment tool that is best used to evaluate the security risks at that facility.  Existing security levels 
that are low are best evaluated with Screening and Best Practice Methods because the security 
systems are not sufficiently sophisticated to warrant Functional or Engagement/Red Team 
Assessments.  However, evaluation of more sophisticated security systems requires greater cost, 
time, or input detail due to the complexity of these systems. 
 
Existing Security Level
Cost, 
Time, 
Input
Detail 
Screening
Best Practice
Functional 
Assessment
Engagement/
Red Team
 
Figure 2.  Security Assessment Tool Class Categories 
 
 
3. Screening Tools 
3.1 Sandia Quickstart Baseline Tool 
The Sandia Quickstart Baseline Tool (SQBT) is a generic, automated tool based on the COBIT 
QuickstartTM [COBIT Quickstart 2003] from ISACA that was initially developed by this LDRD 
effort.  The QuickstartTM tool was improved from a paper-based system to an HTML 
implementation by the addition of two information channels, scoring capabilities, and an 
evaluation function [Campbell and Smith 2006].  Figure 3 is a screen shot of the first two control 
objectives as displayed by the SQBT.  The eight scoring columns are shown as radio buttons.  
The radio buttons enable the user to provide a raw score that indicates the implementation status 
of the user’s organization for that particular control objective.   
 
The “Quickstart Baseline” is an assessment tool based on “control objectives” (described below) 
within the structure of a maturity model.  Like COBIT, the Baseline has a three-tiered, 
hierarchical structure.  The Baseline consists of a set of 62 control objectives, organized into 30 
“Processes” which are, in turn, organized into four “Domains”.  Each control objective is 
intended to describe some aspect of information assurance. 
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Figure 3.  Sandia Quickstart Baseline Tool (two control objective examples) 
 
The SQBT provides a scoring capability that includes weights, ranks, and thresholds.  A “Sub-
mit” button follows the presentation of the control objectives in the HTML file.  When the user 
clicks on this button, the SQBT multiplies the raw score for each control objective by the weight 
for that control objective to arrive at a weighted score.  The sum of the weighted scores is the 
cumulative score.  If ranks are defined, the SQBT then determines the rank using the cumulative 
score, as explained below.  If thresholds are defined, the SQBT uses thresholds in determination 
of rank.  For each Domain, the SQBT shows the following: 
 
 1.  the lowest-numbered control objective in the Domain with the lowest raw score;  
 2.  the lowest-numbered control objective in the Domain with the highest raw score;  
 3.  the average raw score for all the control objectives in the Domain; and 
 4.  the standard deviation of the raw scores for all the control objectives in the Domain.  
 
Figure 4 shows part of a sample scoring window.  Not shown in Figure 4 are two text boxes, one 
for the rank and a second for a list of control objectives along with the raw score each would 
need to be in order for the cumulative score to move to the next higher rank.  If ranks are not 
defined, the headers for both boxes are shown but the boxes are empty. 
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Figure 4.  Sample Scoring Window 
3.2 Critical Infrastructure Control System Test, Analysis and Reporting Tool 
The Critical Infrastructure Control System Test, Analysis and Reporting Tool (CICSTART) Sur-
vey and Questionnaire Tool adaptively poses questions to control systems personnel to assist the 
self-assessor or inexpert assessor of control system cyber-security.  The questionnaire tool 
adaptively poses survey questions based on tasks that each respondent indicates he or she per-
forms.  For example, respondents who indicate they perform the task install computer systems or 
platforms will answer questions that assume familiarity with computer security fundamentals.  
Other respondents who do not share the responsibility to install computer systems will not 
answer these same questions.  In this way, questions are asked only of those respondents who are 
likely to be able to answer them.  The survey itself consists of questions drawn from a variety of 
sources, including the following: 
 
z Sandia’s past experience in assessing control systems, 
z COBIT® Control Practices [IT Governance Institute 2004], and 
z SCADA Security Policy Framework™ [Stamp and Kilman 2005]. 
 
The survey broadly addresses control systems security from governance and policy to security 
implementation and physical security of cyber assets.  This breadth of coverage helps the self-
assessor or inexpert assessor of control systems to more completely identify security problems, 
whether they are technical vulnerabilities in particular computer platforms or failings in security 
awareness and training programs.  The survey and questionnaire tool even help the experienced 
assessor to achieve more consistent results and to better direct their discretionary efforts. 
LDRD—Critical Infrastructure Systems of Systems Assessment Methodology 
 
 27
3.2.1 The CICSTART Survey 
The CICSTART Survey finds its roots in Sandia’s past experience assessing control systems in a 
number of critical infrastructure sectors, especially the water sector.  Over time, Sandia assessors 
developed and maintained a large set of interview questions used to question site personnel. 
Answers to these questions often revealed security problems and directed assessors to dig deeper 
in particular problem areas. 
 
The CICSTART Survey builds upon the strengths of these expert questions, extending coverage 
to include major COBIT® Control Practices and organizing the questions by the SCADA 
Security Policy Framework™.  Question categories include data security, platform security, 
communication security, personnel security, configuration management, audit, applications, 
physical security, manual operations, and security program. 
 
The survey approach presently allows assessors to gather simple statistics such as the number 
and percentage of respondents who perform a given task or respond to a question in a given way. 
Such statistics help assessors better allocate their time and budget.  For example, if nearly all 
respondents agree that a particular security control is in place, there may be little benefit in 
verifying the fact relative to investigating another control that the responsible personnel indicate 
fails to perform its intended function.  The survey approach also allows for future use in 
evaluating the effectiveness of security awareness and training programs. 
 
Survey questions are linked to additional metadata including references to relevant COBIT® 
Control Practices, task prerequisites respondents must select before they will answer a particular 
question, and triggers or simple Boolean rules that indicate the assessor should look further 
based on accumulated responses to a question.  Survey administration tools may use this 
metadata to implement advanced features both for survey respondents and for assessors.  For 
example, the CICSTART Questionnaire Tool uses the metadata to adapt the survey to each 
respondent, limiting the number of questions each respondent must endure and raising the 
overall quality of survey results, and to automatically generate a report template of findings and 
a checklist for further investigation for the assessor.  
 
Survey questions are formatted as plain text using a simple XML schema, providing tool and 
platform independence.  Using standard XML tools, the survey may be distributed in a variety of 
ways, including by paper and by computer or Internet applications. 
 
3.2.2 The CICSTART Questionnaire Tool 
The CICSTART Questionnaire Tool is one means of administering the CICSTART Survey.  The 
questionnaire tool addresses several important requirements including 
 
z ease and flexibility of deployment, 
z controlled access to survey results, 
z no installation or configuration required of survey respondents, 
z automatic report and checklist generation, and 
z access to summary statistics. 
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To address the first three requirements, the CICSTART Questionnaire Tool is a web application 
on a VMWare virtual machine.  The free VMWare Player application is available for Windows 
and GNU/Linux operating systems, allowing the questionnaire tool to be deployed in a variety of 
ways: in particular, hosted by the assessors and accessible via the Internet; hosted on-site on a 
single-purpose, local-area network and accessible in person; and hosted on-site on a corporate 
Intranet and accessible from corporate computers.  Figure 5 shows the start page for the 
CICSTART Questionnaire Tool.  
 
 
Figure 5.  CICSTART Questionnaire Tool Start Page 
When hosted on site (either on a local-area network or corporate Intranet), the assessed site 
maintains controlled access to the survey results.  This option will often be the most suitable 
deployment option, especially for use in a self-assessment.  Figure 6 shows an example of the 
survey questionnaire format. 
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Figure 6.  Example Survey Questions 
Because the questionnaire tool is a web application, respondents only need a standards-
compliant web browser and network access to the web-application server.  The questionnaire 
tool is built on the open-source PHPSurveyor project [PHPSurveyor], customized to support the 
additional report and checklist generation capabilities.  Another benefit of this implementation is 
that the survey may be taken concurrently by any number of site personnel.  
 
When all required respondents have completed the survey, the assessor may generate a checklist 
of issues (Figure 7) that require further investigation and verification.  Survey metadata known 
as triggers allow the questionnaire tool to generate items for the checklist, usually when no 
consensus answer to a question exists or when responsible personnel cannot answer a question. 
 
 
Figure 7.  Example Checklist 
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Related to the checklist, the questionnaire tool may also generate a report template (Figure 8). 
Items included in the report template are frequently related to industry standard security 
practices that by consensus of respondents are not implemented.  Other items included in the 
report template are questions inconsistently answered, for example, when half the respondents 
answer in one way and the other half in a second way.  Such discrepancies often indicate 
inadequate security awareness and training. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Report Template 
Finally, the questionnaire tool provides simple access to summary statistics (see Figure 9). 
 
 
 
Figure 9.  Example Survey Statistics 
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3.2.3 Operational Test 
An alpha test for the CICSTART Survey and Questionnaire Tool was performed during the 
HLD-eCAM Energy Annex Training project of various state National Guard units to conduct 
security assessments of control systems.  The test used the questionnaire tool deployed in two 
manners, first on a stand-alone, local-area network set up in a conference room on site and then 
on a corporate Intranet accessible to all relevant site personnel. 
 
During the test, six site personnel completed the full survey.  The survey results revealed several 
insights that were included in the National Guard out-brief to the site ownership.  Difficulties 
arose in merging the survey results from the two questionnaire tool deployments, demonstrating 
the need to implement the capability into the questionnaire tool. 
 
The alpha test demonstrated the further need to help inexpert cyber-security assessors explain 
when, how, and why vulnerabilities in control systems become security problems that need to be 
addressed.  This need is addressed in part by report and checklist generation.  But, the alpha test 
did not include report or checklist generation.  These features were later tested in the beta test. 
A beta test used a later iteration of the questionnaire tool with the added report and checklist 
generation features.  Responsibility to use the questionnaire tool was turned over to the National 
Guard, with assistance from a Sandia assessor.  For the beta test, the questionnaire tool develop-
ment team was unable to add the ability to adapt the survey to the knowledge, skills, and 
responsibilities of each survey respondent.  Those who completed the survey during the beta test 
reported that it was simply too long and that they were unable to fully answer some of the 
questions, confirming the need to adaptively pose only those survey questions relevant to each 
respondent.  But, unexpectedly, the need to adapt the survey to each respondent extends to 
adaptively offering answer choices − a question may be important to ask of two different sets of 
personnel, but not all answer choices should be offered to each set.  The next iteration of the 
questionnaire tool provides this level of adaptability.  Finally, beta testers found the wording of 
some survey questions to be awkward.  These questions will be rewritten in the next iteration of 
the CICSTART Survey. 
 
4. Risk Estimation and Uncertainty 
When evaluating risk from a random event, such as an earthquake, the analyses implicitly 
assume that our uncertainty is aleatory (stochastic or random).  The probability measure of 
uncertainty is then well suited for uncertainty that is aleatory in nature.  However, an adversarial 
act is not a random event; it is an intentional act by a thinking, malevolent person.  Much of our 
uncertainty of the risk of a cyber attack is epistemic (state of knowledge) even if we assume that 
the probability of attack is 1.  Neither the physical attack nor the cyber attack are a random 
events — they are carefully selected, planned, and executed by the adversary—but we have 
significant uncertainty as to what the adversaries will do and what their capabilities (e.g., “zero 
day” exploits) are.  
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To estimate the effectiveness of physical and cyber security system elements, uncertainty should 
be considered, but there is insufficient information to justify the use of probability as the 
measure of uncertainty for cyber security.  We have applied the belief/plausibility measure of 
uncertainty from the Dempster/ Shafer Theory of Evidence to consistently capture the 
considerable epistemic (state of knowledge) uncertainty associated with estimating the 
effectiveness of cyber security elements.  Appendix A summarizes the belief/plausibility 
measure for uncertainty.  However, there is much more knowledge in physical security 
vulnerability analysis such that probabilistic measures of uncertainty can be used.  The challenge 
for this project was to find a mathematical basis that can accommodate varying states of 
knowledge and estimate vulnerability, without over-representing the degree of knowledge. 
 
This section provides a technique for using the belief/plausibility measure to estimate the effec-
tiveness of a cyber security system.  Since probability is a special case of belief/plausibility, the 
technique can also be used for evaluating combined cyber/physical security elements where the 
effectiveness of the physical security system elements can be modeled probabilistically.  The 
believe/plausibility mathematics also can include the extra-special case of absolute certainty, 
where there is no uncertainty in the estimating parameter.  
 
A Java computer code, BeliefConvolution, was written to convolute belief/plausibility dis-
tributions for algebraic operations on independent variables, including probabilistic OR (union), 
and to calculate belief/plausibility for fuzzy sets.  The code allows aggregation of degrees of 
evidence into bins (linear or log spaced) to reduce the number of degrees of evidence during the 
successive convolution of a large number of variables. 
 
Parts of the BeliefConvolution code were incorporated into the overall Java tool described in 
Section 5 of this report.2 
 
4.1 Evaluation Technique 
The goal is to evaluate Conditional Risk, CR, for a facility 
 
 CR = PS|A × C (Eqn. 1) 
 
where PS|A is the conditional probability of adversary success (S) given an attack (A) and C is the 
consequence given adversary success.  The risk is conditional because it assumes the adversary 
initiates the attack; overall risk would also include a consideration of the likelihood that the 
adversary initiates the attack against the facility and target of interest. 
 
CR is dependent on the threat scenario, which includes the adversary capabilities and the target 
of interest to the adversary in the facility.  Thus, a given facility has a set of conditional risk (CR) 
values, one for each threat scenario.  Let k denote a threat scenario. 
 
 CRk = PS|A, k × Ck (Eqn. 2) 
 
                                                 
2  Specifically, calculations involving expected value intervals developed for BeliefConvolution were incorporated in the overall tool. 
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where CRk is the conditional risk for threat scenario k. 
 
PS|A, k is comprised of many factors based on the specific details of the threat scenario.  Ck is 
comprised of many different types of consequences.  So the evaluation of each of these terms 
consists of an evaluation of each constituent factor. 
 
The project team has chosen a path analysis technique to model the cyber-related actions of the 
threat scenario.  Since PS|A, k  is a probability, it will be composed of numerous lower-level 
probabilities associated with the threat scenario along the paths of concern. 
 
Let j denote a path associated with threat scenario k.  For each path there is a risk 
 
 CRk, j = PS|A, k, j × Ck (Eqn. 3) 
 
We are dealing with intentional adversary acts, not random failures, so the adversary can choose 
a specific path.  Therefore the measure for  CRk is not the sum of the CRk, j,, but is the CRk, j with 
the highest value.3  For paths with the same CRk ,j, the one with the highest Ck is of most 
concern.4  The measure for CRk is  
 
 Measure for CRk = max {CRk, j | all j} (Eqn. 4) 
 
Similarly, the measure for CR is the highest CRk, where for equal CRk the highest Ck is of more 
concern 
 
 Measure for CR = max {CRk | all k} (Eqn. 5) 
 
Let C denote overall consequence for which Ck is the value for threat scenario k. 
 
C is the sum of all the constituent types of consequences.  Let m denote a specific type of 
consequence. 
 
 Ck = ∑Ck, m (Eqn. 6) 
 
where the Cm have been scaled as appropriate for summation.  For example, a death may be 
equivalent to $106, where dollars, or “$”, is a measure of the willingness to pay to prevent a 
specific consequence.  
 
PS|A, k, j for a path j is evaluated by combining the probabilities for each edge in the path, and the 
probability for each edge is evaluated by combining the probabilities for each security primitive 
on the edge for the specific threat scenario k (see Figure 14). 
 
                                                 
3  For random acts, the measure of CRk would be the sum of the CRk, j. 
4 “Highest” based on plausibility. 
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The probabilities are combined using the algebra of probability.  Assuming independence, given 
two probabilities PX and PY for two events X and Y, the probability of both X and Y (AND or 
intersection) is Px · PY, and the probability of either X or Y (OR or union) is  Px + PY - Px · PY. 
 
Each variable has uncertainty.5  That is, a given constituent of PS|A, k, j is a probability with a 
range [0, 1] and there is uncertainty as to the exact value of the variable in that range.   
 
Similarly, each constituent of Ck, m has a range [minimum consequence, maximum consequence] 
and there is uncertainty as to the exact value of the variable in that range.  Uncertainty for a 
variable is captured by assigning a measure to the values over the range for the variable.6 
 
One widely used measure for uncertainty is probability.  But if the information available is 
nonspecific, the probability measure does not include all of the uncertainty.7  
 
Due to the lack of fidelity of the information available for evaluating intentional acts, a measure 
of uncertainty more general than probability will be used, that measure being belief/plausibility.  
Probability is a special case of belief/plausibility, so if some variables can be modeled with 
probability the use of the belief/plausibility measure is still valid.8   
 
It is important to note that each possible value of a variable is calculated by performing the 
mathematical operations of concern on the values of the constituent variables.  The uncertainty 
in each value is calculated by convoluting uncertainty distributions for the constituent variables. 
For example, for three variables A, B, and C the possible values for D = (A + B) C are {d | d = (a 
+ b) c where a is over A, b is over B, and c is over C}.  The uncertainty for each d is evaluated 
by convoluting the uncertainty distributions for A, B, and C using the mathematics appropriate 
for the measure being used for uncertainty (i.e., belief/plausibility for our evaluation). 
 
4.1.1 Simple Example of Belief/Plausibility 
This section provides a simple example of the use of the belief/plausibility measure for 
uncertainty.   
 
Consider two independent consequences X and Y to be added to form an overall consequence Z = 
X + Y.  For any given specific values of X and Y, x and y, Z has a specific value z =  x + y.   
 
If X and Y have no uncertainty, then both X and Y have one value, x1 and y1, and Z has the one 
value z1 =  x1 + y1, and there is no uncertainty for Z.   
                                                 
5  Here variable means a random variable, say X, which is a mapping from the Sample Space (S) of interest to the Reals (R).  X: S→R.  S is the 
domain, R is the codomain, and X(S) is the range.  To be precise, “values of a random variable” means the range of the random variable. 
6  Only one value will occur, but there is uncertainty as to which value will occur. 
7  Nonspecificity is a type of uncertainty.  See Appendix A. 
8  For a variable such as PS|A, k  quantified as a probability, the term probability is used in the objective, or frequency sense as the value of the 
variable.  The uncertainty in the variable is measured with belief/plausibility and under certain conditions belief and plausibility both reduce 
to probability where the term probability is used in the subjective or state of knowledge sense as a measure of uncertainty.  Thus, probability 
is used to mean two different concepts: the value (objective) and the uncertainty in the value (subjective). 
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If X and Y have uncertainty, and the information about X and Y is specific enough to use 
probability as the measure of uncertainty, then the uncertainty in Z resulting from addition of all 
the possible values of X and Y is a probability calculated by convoluting the probability 
distributions for X and Y under addition to produce a probability distribution for Z. 
 
If the information about X and Y is too nonspecific to use probability as the measure of 
uncertainty, then a more general measure of uncertainty called belief/plausibility can be used.  
For many of the variables associated with the effectiveness of cyber security elements in 
countering intentional acts by adversaries, the information is too nonspecific to use probability 
and the use of a belief/plausibility measure is needed. 
 
Instead of assigning a measure of uncertainty to values of X and Y (as done with probability), 
belief/plausibility allows a measure of uncertainty to be assigned to intervals over X and Y.  For 
example, let X range from 0 to 100 and let the degrees of evidence be as follows:9 
 
0.20 for the interval [0, 10] 
0.35 for the interval [2, 25] 
0.45 for the interval [82, 100] 
 
The belief/plausibility for exceeding a given consequence can be easily evaluated.  Let x be the 
consequence to be exceeded.  The plausibility for exceeding x is the sum of all degrees of 
evidence for which the associated interval has any overlap with the interval (x, 100].  The belief 
for exceeding x is the sum of all degrees of evidence for which the associated interval lies 
(completely) within (x, 100].  For example, let x be 15; the interval of interest is (15, 100].  
Figure 10 shows the situation graphically. 
 
 
Figure 10.  Intervals for Simple Example 
Both [2, 25] and [82, 100] overlap (15, 100] so the plausibility for (15, 100] is 0.35 + 0.45 = 0.8. 
[82, 100] is the only interval that lies within (15, 100] so the belief for (15, 100] is 0.45. 
 
                                                 
9  Using standard interval symbols, [ means include and ( means exclude.  For example, [a, b] denotes all real numbers between a and b 
including a and b.  (a, b] denotes all real numbers between a and b excluding a and including b. 
0 2 10 25 82 100 
( 
15 
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The interval calculation is more complex for convolution, but is straightforward for convolution 
involving simple functions such as addition or multiplication of two constituent variables.  The 
degrees of evidence for the result are calculated by forming the relation consisting of all 2-tuples 
with the first element of the tuple an interval with a non-zero degree of evidence from the first 
variable and the second element of the tuple an interval with a non-zero degree of evidence from 
the second variable.  The degree of evidence for each tuple is the product of the two degrees of 
evidence for each element in the tuple assuming independence.  An interval for the convoluted 
result is obtained by applying the appropriate function (e.g., addition or multiplication) to the 
intervals in the tuple. 
 
For example, let X range from 1 to 20 with the following degrees of evidence and intervals: 
 
 0.8 for [2, 15] 
 0.2 for [1, 10] 
 
Let Y range from 0 to 30 with the following degrees of evidence and intervals: 
 
 0.7 for [5, 25] 
 0.3 for [0, 4] 
 
Let Z be the convolution resulting from the addition of X and Y.  Z ranges from 1 to 50.  Z has the 
following degrees of evidence for the indicated tuples: 
 
 0.8 * 0.7 for <[2, 15], [5, 25]> 
 0.8 * 0.3 for <[2, 15], [0, 4]> 
 0.2 * 0.7 for <[1, 10], [5, 25]> 
 0.2 * 0.3 for <[1, 10], [0, 4]> 
 
Since the function is addition, Z has the following degrees of evidence for the indicated intervals: 
 
 0.56 for [7, 40] 
 0.24 for [2, 19] 
 0.14 for [6, 35] 
 0.06 for [1, 14] 
 
The likelihood of exceedance for Z is shown in Figure 11.  Also, Figure 11 shows the expected 
value interval for Z.   
 
(NOTE:  Had Z been modeled using probability, belief and plausibility both become probability 
and the expected value interval is a point value, the mean.  For this case, Figure 11 would have 
one curve, probability, and a point estimate expected value, the mean of the probability 
distribution.) 
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Belief/Plausibility Exceedance Results
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Figure 11.  Belief/Plausibility for Example for Variable Z 
4.1.2 Vagueness 
To summarize results, a variable may be partitioned into various linguistic events.  This aspect 
was explored, but not incorporated into the Functional Assessment tool described in Section 5.  
For example, “Consequence” can be partitioned into “Minor”, “Moderate”, “Major”, and “Catas-
trophic”.  These linguistic terms are fuzzy sets where fuzziness reflects a type of uncertainty 
called vagueness.  Vagueness is the uncertainty in categorizing a known value of a variable.  For 
example, for a given day that is partially cloudy there is uncertainty as to the degree to which 
that day is “Sunny.”  A fuzzy set captures vagueness by allowing partial membership of a value 
in the set. 
 
Figure 12 shows a partitioning of Z into linguistic events represented by fuzzy sets.  The 
linguistic methods are available in BeliefConvolution; however, these have not been enabled in 
the methodology described in Section 5.   
 
As an example of vagueness, consider the value z = 21.  It is uncertain as to whether “21” is 
“Minor” or “Moderate” as reflected by the partial degree of membership of “21” in each of these 
fuzzy sets.  
 
Expected Value Interval: 
[5.3, 32.7] 
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Figure 12.  Linguistic Partition of Z 
A belief/plausibility interval can be calculated for each fuzzy set.  For Z, the results are shown in 
Figure 13.  These results were calculated using the BeliefConvolution code. 
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Figure 13.  Uncertainty for Linguistic Partition of Z 
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For the simple example Z = X + Y, Figure 11 is the “numerical” result and Figure 13 is the 
“linguistic” result. 
 
4.1.3 Evaluation of Conditional Risk (CR) 
CR as defined in Equation 1 can be evaluated using belief/plausibility as the measure for uncer-
tainty and that the results of the evaluation can be provided in both numeric and linguistic form. 
 
CR will be built up from its constituent factors as discussed earlier.  Each factor will have a 
numerical result (and if a linguistic partition is defined for that variable) a linguistic result, so the 
results can be provided at any level of the model.   
 
That is, CR, CRk, PS|A, k, j , Ck, and so on each have a numerical result such as that in Figure 11, 
and- given definition of a linguistic partition- a linguistic result such as that in Figure 13. 
 
Evaluation of PS|A, k 
 
For threat scenario k, PS|A, k, is built up from the PS|A, k, j as follows, using the simple example for 
two paths shown in Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 14.  Two-Path Example. 
Path 1-2-3 consists of two edges (1-2 and 2-3), and the edge from 1-2 is modeled as two parallel 
edges called [1-2]1 and [1-2]2.  Path 1-3 has one edge 1-3.  For the threat scenario of interest, two 
types of data are applied to the graph: (a) security primitives for cyber security and (b) adversary 
characteristics.  There may be numerous security primitives, such as Authentication, Network 
Access Control (NAC), and User Access Control (UAC).  Each security primitive has a level of 
“hardness”; example levels for Authentication are:  
 
• no password,  
• weak password with periodic change,  
• strong password with no periodic change,  
1 
2 
3 
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• strong passwords with periodic change, and  
• strong passwords with periodic change and limits on failed password attempts.   
 
The adversary characteristics consist of factors such as:  
• funding, 
• goal intensity 
• stealth 
• physical access 
• cyber skills 
• implementation time 
• cyber organization size 
 
Let t denote a security primitive of a certain type, for example, Authentication, and let h(t) 
denote the hardness level of that primitive (e.g., strong passwords with periodic change.)  Let 
e(j) denote an edge on a path j.  Each security primitive for each edge for each path is evaluated 
as the probability that the adversary with characteristics specified by threat scenario k can defeat 
this security primitive.10  Let Ph(t), e(j), k denote this probability.  The uncertainty for each Ph(t), e(j), k 
is captured by assigning degrees of evidence over the [0, 1] range.  Using expertise available, a 
library of degrees of evidence can be pre-defined for each Ph(t), e(j), k. 
 
For a given edge e(j) the measure for that edge is the probabilistic combination of all the Ph(t), e(j), 
k associated with that edge.  Let Pe(j), k denote the probability that the adversary successfully 
compromises edge e(j).  A higher probability implies more vulnerability.   
 
 Pe(j), k = OPERATION Ph(t), e(j), k over all t elements on the edge (Eqn. 7) 
 
where OPERATION denotes the collection of probabilistic addition and/or probabilistic multi-
plication as appropriate for the logic of the security elements on the edge.   
 
For example, let e(j) have two security primitives SP1 and SP2 with hardness levels h1(SP1) and 
h2(SP2).  If both SP1 and SP2 must be defeated, then for threat scenario k: 
 
Pe(j), k =  Ph1(SP1), e(j), k * Ph2(SP1), e(j), k.  If defeat of either SP1 or SP2 must is sufficient, then  
Pe(j), k =  Ph1(SP1), e(j), k + Ph2(SP1), e(j), k - Ph1(SP1), e(j), k * Ph2(SP1), e(j), k.   
 
Parallel edges can be used to model “OR” choices where an adversary can move from goal state 
1 to goal state 2 via either path between goal state 1 and goal state 2.  With this convention on 
any given edge, the logic then is purely “AND” since an adversary must defeat all of the security 
primitives on that particular link.  Using this convention  
 
 Pe(j), k = П Ph(t), e(j), k over all the elements on the edge (Eqn. 8) 
 
and for n parallel edges en(j), the measure for the combined edges is 
                                                 
10 Probability in the objective sense (frequency). 
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The probability for the path PS|A, k, j as is evaluated as the product of the probabilities of each 
edge in the path: 
 
 ∏=
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kjejkAS PP  (Eqn. 10) 
 
The probability for the threat scenario k is PS|A, k and is evaluated as the worst path: 
 
 PS|A, k = max {PS|A, k, j | all j paths} (Eqn. 11) 
 
since for an intentional act the adversary has the choice of paths.  (NOTE: This assumes that the 
adversary knows which path is easiest, which is a conservative assumption.  In practice, a de-
fender might use deception and operational security techniques to attempt to limit the 
adversary’s knowledge.) 
 
Evaluation of CRk 
 
The consequence Ck is evaluated as the sum of the constituent consequences m for threat 
scenario k as indicated in Equation 6.  Degrees of evidence must be assigned to each Ck, m based 
on the information available for the potential consequences for the specific target and specific 
adversary capabilities specified by threat scenario k.  Contrary to the case for the Ph(t), e(j), k, a 
library of degrees of evidence cannot be created for the Ck, m since the evidence is target-specific. 
 
After both PS|A, k and Ck have been evaluated, CRk and then CR are evaluated using Equations 2 
and 5, respectively.  
 
4.1.4 Example Calculation 
This section applies the BeliefConvolution code to an example calculation of CR.  The example 
has a great deal of uncertainty in the data to emphasize the ability of the approach to model 
highly uncertain information. 
 
For this example consider a case with two paths of concern as shown earlier in Figure 12, using 
the convention that “OR” choices are modeled as parallel edges.  One of the parallel edges for 1-
2 has two security primitives SP1 and SP2 with hardness h2(SP1) and h4(SP2).11  The other edge 
for 1-2 has one security primitive SP3 with hardness h2(SP3).  Edge 1-3 has security 
primitives/hardness: h4(SP1) and h6(SP2), and edge 2-3 has security primitive/hardness h3(SP5).  
Consider a specific threat scenario k. 
 
                                                 
11 Here, hn(SPm) denotes hardness level n for security primitive type m. 
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Assume that from the data library, the degrees of evidence for the security primitives of the 
specified hardness for the specified threat are as given in Table 2. 
Table 2.  Data for Degrees of Evidence for Security Primitives for Threat Scenario k 
Security Primitive and 
Hardness Interval Degree of Evidence 
h2(SP1)   [0.3,  0.6] 0.7 
 [0.4,  0.5] 0.2 
 [0.5, 0.75] 0.1 
h4(SP2) [0.5, 0.7] 0.2 
 [0.2, 0.8] 0.8 
h2(SP3) [0.4, 0.8] 1.0 
h4(SP1)   [0.2, 0.4] 0.9 
 [0.2, 0.6] 0.1 
h6(SP2) [0.1, 0.4] 0.4 
 [0, 0.5] 0.6 
h3(SP5) [0.5,  0.9] 0.5 
 [0.4,  0.8] 0.2 
 [0, 1.0] 0.3 
 
The probability for path 1-3 is: 
 
P[h4(SP1)]  * P[h6(SP2)] 
 
The probability for path 1-2-3 is: 
 
{P[h2(SP1)]  * P[h4(SP2)] + P[h2(SP3)] – P[h4(SP2)] * P[h2(SP3)] * P[h2(SP3)]  } * 
P[h3(SP5)]. 
 
Using the results of the calculation and using the upper expected value interval for ranking paths, 
Path 1-2-3 is worse (higher probability of adversary success) than path 1-2, so using Equation 9, 
PS|A, k is PS|A, k, 1-2-3. 
 
Figure 15 shows the numerical result for path 1-2-3. 
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Belief/Plausibility Exceedance Results
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Figure 15.  Numerical Result for Probability of Adversary Success (Path 1-2-3) 
Let C be comprised of two types of consequences with evidence for threat scenario k as indicated 
in Table 3. 
Table 3.  Consequences for Example 
Consequence Interval Degrees of Evidence 
Ck, 1 [10
4, 106] 0.55 
 [103, 107] 0.45 
Ck, 2 [10
2, 106] 0.60 
 [104, 107] 0.33 
 [101, 105] 0.07 
 
Figure 16 shows the results for Ck. 
 
Expected value 
Interval: [0.15, 0.81] 
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Belief/Plausibility Exceedance Results
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Figure 16.  Numerical Result for Consequence 
Figure 17 shows the results for CRk. 
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Figure 17.  Numerical Result for Conditional Risk 
Expected Value Interval: 
[9.3x103, 8.9x106] 
Expected Value Interval: 
[1.4x103, 7.3x106] 
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Assume that Conditional Risk is defined linguistically as in Figure 18. 
 
Linguistic Partition for Conditional Risk
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Figure 18.  Linguistic Partition for Conditional Risk 
Using the linguistic partition of Figure 18, the linguistic result for the example can be calculated 
using BeliefConvolution.  These results are provided in Figure 19 and show, for this example, the 
state of knowledge is highly uncertain for the Moderate and Major descriptors for risk.  These 
results are provided in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19.  Linguistic Result for Conditional Risk 
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4.2 Presentation of Results for a Collection of Scenarios 
The detailed numerical results for each scenario are presented in Figure 20, Figure 21, and 
Figure 22.  In application, a number of scenarios will be evaluated and the expected value 
interval can be used to summarize the results for a large number of scenarios. 
 
The following variables will be evaluated for a number of specific threat scenarios:12 
• PEpo, the probability of PPS success for a physical-only attack 
• PEc, the probability of cyber system success for a cyber-only attack 
• PEpz, the probability of PPS success given defeat of cyber controlled elements 
• Cn, the consequence of type n (e.g., deaths, outage weeks, etc.)  
• C, the sum of all Cn using the common measure of $, willingness to pay. 
 
A threat scenario includes: adversary resources (attributes and knowledge), target, and attack 
plan.  Let “k” denote a specific threat scenario.  Each of the variables is dependent on the threat 
scenario, so the evaluation will consist of the set of values {PEpo k, PEc k, PEpz k, Cn k, Ck} for each 
threat scenario. 
 
For PEpo k and PEpz k, a point value will be calculated.  It is assumed that the point value is the 
mean of a probability distribution if these variables were evaluated by convoluting probability 
distributions for all the constituent terms. 
 
For PEc k, Cn k, and Ck a belief/plausibility distribution will be calculated, and an expected value 
interval of the distribution will be calculated. 
 
Ck = ∑Cn k where convolution is used to propagate uncertainty.13  Similarly, other measures can 
be calculated using convolution.  For example, PEc k ·C is the conditional risk for a cyber only 
attack.  PEcp k ≡ 1 – (1- PEc k) ·(1- PEpz k) is another measure. 
 
Let [E*(X), and E*(X)] denote the expected value (interval) for variable X based on a 
belief/plausibility measure; for the special case of probability E*(X) = E*(X) = Mean(X), the 
mean of the probability distribution.  All of the variables of interest (probabilities and 
consequences) have non-negative values, and assuming the variables are noninteractive 
(independent for probability), for any two variables X and Y:  
• E*(X+Y) = E*(X) + E*(Y) and E*(X+Y) = E*(X) + E*(Y) 
• E*(X·Y) = E*(X) ·E*(Y) and E*(X·Y) = E*(X) ·E*(Y) 
                                                 
12 A system effectiveness probability is related to the adversary success probability by Psystem = 1 – Padversary. 
13 The BeliefConvolution Java code performs the convolution using the belief measure.  Probability is a special case of belief. 
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For example, as indicated in Figures 15, 16, and 17, from the detailed convolution calculation, 
the upper expected value for conditional risk, 7.3 × 106, is equal to the product of the upper 
expected values for adversary success and consequence, 0.81 and 8.9 × 106, respectively.  The 
lower expected value for conditional risk, 1.4 × 103, is equal to the product of the lower expected 
values for adversary success and consequence, 0.15 and 9.3 × 103, respectively. 
 
So, the expected values of functions involving addition/multiplication of variables can be 
calculated without performing the convolution.  (Of course, without performing the convolution 
the uncertainty distribution for the function is not known.)  For example, the expected value for 
PEc k ·C can be directly calculated from the expected values of PEc k and C without performing the 
convolution and then calculating the expected value of PEc k ·C.  
 
The top-level numerical results can be presented as expected values for the variables of interest, 
where the expected value is in general an interval that is a point (the mean) for some of the 
variables.   
 
The top-level results are formed from a matrix, each row consisting of a vector.  Specifically, a 
row is: 
 
{Mean(PEpo k), [E*(PEc k), E*(PEc k)], Mean(PEpz k), [E*(Cn k), E*(Cn k)], [E*( Ck), E*( Ck)]} and k 
ranges over all threat scenarios to form all the rows of the matrix. 
 
For any function of interest, the expected value interval can be easily calculated, without 
convolution, from the expected values of its arguments as previously discussed.   For example, 
for the function PEcp k ≡ 1 – (1- PEc k) ·(1- PEpz k) the expected value is: 
 
[1 – (1-E*(PEc k))·(1-Mean(PEcz k)), 1 – (1-E*(PEc k))· (1-Mean(PEcz k))]. 
 
For a specific threat scenario k, let Px k denote a probability of type x (PEpo k, PEc k, PEpz k, PEc p, 
etc.) and let Cx k denote a consequence of type x (Cn k, or Ck).14  For each Px k there is an expected 
value interval [E*(Px k), E*(Px k)].  For each Cx k there is an expected value interval [E*(Cx k), E*(Cx 
k)].  There is also an expected value interval for the function Px k· Cx k: [E*(Px k) · E*(Cx k), E*(Px k) 
· E*(Cx k)].  
 
The top level numerical results for a specific threat scenario are these expected value intervals 
for Px k, Cx k, and Px k· Cx k.  Figure 20 is an example of the top-level results for one threat 
scenario.  Note that Px k· Cx k is Cx k scaled down by Px k; that is, Px k· Cx k is the probability of the 
consequence where Cx k is the consequence given adversary success and Px k is the probability of 
adversary success given attack.   
 
Px k will be called the “Likelihood”, Cx k is the “Consequence”, and Px k· Cx k will be called the 
“Expected Consequence.” 
                                                 
14 Px k can also represent one minus any of the probabilities of interest, such as 1 – PEc k. 
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Figure 20.  Example Results for One Threat Scenario 
Using the top-level numerical results for one threat scenario, aggregate results can be generated; 
e.g., for a fixed target, the results for all threat resources can be presented as in Figure 21. 
 
 
Figure 21.  Example Results for All (Three) Threat Resources for One Target 
Similarly, for a fixed threat resource over all targets, the results can be summarized (Figure 22). 
 
Other roll-ups can be created as necessary. 
 
In summary, the top-level numerical results are based on aggregating expected values for 
Consequence, Likelihood, and Expected Consequence for each threat scenario.  The scenarios 
can be ranked by decreasing concern using either of two methods: (1) rank by the upper value of 
the expected value interval, E*, and subrank by the lower value of the expected value interval, 
E*, or (2) rank by the point estimate (E* + E*)2.  The linguistic results for a collection of 
scenarios can be presented as in Figure 23; here scenarios are rolled up over all targets for a 
specific threat resource. 
[E*(Px k), E*(Px k)] for Likelihood 
[E*(Cx k), E*(Cx k)] for Consequence 
[E*(Px k·Cx k), E*(Px·Cx k)] for Expected Consequence  
(Consequence weighted by Likelihood) 
Likelihood: Px all threats one target 
Consequence: Cx all threats one target 
Expected Consequence: Px·Cx all threats one target 
Threat a 
Threat b 
Threat c 
Threat b 
Threat a 
Threat c 
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Figure 22.  Example Results for All (Three) Targets for One Threat Resource 
 
 
Figure 23.  Linguistic Results for Consequence for One Threat Resource  
over All (Three) Targets 
 
Scenarios can be ranked linguistically by decreasing concern using plausibility for the “worst” 
fuzzy set, “Catastrophic” in the example, subranked by plausibility for the next worst fuzzy set, 
“Major” in the example, and so on. 
 
Likelihood: Px all targets one threat 
Consequence: Cx all targets one threat 
Expected Consequence: Px·Cx all targets one threat 
Target a 
Target b 
Target c 
Target b 
Target a 
Target c 
Minor  Moderate  Major  Catastrophic 
Belief/Plausibility Interval 
Targets a, b, c 
Targets a, b, c 
Targets a, b, c 
Targets a, b, c 
0.0
1.0
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5. Functional Tool 
5.1 Cyber-Physical Security Analysis Methodology (CPSAM) 
The risk assessment methodology shown in Figure 24 is a “functional assessment” that uses six 
steps to estimate the risk associated with various consequences of concern, protective measures, 
asset locations, and threat levels.  The goal of the methodology is to provide the facility operator 
with a relative ranking of the assets that might require improved protection.  The facility operator 
can then perform trade studies to determine where to spend a limited capital improvement budget 
– as well as where to best position operational security assets and personnel. 
 
User Evaluates Conditional Risks for Various Threats 
upon the System to Identify Risk Mitigation Measures
User Defines 
Consequences of Concern 
& Metrics for Specific 
Physical Outcomes
Evaluate Physical and Cyber Protection 
Measures & Specified Threat Capability. 
Return PS/A 
For User-Defined Consequences - 
Return Combinations of Facility/
Asset Failures  
User Creates the Capabilities & 
Constraints of the Adversary 
Engineering Process Model
Commodity Delivery Model,
Contaminant Dispersion, 
Hazardous Material Impact Model
Threat Definer
Vulnerability 
Analyst 
(PS/A)
Consequence 
Definer 
(C)
Conditional Risk
Set Developer
(RC = PS/A * C) 1
2
5
6
Facility
 Definer
User Creates the Detect, Delay, and 
Response features for each Facility/Asset 
3
4
 
Figure 24.  CPSAM Use Case Diagram 
The high-level use case for this methodology is shown in Figure 24.  Step one (1) is that the risk 
analyst must first determine the Consequence of Concern (CoC) and with associated 
“unacceptable” system states.  An Engineering Process Model (EPM) in step two (2) or expert 
opinion can then be used to determine the asset-specific “cut sets” that can cause a given CoC.  
The Vulnerability Assessment (VA) process comprises the traditional steps of a) defining the 
protective measures (both physical and cyber) for each asset; b) defining the appropriate Threat 
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Model; and c) comparing the protective measures, asset susceptibility and threat characteristics 
to generate the “Probability of Success given an Attack” (PS|A) for each cut set that can cause a 
CoC.  The Conditional Risk Set Developer then estimates the risk associated with various 
consequences of concern, protective measures, asset locations and threat levels.  The risk is 
“conditional” because the model assumes that a specified attack occurs.  Figure 25 shows a flow 
diagram showing the detailed steps for data inputs required by the user.  
 
 
Figure 25.  User Input Flow Diagram 
5.2 Consequence Definer 
5.2.1 Consequences of Concern 
For water systems, CoCs might include: a) inadequate flow; b) unacceptable quality; and 
c) hazardous material releases.  For example, the “inadequate flow” CoC might be further broken 
down as: 
• loss of service to “general/residential” customers,  
• loss of service to critical customers (hospitals or large employers), or  
• loss of fire-fighting service to those same classes of customers.    
 
Unacceptable quality might include both unpalatable water (due to taste, odor, and turbidity) and 
nonpotable water that would cause illness in the general population.  For these CoCs, the 
physical outcomes are typically duration, extent, and recovery costs.  The associated metrics are 
time, numbers of customers affected, and dollars.  The physical outcomes for hazardous material 
releases from water system facilities might include Cl2, H2O2 and NH3 releases.  The associated 
metrics are health impacts such as deaths, illness levels, and hospital admissions.  Figure 26 
shows that the use can define a consequence with a title description, metric name and 
value/range with the Belief/Plausibility method to describe uncertainty in the native metric 
value. 
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Section 5.2.2 describes how a risk analyst can differentiate between differing CoCs with 
disparate physical outcomes and metrics using a Willingness to Pay consequence conversion 
process. 
 
 
Figure 26.  Native Consequence Definer 
5.2.2 Consequence Conversion – Willingness to Pay 
A major challenge to developing a single score for differing consequences is that there are poten-
tially differing physical outcomes with differing metrics that define the transition from an accep-
table state to an unacceptable state.  The Telecommunications Outage Index [ANSI 1997] is one 
example of a scoring function that uses a multi-criteria utility function to scale the importance of 
each failed service, the duration of each outage, and the magnitude of each outage (based on the 
number of customers and the time of day when the outage occurs). 
 
This research developed a general consequence index method that assesses the user-perceived 
importance of selected CoCs by using a willingness to pay function.  For each CoC, several 
physical outcomes may be evaluated.  For example, a previous section of this report described 
three general classes of consequences for water systems:  inadequate flow, unacceptable quality, 
and hazardous material releases.  The physical outcomes for flow and water quality might 
include duration, extent, and recovery cost for the abnormal event.  Each of these physical 
outcomes may have a different importance value that can be estimated by a willingness to pay to 
prevent this outcome.  For each physical outcome, metrics defining the severity of that outcome 
can be used as a scaling factor to distinguish between small, medium, or large impacts, and 
commensurate willingness to pay to prevent the occurrence.  For example, the willingness to pay 
to prevent one physical outcome might have a high value, but if a large number of similar 
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physical outcomes were to occur, the willingness to pay is not a simple product of the 
willingness to pay value and the number of occurrences (see Figure 27).    
 
Since not all consequences, physical outcomes, and metrics have equal perceived impacts to the 
infrastructure management, the willingness to pay approach provides a method to discriminate 
these details.  The consequence index can then be used in conjunction with the vulnerability 
values to identify the most important risks that need to be managed.   
 
 
Figure 27.  Example of How Willingness to Pay is Affected by Consequence Magnitude 
5.3 Engineering Process Model 
Engineering process models (EPMs) exist for most every large commodity infrastructure.  Each 
one has potential features to exploit to connect an asset, or combinations of assets, that can cause 
the CoC.  These can be complicated engineering models that the project decided not to explicitly 
embed within CPSAM.  
 
For water systems, the EPANET software [EPANET] has the following seven asset-types: 
reservoirs; pumps, pipes, junctions, valves, emitters, and tanks.  EPANET has a Graphical User 
Interface (GUI) and file import capability that allows an analyst to produce a flow-based model 
of a water system.  Add-on software can be written to generate the appropriate cut sets for 
various flow-based CoCs.  These cut sets can then be used as inputs for the Facilities Definer 
that describe the protective measures associated with the critical asset and Vulnerability Analyst 
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(VA) functional blocks.  (Note: the prototype CPSAM software did not link to EPANET at the 
completion of the LDRD effort.) 
 
5.4 Facility Definer 
The Facility Definer is a multi-step process (Figure 28) where the user inputs the asset linked to 
the CoC in the Engineering Process Model Step (Figure 29).  Each asset then requires an 
assignment to a specific physical location and a cyber location, which requires input details on 
the physical security and cyber security posture. 
 
Figure 28.  Facility Definer User Input Flow Chart 
LDRD—Critical Infrastructure Systems of Systems Assessment Methodology 
 
 55
 
Figure 29.  Asset Definer 
The Physical Security posture is evaluated by the Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption 
(EASI) mathematics, which are based on a probabilistic logic analysis method (Garcia 2001).  
For each physical location, the number of protective layers are identified and defined by type, 
description, and whether these layers are cyber-controlled.  Section 5.6.1.1 describes the EASI 
model. 
 
 
Figure 30.  Physical Location and Physical Security Posture User Input 
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Figure 31.  Cyber Location and Cyber Security Posture User Input 
5.5 Threat Definer 
The Threat Definer (TD) establishes the specific capabilities of the adversary.  In this research, 
the physical-attack capabilities were sorted into four broad categories: hand-tools, power-tools, 
explosives, and vehicles.  The susceptibility of various physical protection systems (e.g., doors, 
locks, and fences) to these four physical attack categories has been well quantified in experi-
mental programs.  Figure 32 shows the selections for an open field Threat ID that contains the 
integer number of adversaries and weapons that are used to compare against the Physical 
Security posture using the EASI calculation engine.  Considerably less work has been done to 
quantify cyber adversaries and their impact on cyber protective systems. 
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Figure 32.  Threat Definer 
 
5.5.1 Adversary Physical Threat Characteristics and Capabilities 
In the physical-security literature, the physical-attack capabilities are often sorted into four broad 
categories:  hand tools, power tools, explosives, and vehicles.  The susceptibility of various PPSs 
(e.g., doors, locks, and fences) to these four physical attack categories has been well quantified 
in experimental programs (Garcia 2001).  For example, power tools and explosives can damage 
the state of a physical asset or facilitate entry through locked doors.   
 
5.5.2 Adversary Cyber Threat Characteristics, Capabilities, and Categories 
Most past work on cyber adversaries have focused on qualitative descriptions of characteristics 
and capabilities.  This work required quantified cyber adversary characteristics and capabilities 
for determine the impact on elements of cyber protection systems (CPSs).  The following cyber-
attack capabilities [Duggan 2005] were used to derive category-based cyber threats: 
• Funding 
• Goal Commitment Intensity 
• Stealth 
• Physical Access 
• Cyber Skills 
• Implementation Time 
• Cyber Organization Size 
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5.5.2.1 Funding 
The funding characteristic is often an enabler for other characteristics.  Funding is a multiplier 
factor that may enhance any other attribute.  However, increased funding may reduce the 
adversary’s stealth since they may now be using resources outside their own organization.  
Representative High (H), Medium (M) and Low (L) funding levels for this characteristic might 
currently be: 
• H – Hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars. 
• M – Thousands to hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
• L – Zero to thousands of dollars. 
 
5.5.2.2 Goal Commitment Intensity 
This characteristic is based on the adversary’s determination in achieving their goals or 
objectives.  Representative levels for this characteristic are: 
• H – A group member is willing to die to achieve the organization’s goals.   
• M – A group member is willing to be caught or captured, and possibly go to prison. 
• L – Group members are not willing to be caught or captured. 
 
5.5.2.3 Stealth 
This characteristic is defined as the required level of stealth necessary to achieve the adversary’s 
goal.  When the required level is not maintained, the goal will not be achieved.  Representative 
levels are: 
• H – Loss of stealth prior to attack execution cannot be tolerated. 
• M – Either loss of absolute stealth can be tolerated or total stealth cannot be achieved due 
to other restrictions. 
• L – Either stealth prior to execution is not a requirement or stealth is not considered 
important to the threat group. 
 
5.5.2.4 Physical Access 
This characteristic is based on whether the threat group is able to gain physical access to some 
cyber resource for some portion of an attack.  In addition, access to certain design-level 
information is sometimes only available to someone with physical access to the actual system.  
The group’s funding level and time frame often enhance this characteristic.  Representative 
levels are: 
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• H – Able to gain long-term physical access to the cyber resource by placing someone in 
the proper employment, turning an insider, or other means.   
• M – Able to identify where physical access is needed and then gain the required physical 
access through some short-term method such as blackmail, coercion, or breaking and 
entering.   
• L – Cannot physically access the cyber resource.   
 
5.5.2.5 Cyber Skills 
This characteristic considers the threat’s cyber skills, training programs, and research programs 
but does not include skills that are found outside the organization, or those that may be 
purchased.  Representative levels are: 
• H – Detailed knowledge of current exploits, an internal training program, and an active 
research and development (R&D) program in new exploits. 
• M – Good knowledge of current exploits, some capacity for internal education, but not 
much for R&D on new exploits. 
• L – Some knowledge of current exploits and some skill with information technology, no 
capacity for a training or R&D program. 
 
5.5.2.6 Implementation Time 
This characteristic is the total amount of time that an organization is willing to use in planning, 
developing, and deploying a cyber attack.  It includes the time necessary for all steps up to the 
actual execution of an attack.  Representative levels are decades/years, years, months, and 
weeks. 
 
5.5.2.7 Cyber Organization Size 
This characteristic accounts for the size and social networking ability of the cyber-literate 
members of the threat group.  The levels imply a structure for the group as well.  Representative 
levels are: 
• Hundreds – Hundreds of individuals are working together and communicating. 
• Tens of Tens – Many small groups communicate loosely between the groups.  Limited 
information is moved between groups. 
• Tens – Small workgroups that work independently. 
• Ones – Individuals that work independently. 
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Table 4 shows a consolidation of the cyber threat characteristic parsed with the scaled 
capabilities to derive six general categories.  These six general cyber threat categories are 
compared with the cyber protection system capabilities to determine the success or failure of the 
cyber threat against the cyber protection system on an element by element basis (see Section 
5.6.2 System Effectiveness against Cyber Attack) 
Table 4.  Threat Characteristics 
 
5.6 Vulnerability Analyst 
The method produces a quantitative measure for “asset invulnerability,” which is the ability of 
the facility to withstand an attack against a commodity-delivery asset without suffering the CoCs 
associated with that asset’s failure. 
 
Figure 33 illustrates the top-level logic for assessing the asset invulnerability.  The consequences 
associated with an asset’s failure can be avoided by either: 1) preventing the failure of the asset; 
or 2) mitigating the effects of the asset’s failure.   
 
System Effectiveness 
Against Physical Attack
Asset Invulnerability
Maximum of Inputs
Asset Failure Prevention
Minimum of Inputs
System Effectiveness 
Against Cyber Attack
32
Asset Failure Mitigation
4
 
Figure 33.  Top-Level Logic for Asset Invulnerability. 
Threat 
Category Funding 
Goal  
Intensity Stealth 
Physical 
Access 
Cyber 
Skills 
Implementation 
Time 
Cyber Org 
Size 
I H H H H H Decades/ Years Hundreds 
II H H H M M Years Tens of 
Tens 
III M H M M M Months Tens 
IV L M H L H Months Tens 
V L M M L M Months Ones 
VI L L L L L Weeks One 
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Preventing asset failure by providing physical and cyber protection measures to defeat attacks is 
generally desirable, but may not be practical in all circumstances.  For example, some facilities 
may have assets located over a large geographic area or in exposed locations that are difficult to 
protect.  Consequently, protecting all of the key assets in some facilities may be very costly or 
practically impossible.  In such circumstances, mitigating the effects of asset failures may be a 
more cost-effective way of avoiding the CoC than providing a highly effective physical and CPS. 
 
Because either prevention or mitigation of asset failure can ensure that the CoC does not occur, 
this analysis develops effectiveness measures for both asset failure prevention and asset failure 
mitigation.  The CPSAM methodology then selects the larger of those two measures as the 
measure of asset invulnerability.   
 
5.6.1 System Effectiveness against Physical Attack 
There are a number of established methods that can be used to estimate PPS effectiveness 
[Garcia 2001, Biringer et al. 1999].  These methods generally involve an assessment of: 1) the 
likelihood that a response force can interrupt an attack before the adversary completes his attack 
sequence; and 2) the likelihood that the response force can stop the adversary from proceeding 
on with the attack sequence.  These two factors are termed the probability of interruption (PI) 
and the probability of neutralization (PN).   
 
In the CPSAM approach, established methods are used to estimate the PPS effectiveness against 
physical attacks through the use of the EASI (Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption) 
model [Bennett 1977] to estimate PI.  The probability of neutralization (PN) is then estimated 
from the ratio of the number of adversaries to the number of response force personnel using 
results derived from many runs of the BATLE  code (Brief Adversary Threat Loss 
Estimator)[Engi and Harlan 1981].  The effectiveness of the PPS (PE) is then taken to be: 
 
 PE = PI * PN 
 
The selected evaluation tools are first used to estimate the PPS effectiveness against a physical 
attack with all elements (for example, barriers and alarm systems) assigned their normal 
performance values.  
 
In order to account for the possibility that the attacker may be able to eliminate or degrade some 
of the PPS elements through cyber means, an analysis is also run assuming that any cyber-
controlled PPS elements are defeated (that is, have zero performance values for detection and 
delay)..  For example, if a lock is cyber-controlled then this proposed methodology assumes that 
the penetration time for the physical barrier it secures is reduced to zero if a cyber attack is 
successful.  The results of the analysis of PPS effectiveness with cyber-controlled element 
performance set to zero are coupled with estimates of the difficulty of defeating the CPS 
elements with a cyber attack to produce the measure of effectiveness of the system against a 
cyber-enabled physical attack.   
 
The remainder of this report uses the following definitions.  The likelihood that the fully 
functioning PPS will be effective against a physical-only attack is denoted PEpo. The likelihood 
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that the PPS is effective with its cyber-controlled elements defeated is denoted PEpz. The 
likelihood that the CPS will be effective against a cyber attack is denoted PEc.   
 
5.6.1.1 The EASI Model 
EASI (Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption) is a simple method for evaluating the per-
formance of a physical protection system along a specific path under specific conditions of a 
threat and system operation.  The model computes a probability of adversary interruption from 
an analysis of the interactions of detection, delay, response and communication.  An adversary is 
considered “interrupted” when a response force arrives to encounter the adversaries and takes 
actions that force the adversaries to abandon their pursuit of their ultimate objective (at least 
temporarily) in order to counter the actions of the response force.  If the response force 
successfully defeats the adversary force, the adversary is said to be neutralized and cannot 
complete their ultimate objective.  If the adversary force defeats the response force, the 
adversary can resume pursuit of their ultimate objective.  In this case, the interruption of the 
adversary was temporary. 
 
To compute the probability of interruption using the EASI model, the analyst first precisely iden-
tifies the adversary path or scenario to be evaluated.  Each opportunity for detecting the 
adversary is recorded, along with its corresponding probability of adversary detection PDi.  Each 
detection probability is a point estimate value that represents the aggregate performance of the 
detector sensing abnormal or unauthorized activities, the transmission of the detector’s signal to 
an alarm assessment point, and the realization by the human in assessing the alarm that an 
adversary attack is in progress which requires activation of response mechanisms.  In addition, 
the analyst estimates the time required for the adversary to accomplish each step along the path 
or scenario Ti, and especially the delay times between the identified detection opportunities.  The 
mean time for each step is recorded, along with its standard deviation.  The EASI model 
interprets these values as parameters for a Normal distribution.  The analyst characterizes the 
security response force in terms of the probability of successful communication of the alarm to 
the response force PC as well as the time required for the response force to react and interrupt the 
adversary TR (again, a mean and standard deviation are required). 
 
The method by which the EASI model computes the probability of interruption is as follows.  
Each possible detection point is examined separately as though adversary detection occurs ex-
actly at that point.  The adversary is detected at exactly that point only if they are not detected at 
all previous detection opportunities and are successfully detected at that point.  To obtain the 
likelihood of exactly this scenario occurring, one multiplies together the nondetection proba-
bilities for all previous detection opportunities times the detection probability at this point.  Now, 
given that the adversary is detected at this point, interruption requires that the alarm be success-
fully communicated to the response force and that the remaining adversary task time is greater 
than the response force reaction time.  The analyst provides the alarm communication probability 
directly.  The method convolves the normal distributions for all remaining adversary step times 
with the response force reaction time to determine the probability that the response force arrives 
in time to interrupt the adversary.  Thus, the probability of interruption given detection at exactly 
the ith detection opportunity PIi can be written as: 
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Since these computed interruption probabilities satisfy probabilistic conditions of being mutually 
exclusive, the overall probability of interruption for this path PI is simply the sum of the inter-
rupttion probabilities at each detection opportunity, or: 
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The EASI method can be viewed graphically in terms of a small event tree.  Each detection op-
portunity represents an event tree question that must be decided probabilistically based on the 
probability of detection or nondetection.  At the end of the event tree, one adds two questions to 
represent the performance of the response force: one to represent the probability that the alarm is 
successfully communicated to the response force, and one to represent the probability that the 
response force arrives in time to interrupt the adversary.  This probability will vary within the 
event tree to represent the differences in remaining adversary step times as described above.  A 
representative event tree for a system with three possible detection opportunities is shown in 
Figure 34. 
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Figure 34.  EASI Event Tree 
5.6.2 System Effectiveness against Cyber Attack 
Cyber security evaluations have, in the past, focused on compliance with industry best practices 
or red team evaluations.  In contrast, this analysis approach has developed a tool for scoring the 
expected performance of a facility’s CPS based on the adversary characteristics and the elements 
of cyber protection present in the facility.  The CPS evaluation model uses information on the 
attacker’s cyber capabilities (e.g., physical access and cyber skills) and the security primitives 
(such as authentication, Network Access Control (NAC), and User Access Control (UAC)) 
provided by the cyber protection elements to produce a system effectiveness value for PEc for 
each cyber-controlled asset.  The quantity (1-PEc) is then a measure of the likelihood that the 
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attacker could successfully penetrate the CPS and manipulate the target asset from a given CAP 
in order to cause a CoC.  The details of the CPS evaluation model will be given in a future 
report. 
 
PEc is computed for attacks that originate offsite (e.g., through the internet) and at any on-site 
locations from which a commodity delivery asset can be manipulated by cyber means.  For on-
site locations, these “Cyber Attack Points” (CAPs), might include the central control station, 
router or switch locations, remote terminal unit locations, communications centers, and points at 
which access can be gained to the administrative local area network.  (NOTE: these “on-site” 
locations can be located remotely from the commodity delivery asset that can cause the CoC.)  
The likelihood that the defined threat can cause failure of the commodity delivery asset under 
analysis from a CAP is denoted (1 - PEc(CAP)).  The system effectiveness against physical 
attacks is estimated for each on-site CAP using the approach described in the previous 
subsection and is denoted PEp(CAP).  PEp(CAP) is a measure of the likelihood that the PPS will 
prevent the adversary from gaining physical access to the CAP.  A physical-enabled cyber attack 
is one in which the adversary gains physical access to a CAP and launches a cyber attack from 
that location.  The likelihood of success of such an attack is the product of the likelihood of 
gaining physical access to the CAP, which is (1-PEp(CAP)), and the likelihood of successfully 
mounting a cyber attack from that point, which is (1-PEc(CAP)).  A system effectiveness 
measure, PE(CAPj ), is then computed for the jth CAP as:  
 
 PE(CAPj )  = 1 – (1-  PEc(CAPj ))*(1- PEp(CAPj )) 
 
Figure 35 illustrates the process used to estimate PEc. 
 
 
Figure 35.  System Effectiveness Against Cyber Attack  
The overall system effectiveness measure against cyber attack is the minimum value of PE(CAPj) 
for all CAPs considered. The CAP with the minimum system effectiveness measure is the one 
for which a combined physical and cyber attack is most likely to produce adversary success.  If a 
facility has a very robust PPS, an offsite location may be the most effective place from which to 
launch a cyber attack.  If it is relatively easy to get to an administrative local area network 
(LAN) terminal (e.g., one that bypasses the external firewall and other boundary access controls) 
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but difficult to penetrate further into the facility by physical attack then the “best” attack route 
may be to carry out a physical attack to get to that LAN terminal, and then launch a cyber attack 
from that location.  If the CPS is highly effective for all CAPs then a physical-only attack may be 
the most successful strategy.  The overall system effectiveness measure against cyber attack 
(cyber-only attacks and physical-enabled cyber attacks) is the value for the CAP from which the 
combined physical and cyber attack is in some sense optimal for the adversary. 
 
5.6.2.1 Security Primitives 
This section describes various categories for the security primitives proposed by Stamp, et al., in 
[Stamp and Kilman].  This section provides the foundation for the end goal, which is to use 
Belief Theory to compare the categories for the security primitives with the categories for the 
adversary characteristics that were proposed by Duggan [Duggan]. 
 
The security technology primitives (which include authentication, NAC, UAC, cryptography, 
integrity checking, data-aging protection, logging/monitoring/ auditing, and system management 
[Stamp and Berg] can be used to model the cyber security barriers between cyber locations.  This 
section presents an overview of the security guidelines and best practices for these primitives 
from the Network Reliability and Interoperability Council (NRIC) [NRIC] and the National 
Security Agency (NSA) [SNAC].   
 
5.6.2.1.1 Authentication 
Authentication assures that a person is who they say they are.  Authentication can be 
implemented through the use of passwords.  Authentication has the following three basic 
elements in a typical commodity delivery infrastructure facility: 
• Length/type/character set of password: 
– Use strong passwords [NRIC], which are 12 or more characters in length on 
Windows systems and at least eight characters on a UNIX system. 
– Include upper and lowercase letters, numbers, and special characters.   
– Do not use dictionary words.   
– Eliminate passwords found in a list of easily guessed or “cracked” passwords.  
(NOTE: Administrators should obtain password-guessing programs and run them 
frequently to identify users who have easily guessed passwords.)   
• Change frequency—Change passwords regularly (i.e., every 30 to 90 days). 
• Limitation of login attempts—Limit the number of failed password attempts [SNAC]. 
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5.6.2.1.2 Network Access Control 
Access control, in the context of network security, is the ability to limit and control access to 
systems via communication links.  To implement access control, it is recommended that a 
segmented/partitioned network architecture be implemented.  More specifically, where practical, 
it is suggested that user traffic networks, network-management infrastructure networks, 
customer-transaction system networks, and enterprise communication/business operations 
networks be separated and partitioned [NRIC]. 
 
NAC has the following basic elements in a typical commodity-delivery infrastructure facility: 
• Traffic filtering device (e.g., a firewall).  Those services that are not explicitly permitted 
by the site’s security policy are prohibited, and hence blocked at the firewall [SNAC]. 
• Physical separation and physical protection of networks. 
• Virtual private networks.  (VPN).  Note:  This element may overlap with the security 
primitives for cryptography and authentication. 
• Authentication.  This element’s characteristics may be either identical to or be a subset 
of those listed for the authentication primitive in Section 5.6.2.1.1.  For commodity 
delivery facilities, one difference may be the presence or absence of two-factor 
authentication, such as a SecurID Card or other token.  Two other issues are user 
authentication to the network and network administrator authentication to the network 
devices themselves. 
 
5.6.2.1.3 User Access Control 
In terms of UAC, it is good practice to implement “least privilege” rights [NRIC].  Applying 
“least privilege” limits users’ access to only the data and services required to perform their jobs 
[SNAC].  
 
“Privilege escalation” is an important attack path.  It is often easier for an adversary to 
compromise a user account and then obtain root/administrator privileges than it is for that 
adversary to directly compromise an administrator account.  (NOTE:  This path applies to both 
user accounts and general-purpose accounts such as network printers.) 
 
UAC contains the following elements: 
• Physical protection of the system 
• Access control policy—How are rights are administered? 
• Type of software used to implement access control. 
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5.6.2.1.4 Cryptography 
Cryptography protects the confidentiality of data by encoding the data so that only authorized 
parties can read the data.  
 
Cryptography contains the following elements: 
• Algorithms—Use industry-accepted algorithms (e.g., 3DES or AES) [NRIC].  Many 
non-standard cryptography algorithms and key lengths do not protect the confidentiality 
of data.  Another issue is the correctness of the software implementation.  Software from 
reputable security vendors or well-vetted open sources is often preferable to home-grown 
software because it has been better tested and proven.  Weakness in software 
components, such as the random number generators, can drastically reduce the “work 
factor” associated with a given software implementation of a putatively strong algorithm. 
• Key lengths—Use only industry-accepted key lengths.  The minimum recommended key 
length for a given algorithm may change every year based on the advances (driven by 
Moore’s Law) in easily obtainable yet powerful computing hardware. 
• Key management procedures—An adversary typically attacks the key distribution and 
key storage processes rather than the underlying cryptography algorithm.  For example, 
an adversary with high physical access might steal a user’s password.  Similarly, a well-
funded adversary might subvert an insider in order to obtain copies of the keying 
material. 
 
5.6.2.1.5 Integrity Checking 
Integrity checking provides protection against data modification.  Integrity checking is 
performed for: 
• System files—Check the integrity of system files that are susceptible to malevolent 
modification [NRIC].  Integrity checking will not prevent data modification, but will 
detect it. 
• Incoming messages—Just because a message says it is from a trusted source does not 
mean it was written/sent by that trusted source. 
• System hardware—Perform Power-on Self Tests (POSTs) and Built-In Tests (BITs). 
• Executing commands—Check for “faithful execution.”  Of these four elements, “faithful 
execution” is likely not implemented in commodity delivery infrastructures because it is 
currently implemented only in high-assurance products used in government security 
applications. 
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5.6.2.1.6 Data-Aging Protection 
Even if the integrity of messages is checked, adversaries can still replay previous messages.  
Data aging contains the following elements: 
• Timestamps—A timestamp or an incrementing counter should be used to mitigate replay 
attacks.  The accuracy of this timestamp needs to be ensured because an inaccurate 
timestamp provides no mitigation [NRIC]. 
• Network-wide time synchronization—In process control systems, the absolute time of a 
given event’s occurrence may be a crucial element in a realtime control algorithm.  In 
contrast, incrementing counters may suffice for data-aging purposes in non-realtime 
systems.) 
 
5.6.2.1.7 Logging/Monitoring/Auditing 
Logging, monitoring, and auditing are needed to observe events and respond to the activities of 
the network.  Logging/monitoring/auditing contains the following three elements: 
• Event recording—All security-related events should be automatically documented in 
logs [NRIC] by the system.  However, automated logging or documenting security-
related events provide no real benefit if no one views the documentation.   
• Event assessment—A trained individual should view the documentation on a regular 
basis, searching for anomalies. 
• Response—If an alarm or an anomaly is found in the documentation, a “response” must 
occur in a timely manner.  If there is no meaningful and timely response, then event 
recording and event assessment may be pointless exercises.  The lack of response is an 
important vulnerability in cyber systems.  (NOTE: An example of a response would be to 
change the filtering rules at the firewall.) 
 
5.6.2.1.8 System Management 
System management deals with the maintenance of computer systems on the network.  System 
management contains the following elements and associated best practices: 
• Backups—Perform current or implement new system backup procedures [SNAC].  This 
backup should be stored on another system.  Also, when feasible, the system on which 
the backup is stored should not be co-located with the other system. 
• Malware protection—Deploy malware protection tools in a manner in which signatures 
are kept current [NRIC].  A malware protection tool with old signatures will provide little 
or no protection against new malware.   
• Configuration management—Keep operating systems and applications current through 
updates or patches.  Also, disable all unnecessary services.  Potentially vulnerable 
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services (e.g., Network Time Protocol (NTP), Remote Procedure Calls (RPC), Finger, 
RSH-type commands, etc.) should be disabled, if unneeded, or provided with additional 
protection [NRIC]. 
• Security testing—Test the security of all of the devices (clients, servers, switches, 
routers, firewalls and intrusion detection systems) on the network periodically and after 
any major configuration changes on the network [SNAC]. 
 
5.6.2.2 Security Primitive Effectiveness 
Best practices and guidelines provide a standard for measuring each primitive.  These were the 
basis for a CPEI calculation using “elicitation tables” to sort a particular installation’s CPS into 
one of several “Cyber Security Posture” (CSP) categories for each security primitive.  Tables 5 
through 11 show examples of the elicitation tables.  Instead of a purely subjective categorization 
of CSPs from I (weak) to V (strong), the tables use policies and features to quantify CSPs. 
 
Belief Theory is then used to compare these categories for the CSPs with the adversary 
characteristics proposed by Duggan.  The end goal of this process is to quantify the “belief” that 
a given adversary category can defeat a given CSP category for a given security primitive. 
Table 5.  Authentication 
Posture  
Category Cyber Security Posture 
I No passwords. 
II Weak passwords.  No periodic changes. 
III Strong passwords. No periodic changes. 
IV Strong passwords. Periodic changes.   
V Strong passwords. Periodic changes. Limits on failed password attempts.  Passwords are 
“cracked” every month to find users who choose easily guessed passwords. 
Table 6.  Network Access Control  
Posture  
Category Cyber Security Posture 
I Remote login via password-protected dial-up connections. No firewall. 
II Remote logins allowed from Internet.  IP address filtering and port blocking.   
III Remote logins allowed via VPN connection. 
IV No remote logins.  SCADA controls are accessible only from LAN-connected terminals. 
V No remote logins.  SCADA LAN is physically separate from other LANs. 
 
The NAC elicitation table assumes that the VPN uses an SSL connection but does not require 
token-based authentication.  Similarly, the Authentication elicitation table assumes that token-
based access is not used for user-to-host or administrator-to-network device authentication. 
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Table 7.  User Access Control 
Posture  
Category Cyber Security Posture 
I Physical access unmonitored.  Rights given to everyone. 
II Physical access monitored.  Rights assigned to individual users. 
III Physical access monitored.  Rights assigned to groups.  All cyber equipment is physically secured. 
 
In the UAC elicitation table, “physically secured” means that key system hardware is either in a 
locked enclosure or has certain input/output (I/O) devices disabled.  Locking or disabling 
hardware helps prevent simple privilege escalation attacks such as booting from a floppy disk or 
compact disk (CD).  The difference between rights assigned to “individual users” vs. “groups” is 
the notion of “roles-based access control (RBAC).”  With RBAC, essential system roles are 
clearly defined.  Each user is then assigned one, or more, system roles.  Each role is given the 
“least privilege” necessary to accomplish its job function.  This approach makes it easier to audit 
user privileges than assign system rights on a per-individual basis. 
Table 8.  Cryptography 
Posture  
Category Cyber Security Posture 
I Plaintext communications over wireless channel. 
II Plaintext communications over Public Internet or PSTN. 
III Encrypted communications over a VPN using non-industry-accepted algorithms and key lengths.  
Non-standard key management practices are used. 
IV Encrypted communications over a VPN using either non-industry-accepted algorithms or key 
lengths.  Industry-standard key management practices are used. 
V Encrypted communications over a VPN using industry-accepted algorithms and key lengths.  
Industry-standard key management practices are used. 
Table 9.  Integrity Checking 
Posture  
Category Cyber Security Posture 
I No integrity checking. 
II Integrity checking for incoming messages.  Hardware POST. 
III Integrity checking of incoming messages and all susceptible system files.  Hardware BIT. 
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Table 10.  Data Aging Protection 
Posture  
Category Cyber Security Posture 
I No data-aging protection. 
II Messages are time-stamped.  
III Messages are accurately time-stamped. 
Table 11.  Logging/Monitoring/Auditing 
Posture  
Category Cyber Security Posture 
I No logging or monitoring 
II Logging, but logs are not viewed 
III Some security-related events are logged.  Untrained individual monitors logs. 
IV Some security-related events are logged.  Trained individual monitors logs. 
V All security-related events are logged.  Trained individual monitors logs. Able to respond. 
 
(NOTE: Categories I-IV are functionally equivalent for this security primitive since detection 
and assessment without a response is typically useless.) 
Table 12.  System Management 
Category Cyber Security Posture 
I No system management. 
II Performing backups. Keeping OS/Applications current through patching. 
III Current malware protection tools. Performing backups. Keeping operating system (OS)/ 
Applications current through patching.  Disabling unnecessary services.  Performing periodic 
security testing. 
 
5.6.2.3 Comparison of Adversary Capabilities with Security Primitives 
The adversary’s capabilities (against each security primitive) must be compared with the 
instantiation of that security primitive on a given virtual link.  In each table in this section, each 
variable (for which degrees of evidence are assigned) can be physically interpreted as: “the 
probability (subjective, frequency) that the adversary with the stated capabilities can defeat the 
associated security primitive of the indicated level”.   
 
If the intervals to which degrees of evidence are assigned are points, then the belief measure is a 
probability measure.  If only one point has a degree of evidence of 1.0 then there is no 
uncertainty in that belief.   
 
LDRD—Critical Infrastructure Systems of Systems Assessment Methodology 
 
 72
Within each box in a given table, the notation is that a given interval [a,b) has a degree of 
evidence value of X; we can then calculate belief and plausibility from the degrees of evidence.  
The “[“ and “(“ symbols have the standard meaning in set theory. 
 
5.6.2.3.1 Authentication 
In Table 13, the level of physical access is a main discriminating factor.  If the adversary has 
high or medium access and a long implementation time, then a subverted insider is likely to 
disclose their own password or find another user’s password.  Hence, Category I through III 
adversaries are hard to deter with password-based authentication systems.  The cyber skills are a 
secondary discriminating factor between Category IV through VI adversaries.  A high level of 
cyber skills is required to break strong passwords that are changed infrequently.  Finally, all 
adversary levels can break weak passwords that seldom change. 
Table 13.  Comparison of Adversary Capabilities with Authentication Security Primitive 
Threat Category 
Authentication Category 
I II III IV V VI 
I No passwords [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 
II Weak passwords.  No 
periodic changes. 
[1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [0.9,1] 1 [0.8,1] 1 
III Strong passwords. No 
periodic changes. 
[1] 1 [0.7, 1) 0.1 
[1] 0.9 
[0.7, 1) 0.2 
[1] 0.8 
[0.7, 1) 0.2 
[1] 0.8 
[0.7, 1) 0.4 
[1] 0.6 
[0,0.3) 0.8 
[0.3,0.7) 0.1
[0.7,1.0] 0.1 
IV Strong passwords. 
Periodic changes. 
[1] 1 [0.7, 1) 0.3 
[1] 0.7 
[0,0.3) 0.3 
[0.3,0.7) 0.4
[0.7,1.0] 0.3 
[0] 0.5 
(0,0.3] 0.5 
[0] 0.7 
(0,0.3] 0.3 
[0] 0.9 
(0,0.3] 0.1 
V Strong passwords. 
Periodic changes. 
Limits on failed 
password attempts. 
[1] 1 [0.7,1.0) 0.5
[1] 0.5 
[0,0.3) 0.6 
[0.3,0.7] 0.4 
[0] 0.9 
(0, 0.3] 0.1 
[0] 0.9 
(0, 0.3] 0.1 
[0] 1 
 
This version of Table 13 was generated as follows: 
 
1) Threat Category I (with high cyber skills and physical access) is believed to always win 
against a commodity infrastructure’s cyber-security posture. 
 
2) All threat categories are believed to win against the lowest two categories (no passwords 
and weak, unchanging passwords) for the Authentication security primitive.  However, 
Threat Categories V and VI might occasionally fail because they have low physical 
access and/or low cyber skills.  They also have a limited implementation time (e.g., 
months). 
 
3) The Threat Categories IV, V, and VI typically fail against Authentication Category V 
(strong passwords that change frequently) because their limited implementation time 
(months) makes a brute-force, password-cracking attack unlikely even if they have good 
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cyber skills.  In addition, their low level of physical access also makes password-stealing 
unlikely. 
 
4) The other boxes (e.g., the ones in the middle of the table) can be viewed as follows: 
• The interval [0] can be viewed as a “really low” likelihood of success.   
• The interval [0,0.3) can be viewed as “low.” 
• The interval [0.3,0.7) can be viewed as “medium.” 
• The interval [0.7,1.0) can be viewed as “high.” 
• The interval [1] can be viewed as a “really high” likelihood of success.   
• The evidence assigned to each interval is then a subjective comparison of the Threat 
Categories’ physical access, cyber skills, and implementation time with each 
Authentication Category’s attributes for password length and change frequency.  
Varying degrees of evidence were thereby assigned to each of the intervals described 
above. 
 
5.6.2.3.2 Network Access Control 
In Table 14, cyber skills are the primary method for defeating Authentication Categories II and 
III.  If no remote logins are allowed, then physical access becomes the primary determinant.  For 
Category I, the main problem is finding the dial-up modem’s phone numbers, which can be 
solved via a mix of cyber skills and physical access. 
 
This security primitive is not based on work-factor.  As such, the adversary’s chance of success 
is based on more qualitative factors such as: 
 
a) Have exploits for a particular device (e.g., a firewall) existed in the past? 
 
b) What is the likelihood that an adversary can either obtain an existing exploit or craft a 
new “zero day” exploit for a given device? 
 
c) What is the likelihood that a given device will be misconfigured to allow a given known 
exploit? 
 
d) What is the likelihood that an adversary can use their physical access to subvert an 
insider to introduce an exploitable vulnerability? 
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Table 14.  Comparison of Adversary Capabilities with Network Access Control Security 
Primitive 
Threat Category 
NAC Category 
I II III IV V VI 
I Password-protected 
dial-up.  No firewall. 
[1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [0.7,1] 1 [0.3, 0.7) 0.5
[0.7,1] 0.5 
II Remote login from 
Internet.  Firewall. 
[1] 1 [0.3, 0.7) 0.2
[0.7, 1.0] 0.8 
[0.3, 0.7) 0.5
[0.7, 1.0] 0.5 
[0.3, 0.7) 0.2
[0.7, 1.0] 0.8 
[0.3, 0.7) 0.5 
[0.7, 1.0] 0.5 
[0, 0.3) 0.8 
[0.3, 0.7] 0.2 
III Remote logins via 
VPN. 
[1] 1 [0, 0.3) 0.5 
[0.3, 0.7] 0.5 
[0, 0.3) 0.8 
[0.3, 0.7] 0.2 
[0.3, 0.7) 0.8
[0.7, 1.0] 0.2 
[0, 0.3) 0.8 
[0.3, 0.7] 0.2 
[0] 1 
IV No remote logins.  
SCADA net not 
physically isolated from 
other LANs. 
[1] 1 [0.3, 0.7) 0.2
[0.7, 1.0] 0.8 
[0.3, 0.7) 0.8
[0.7, 1.0] 0.2 
[0] 0.6 
(0, 0.3] 0.4 
[0] 0.8 
(0, 0.3] 0.2 
[0] 1 
V No remote logins.  
SCADA LAN physically 
isolated from other 
LANs. 
[1] 1 [0, 0.3) 0.5 
[0.3, 0.7] 0.5 
[0, 0.3) 0.8 
[0.3, 0.7] 0.2 
[0] 0.8 
(0, 0.3] 0.2 
[0] 0.9 
(0, 0.3] 0.1 
[0] 1 
 
This version of Table 14 was generated as follows: 
 
1) The belief that an adversary can succeed against NAC Category I is predicated on the 
ability to obtain the phone number(s) for the dial-up modems by either cyber or physical 
means.  (NOTE: The strength of the password protection would be evaluated via the 
Authentication security primitive.) 
2) Threat Category VI is unlikely to win against the higher NAC categories but has some 
chance of finding an existing vulnerability in a firewall to defeat Authentication Category 
II.  The other threat categories have evidence based on a combination of their cyber skills 
and their implementation time. 
3) NAC Category III is likely safe against adversaries without high cyber skills since an 
attack would likely exploit an implementation flaw in the VPN software.  (Again, the 
strength of the authentication would be evaluated by that security primitive.)  Imple-
mentation time is again a secondary indicator. 
4) NAC Category IV is likely safe against an adversary without medium or high physical 
access.  Cyber skills and implementation time become secondary factors. 
5) NAC Category V is likely safe against an adversary without high physical access.  Cyber 
skills and implementation time are secondary factors in how close to “0” the evidence is 
that an adversary (without high physical access) could exploit this NAC category.  
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5.6.2.3.3 User Access Control 
Table 15 assumes that anyone with medium or high physical access and medium or high cyber 
skills has some likelihood of defeating this security primitive, even if the equipment is physically 
secured.   
Table 15.  Comparison of Adversary Capabilities with User Access Control  
Security Primitive 
Threat Category 
UAC Category 
I II III IV V VI 
I Physical access 
unmonitored.  Rights 
given to everyone. 
[1] 1 [0.7,1] 1 [0.3, 0.7) 0.2
[0.7, 1.0] 0.8 
[0.3, 0.7) 0.5 
[0.7, 1.0] 0.5 
[0.3, 0.7) 0.8 
[0.7, 1.0] 0.2 
[0, 0.3) 0.8 
[0.3, 0.7] 0.2 
II Physical access 
monitored.  Rights 
given to individuals. 
[1] 1 [0.3, 0.7) 0.2
[0.7, 1.0] 0.8 
[0.3, 0.7) 0.5
[0.7, 1.0] 0.5 
[0, 0.3) 0.8 
[0.3, 0.7] 0.2 
[0, 0.3] 1 [0] 0.8 
(0,0.3] 0.2 
III Rights given to groups. 
All equipment is 
physically secured. 
[1] 1 [0.3, 0.7) 0.5
[0.7, 1.0] 0.5 
[0, 0.3) 0.8 
[0.3, 0.7] 0.2 
[0] 0.8 
(0,0.3] 0.2 
[0] 0.9 
(0,0.3] 0.1 
[0] 1 
 
This version of Table 15 was generated as follows: 
 
1) Threat Category VI is unlikely to win if physical or cyber access is controlled.  However, 
adversaries have some chance against UAC Category I. 
 
2) The performance of the other Threat Categories against UAC Category I is based on the 
combination of physical access with cyber access and implementation time being 
secondary factors. 
 
3) The performance against UAC Categories II and III then more heavily weights the 
evidence towards adversaries who have medium/high physical access and medium/high 
cyber skills. 
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5.6.2.3.4 Cryptography 
The cryptography security primitive is also based on work factor like the authentication security 
primitive.  Physical access also plays some role since it can be used to attack the key distribution 
system.  In general, work factor based attacks are more difficult against cryptosystems then they 
are against password-based authentication.  However, the difficulty of stealing keying material 
may often be comparable to that of stealing passwords.  (Table 16) 
Table 16.  Comparison of Adversary Capabilities with Cryptography Security Primitive 
Threat Category 
Cryptography Category 
I II III IV V VI 
I Plaintext over wireless [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [0.7,1] 1 
II Plaintext over Internet 
PSTN 
[1] 1 [0.7,1] 1 [0.3,7) 0.5 
[0.7,1] 0.5 
[0.7,1] 1 [0.3,7) 0.8 
[0.7,1] 0.2 
[0,0.3] 1 
III VPN with non-standard 
algorithms, key lengths 
and key management 
[1] 1 [0.3,7) 0.5 
[0.7,1] 0.5 
[0, 0.3) 0.5 
[0.3, 0.7] 0.5 
[0.3,7) 0.5 
[0.7,1] 0.5 
[0, 0.3) 0.8 
[0.3, 0.7] 0.2 
[0] 1 
IV VPN with either non-
std algorithms or key 
lengths.  Industry-
standard key 
management 
[1] 1 [0, 0.3) 0.8 
[0.3, 0.7] 0.2 
[0] 0.5 
[0, 0.3] 0.5 
[0, 0.3) 0.8 
[0.3, 0.7] 0.2 
[0] 0.8 
[0,0.3] 0.2 
[0] 1 
V VPN with industry-
accepted algorithms, 
key lengths and key 
management 
[1] 1 [0] 0.5 
[0, 0.3] 0.5 
[0] 0.8 
[0,0.3] 0.2 
[0] 0.5 
[0, 0.3] 0.5 
[0] 1 [0] 1 
   
This version of Table 16 was generated as follows: 
 
1) Plaintext over wireless channels is typically accessible to everyone.  So, Cryptography 
Category I is basically useless as a security measure.  However, adversaries with low 
cyber skills might not be able to obtain the requisite radio hardware. 
 
2) Installing a sniffer program in the public Internet or the PSTN takes a fairly high level of 
either cyber skills or physical access to the ISP or Telco equipment.  Implementation 
time is a secondary factor.  The scores for Threat Categories II through V reflect that. 
 
3) Threat Category I always wins because (even against industry-standard practices) they 
can eventually steal keying material or subvert an insider. 
 
4) The values for Threat Categories III through V against the various VPN levels need 
further study.  However, many “non-standard” aspects of crypto have been successfully 
attacked.  Examples include the original cryptography for NetScape, WEP for IEEE 
802.11b networks, and DVDs. 
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5.6.2.3.5 Integrity Checking 
This section assumes that best-practice cryptographic means are used to provide integrity check-
ing of messages and files.  So, adversary attacks against integrity checks for messages and files 
are similar to those against the cryptography security primitive. 
 
The BIT and POST functions for the process-control hardware are also assumed to be industry-
standard.  So, they will help protect against adversarial attacks against in-situ hardware.  They 
will not protect against life-cycle attacks that subvert the hardware before installation into the 
commodity delivery infrastructure’s networks. 
Table 17.  Comparison of Adversary Capabilities with Integrity Checking Security 
Primitive 
Threat Category Integrity Checking 
Category I II III IV V VI 
I No integrity checking. [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 
II Integrity checking for 
incoming messages.  
Hardware POST. 
[1] 1 [0, 0.3) 0.5 
[0.3, 0.7] 0.5 
[0, 0.3) 0.8 
[0.3, 0.7] 0.2 
[0.3, 0.7) 0.8
[0.7, 1.0] 0.2 
[0, 0.3) 0.8 
[0.3, 0.7] 0.2 
[0] 1 
III Integrity checking of 
incoming messages & 
system files.  Hardware 
BIT. 
[1] 1 [0.3, 0.7) 0.2
[0.7, 1.0] 0.8 
[0.3, 0.7) 0.8
[0.7, 1.0] 0.2 
[0] 0.6 
(0, 0.3] 0.4 
[0] 0.8 
(0, 0.3] 0.2 
[0] 1 
 
This version of Table 17 was generated as follows:  
 
1) Every adversary class wins if there is no integrity checking.   
 
2) The values for Integrity Checking Category II were set equal to those for NAC Category 
III.  In both cases, the security primitive is likely safe against adversaries without high 
cyber skills since an attack would likely exploit an implementation flaw in the integrity 
checking software or algorithm.  Implementation time is a secondary indicator. 
 
3) The values for Integrity Checking Category III were set equal to those for NAC Category 
IV.  In both cases, the security primitive is likely safe against an adversary without 
medium or high physical access.  (For example, an adversary would corrupt system files 
via a trusted-user account such as an admin account.  They might corrupt system 
hardware during their role as a trusted system installer or maintainer.)  Cyber skills and 
implementation time become secondary factors. 
 
5.6.2.3.6 Data Aging 
This security primitive is not based on work-factor.  As such, the adversary’s chance of success 
is based on more qualitative factors such as: 
 
LDRD—Critical Infrastructure Systems of Systems Assessment Methodology 
 
 78
• Knowledge of the existing time offsets between the process control system elements and 
the control center. 
• The ability to change system clock settings at a given device in order to enable a 
particular attack. 
 
Table 18.  Comparison of Adversary Capabilities with Data Aging Security Primitive 
Threat Category 
Data Aging Category 
I II III IV V VI 
I None [0.7, 1.0] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 
II Time Stamps 
[1] 1 [0.7,1] 1 [0.3, 0.7) 0.2
[0.7, 1.0] 0.8 
[0.3, 0.7) 0.5
[0.7, 1.0] 0.5 
[0.3, 0.7) 0.8 
[0.7, 1.0] 0.2 
[0, 0.3) 0.8 
[0.3, 0.7] 0.2 
III Accurate Time 
Stamps 
[1] 1 [0.7,1] 1 [0.3,7) 0.5 
[0.7,1] 0.5 
[0.7,1] 1 [0.3,7) 0.8 
[0.7,1] 0.2 
[0] 1 
 
This version of Table 18 was generated as follows: 
 
1) If there is no data aging protection then any level of adversary can replay messages at 
will if they can find the technical documentation for the message formats.  Given that 
SCADA/PCS protocol formats are widely available in textbooks and on the Web, this is a 
minimal bar.  However, adversaries with low cyber skills do have some chance of failure. 
 
2) If time stamps are used then the adversary must also be able to eavesdrop on the system 
to determine the time offsets between a particular piece of process control system 
hardware and the control center.  This requires medium to high cyber skills or medium to 
high physical access.  So, the performance of the Threat Categories against Data Aging 
Category II is based on the combination of physical access with cyber skills and 
implementation time being a secondary factor.  (NOTE: This row is set identically with 
UAC Category I.) 
 
3) If accurate time stamps are used then the adversary must be able to access the system via 
cyber or physical means to change system settings.  This often requires high cyber skills 
or high physical access.  However, implementation time is again a secondary factor that 
allows Threat Category II to often succeed. 
 
Another attack against data aging would be to alter the contents of in-transit messages to stage 
denial-of-service attacks.  Protection against message alteration is handled by the Cryptography 
security primitive. 
 
5.6.2.3.7 Logging/Monitoring/Auditing (LMA) 
This security primitive is not based on work-factor.  As such, the adversary’s chance of success 
is based on more qualitative factors, which include: 
LDRD—Critical Infrastructure Systems of Systems Assessment Methodology 
 
 79
• What is the probability that the adversaries’ exploit will be logged? 
• What is the probability that the logged data will be recognized as an exploit? 
• Is there a meaningful and timely response to a logged and assessed event? 
Table 19.  Comparison of Adversary Capabilities with Logging/Monitoring/Auditing (LMA) 
Security Primitive 
Threat Category 
LMA Category 
I II III IV V VI 
I None [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 
II Logging, but logs not 
viewed 
[1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 
III Someone watches logs [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 
IV Trained person 
watches logs 
[1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 
V Trained person 
responds in a timely 
manner 
[1] 1 [0.3, 0.7) 0.5
[0.7, 1.0] 0.5 
[0, 0.3) 0.8 
[0.3, 0.7] 0.2 
[0] 0.8 
(0,0.3] 0.2 
[0] 0.9 
(0,0.3] 0.1 
[0] 1 
 
This version of Table 19 was generated as follows: 
 
1) If there are no logs, or the logs are not viewed, then the adversary always wins.  The 
adversary also always wins if there is no response. 
 
2) The belief that an adversary can deceive a trained person is fairly subjective and based on 
their combination of cyber skills and physical access.  If the adversaries have high cyber 
skills, then they will use an exploit that will not be observable in the logs.  If they have 
high physical access, then they will bribe the monitor to simply not respond.  Imple-
mentation time is a secondary factor.  (NOTE:  The current belief values for Category V 
are identical to those for Category III of the UAC security primitive in Table 15, since 
that row is also a subjective mix of physical access and cyber skills.  Those values 
require further study.) 
 
5.6.2.3.8 System Management 
This security primitive is not based on work-factor.  As such, the adversary’s chance of success 
is based on more qualitative factors that are quite similar to those for the NAC security primitive. 
 The qualitative factors include: 
• Have exploits for a particular application or operating system (OS) existed in the past? 
• What is the likelihood that an adversary can either obtain an existing exploit or craft a 
new “zero day” exploit for a given application or OS? 
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• What is the likelihood that a given application or OS will be misconfigured to allow a 
given known exploit? 
• What is the likelihood that an adversary can use their physical access to subvert an 
insider to introduce an exploitable vulnerability? 
Table 20.  Comparison of Adversary Capabilities with System Management Security 
Primitive 
Threat Category Systems Management 
Category I II III IV V VI 
I No system 
management 
[1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [1] 1 [0.7,1] 1 
II Backups, current 
OS/Apps thru patching. 
[1] 1 [0.3, 0.7) 0.2
[0.7, 1.0] 0.8 
[0.3, 0.7) 0.5
[0.7, 1.0] 0.5 
[0.3, 0.7) 0.2
[0.7, 1.0] 0.8 
[0.3, 0.7) 0.5 
[0.7, 1.0] 0.5 
[0, 0.3) 0.8 
[0.3, 0.7] 0.2 
III Current malware 
protection tools & OS/ 
applications, backups, 
unnecessary services 
disabled, security 
testing. 
[1] 1 [0, 0.3) 0.5 
[0.3, 0.7] 0.5 
[0, 0.3) 0.8 
[0.3, 0.7] 0.2 
[0.3, 0.7) 0.8
[0.7, 1.0] 0.2 
[0, 0.3) 0.8 
[0.3, 0.7] 0.2 
[0] 1 
 
This version of Table 20 was generated as follows: 
 
1) Every threat category is likely to win against Category I (no systems management).  
However, threat Category IV may be unable to find an exploit in a timely fashion.  
(NOTE: This is identical to the belief that an adversary can defeat “plaintext over 
wireless” in Table 16.) 
 
2) For Category II (current OS through patching), the belief is predicated on the adversary 
having sufficient cyber skills to use a new zero-day exploit for an OS before it is patched 
by the system administrator.  However, they need to find an existing exploit for one or 
more applications since the site is not current on malware protection.  So, this row was 
set equal to NAC Category II (“Remote login from Internet are allowed, but a firewall is 
in place.”) 
 
3) For Category III (current OS through patching and malware protection with current 
signatures), the belief is predicated on the adversary having sufficient cyber skills to use 
a new zero-day exploit for an OS or an application before it is patched by the system 
administrator.  Alternately, the adversary might have sufficient cyber skills and 
implementation time to craft new zero-day exploits.  Finally, they might use their 
physical access and implementation time to inject vulnerabilities into the system.  One 
example is subverting the system administrators.  So, this row was set equal to NAC 
Category III (“remote logins via VPN”). 
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5.6.2.4 Example Network for Typical Commercial Installations 
Figure 36 shows a simple example network where not all links implement all three security 
primitives which may be a typical case for commercial installations.  For example, the links 1-2 
and 1-3 might be links from an external CAP (Node 1) to an internal network (Node 2) and a 
business partner (Node 3) since those two links implement the Authentication and NAC security 
primitives.  The link from the business partner to the internal network (3-2) might have NAC and 
UAC, but weaker Authentication requirements than the direct link from the external CAP.  Node 
4 might then be a host on the internal network that can cause a CoC.  From a trusted network 
(e.g., Node 2) only Authentication and UAC are implemented; NAC is added for connections 
that come directly from an un-trusted network (e.g., Node 3).  So, this example is a simple 
example of how weaker security at a business partner can weaken the CSP for a commodity 
delivery infrastructure. 
 
1
3
4
2
A = II
N = II
U = N/A
A = III
N = N/A
U = II
A = III
N = III
U = II
A = V
N = IV
U = II
A = V
N = IV
U = N/A
 
Figure 36.  Example Network 
Table 21 shows the evidence that this network’s cyber security posture will be effective against 
the defined threat categories.  This simple example is qualitatively correct since it shows that the 
network would likely not withstand a highly skilled adversary (e.g., Threat Category I).  How-
ever, it would be reasonably effective against lower-level adversaries (e.g., Threat Categories 
IV-VI) who have poor physical access.  For the medium-skilled adversaries, the proposed 
analysis technique allows an analyst to play “what if” games that complement “best practices re-
views” and red-teaming exercises.  The values in Table 21 can be calculated by convolution of 
terms or by combining the expected values for terms if the variables are noninteracting (inde-
pendent) variables.  An example of the latter technique is as follows.  The expected value inter-
val for adversary success for each security primitive can be calculated using Equation 3 in 
Appendix A with the data from Table 6, Table 7, and Table 8.  The expected value interval for 
adversary success for each path segment is the product of the expected value intervals of all the 
security primitives on that segment.  The expected value interval for adversary success for a path 
is then the product of the expected value intervals for each path segment.  System effectiveness 
for a path (the probability that the adversary is detected) is one minus the expected value interval 
of the overall probability of adversary success.  The path with the lowest midpoint value of its 
expected value interval for system effectiveness is then deemed the “weakest path”. 
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Using the data from Table 5 in Equation 3, the lower expected value for A=V under Threat 
Category III is: 0.6*0 + 0.4*0.3 = 0.12.  The upper expected value for A=V under Threat 
Category III is: 0.6*0.3 + 0.4*0.7 = 0.46.  The expected value interval is thus [0.12, 0.46]. 
 
For path segment 1-2 under Threat Category III, the expected value interval for adversary 
success is (A=V)*(N=IV) = [0.12, 0.46]*[0.38, 0.76] = [0.046, 0.35].  Similarly, for path 
segment 2-4 the expected value interval for adversary success is (A=III)*(U=II) = [0.94, 1] * 
[0.5, 0.85] = [0.47, 0.85].  The expected value interval for adversary success for path 1-2-4 under 
threat category III is [0.046, 0.35]* [0.47, 0.85] = [0.021, 0.30].  The system effectiveness is 1 -  
[0.021, 0.30] = [0.7, 0.98] as indicated in Table 21. 
Table 21.  CPS Effectiveness 
Cyber Threat 
Category 
CPS Effectiveness 
Interval 
Easiest Attack Path 
I [0] (1,3,4) 
II [0.12, 0.68] (1,2,4) 
III [0.7, 0.98] (1,2,4) 
IV [0.9, 1.0] (1,3,2,4) 
V [0.97, 1.0] (1,3,2,4) 
VI [1] No Possible Path 
 
This simple example shows the tradeoffs between business necessity (e.g., the business partner 
may need access to the internal network for maintenance reasons) and security.  The lower-level 
adversaries need to enter through the business partner’s network (1-3-2-4).  For the mid-level 
adversaries, they can defeat the protections for the service provider's business network (1-2-4).  
Finally, the highest-level adversary can penetrate the internal network directly after the 
subverting the business partner’s network (1-3-4). 
 
5.6.3 System Effectiveness Against Cyber-Enabled Physical Attack 
Prior security evaluation methodologies have assessed the effectiveness of cyber and physical 
security systems separately.  In order to quantify the effectiveness of a security system against 
blended cyber/physical attacks, it was necessary to develop a mathematical basis on which such 
quantification could be based.  This project considered two different approaches [Gordon and 
Wyss 2005].  An “Expected Value Approach” involved applying weighting factors to the 
individual component delay times and detection probabilities based on the likelihood that a cyber 
attack could disable the function for that component.  These weighted detection and delay values 
were then used in a traditional physical security analysis to estimate a weighted system 
effectiveness.  While this method was simple, it was found to exhibit a number of undesirable 
characteristics [Gordon and Wyss 2005], and was abandoned in favor of the “Bounding Analysis 
Approach”. 
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The Bounding Analysis Approach involved performing multiple separate physical security 
analyses in which individual components were presumed to be disabled based on postulated 
cyber attacks.  The likelihood of adversary success in accomplishing the postulated cyber attacks 
was considered separately and incorporated in a final overall security system effectiveness for 
each postulated blended attack.  While this method was more complex than the Expected Value 
Approach, it produced robust results that could be readily explained to both analysts and 
customers.  The remainder of this section provides a brief description of this approach.  Greater 
detail regarding the method and comparison can be found in Gordon and Wyss, 2005. 
 
For the cyber-enabled physical attack, both the cyber attack on the cyber-controlled PPS 
elements and the physical attack on the degraded PPS system must succeed for the attack to 
succeed.  The likelihood that the cyber attack succeeds is (1- PEc), and the likelihood that the 
physical attack succeeds against the degraded PPS is (1- PEpz), so the likelihood that both attacks 
succeed is the product of these two values.  The likelihood that the overall system is effective 
against the cyber-enabled physical attack (PEcp) is then 1 minus the likelihood that the attack is 
successful or: 
 
 PEcp = 1 – (1- PEc) * (1- PEpz) 
 
The overall system effectiveness against physical attacks, PEp, (which includes cyber-enabled 
physical attacks if they are possible) is then taken to be the lower of PEpo and PEcp.  Figure 28 
illustrates the approach used to estimate PEcp.   
 
System Effectiveness Against 
Physical and Cyber-Enabled 
Physical Attacks
PEcp = 1 – (1- PEc) * (1- PEpz)
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Detection – Physical Attack
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2
Response Time
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Figure 37.  System Effectiveness against a Cyber-Enabled Physical Attack 
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5.6.4 System Effectiveness Against Physical-Enabled Cyber Attack 
The system effectiveness against a physical-enabled cyber attack is a special case where the 
adversaries are must first succeed with a physical attack to reach the cyber access point within 
the facility.  No special analysis mathematics are needed for this attack type as was the case for 
the cyber-enabled physical attack (Section 5.6.3).  The CPSAM estimates the system 
effectiveness for all four attack types and displays the results in the data tree, but only the most 
successful attack is included in the risk calculation. 
 
5.7 Asset Failure Mitigation  
The adversary can choose to use any of the attack types discussed above.  The measure of asset 
failure prevention performance is considered to be the minimum of the measures for system 
effectiveness against physical attacks (PEp) and the system effectiveness against cyber attacks 
(PEc). 
 
Infrastructure facilities will likely score poorly on asset failure prevention when compared with 
hardened Government facilities.  Consequently, their ability to mitigate asset failures is an 
important part of their protection posture.  Figures 38 and 39 illustrate how asset failure 
mitigation effectiveness is addressed in this proposed methodology.  An effective response to 
asset failures may prevent a given CoC from occurring.  If there is sufficient time to either repair 
or replace the failed assets or implement an alternative mode of operation that bypasses the 
failed assets then the ultimate consequences of those asset failures may be avoided.  In practice, 
mitigation can be effective if all of the following conditions apply: 
• Written procedures are established for performing the mitigation actions. 
• Operators and maintenance personnel are trained to carry out the procedures. 
• Any spare parts or materials required for the mitigation actions are maintained in a secure 
location separate from the asset location. 
 
The Asset Failure Mitigation effectiveness is a unit-less quantity, based on the time required to 
complete the mitigation actions (Tm) and the expected time available from detection of the failure 
until the CoC is inevitable (Tme).  If the ratio of Tm to Tme is small, then it is likely that the asset 
failure can be corrected and the CoC avoided.  If that ratio is large, then there will be insufficient 
time to correct the problem caused by the asset failure, and the consequences of concern are 
likely to occur.   
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Figure 38.  Asset Failure Mitigation 
The sigmoid function shown in Figure 39 is one example of how to estimate the mitigation 
effectiveness measure from the ratio (Tm / Tme).  The values for this parameter for a given utility 
could be set via Monte Carlo simulation, game theory, or subject matter expert opinion. 
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Figure 39.  Example of Asset Failure Mitigation Measure 
An asset’s failure may not be immediately visible to system’s operator.  If no detectors monitor 
the asset’s performance or if the attacker can interfere with the detection and assessment 
processes, then some time may pass before the asset failure becomes apparent to the operators in 
terms of changes in facility performance (e.g., decreased flow in major transmission elements, 
high temperature in critical components, or complaints from end users).  The value selected for 
Tme should take into account the time required to detect the failure – including actions the 
attacker can take to delay detection.  In the simplest formulation of this methodology, the facility 
operators would provide estimates of Tm and Tme. 
 
5.7.1 Advanced Consequence Mitigation Analysis 
In the current version of CPSAM, asset failure mitigation is modeled with a simple time 
function.  However, the team recognizes that mitigation is a function of when the adversary 
actions occur in relation to the onset of consequences.  The following describes an advanced 
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consequence mitigation analysis methodology that was developed, but not included in CPSAM 
because of the large number of input data requirements. 
 
The EASI method was developed to model high-security facilities.  One of its underlying as-
sumptions is that a consequence is inevitable if the adversary force completes all of their tasks.  
This assumption is true if one is modeling the theft of nuclear material or an explosively induced 
dispersal of radioactive materials.  It is even true in many lower-security facilities if the conse-
quence can be achieved by an attack against a single target location.  However, the assumption 
fails for many highly redundant systems, and especially for systems that are both redundant and 
physically distributed, such as networked distribution infrastructures (water, electricity, telecom-
munications, etc.).  These infrastructures have been designed to withstand most single failures 
without causing large consequences in order to ensure that they are robust against natural pheno-
mena such as earthquakes and hurricanes.  To accomplish this, two major design features have 
been used: reserve capacity and redundant distribution networks.  Reserve capacity manifests 
itself in water storage tanks and electrical spinning reserve.  Redundant distribution is embodied 
in loop-type distribution architectures for electricity, water, and telecommunications, and 
redundant geographically diverse point-to-point links in other telecommunications and com-
modity-distribution applications.  The result of these design features is twofold:  
• first, the reserve capacity often gives repair crews time to respond to achieved damage 
states before actual customer consequences occur, and  
• second, redundancy often means that an adversary must attack multiple geographically 
diverse assets almost simultaneously to cause consequences.  
 
Drawing upon the event tree representation of the adversary attack to extend the EASI method 
can account for consequence achievement and consequence mitigation.  For the sake of simpli-
city in the event tree graph, this discussion neglects the step of communicating with the response 
force to initiate response as this is generally quite reliable, especially in situations where 
lightning-fast response is not expected.  Instead, we add events to the tree that consider: 
• the time required for an adversary to accomplish a sabotage event,  
• the likelihood that the adversary can successfully execute the sabotage if given sufficient 
time to carry out their plan, 
• the time delay between the sabotage event and the occurrence of consequences (owing to 
the depletion of reserve capacity within the system), and  
• the time required for a mitigation response team to repair or reconfigure the system to 
avoid consequences. 
 
In order to complete both the graphical analysis and its related mathematical implications, it is 
important that some nomenclature be established (these terms are similar in definition to those 
used in the EASI tool). 
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Attack-Phase Variables 
PDi Probability of detection at the ith security layer. 
Ti Adversary delay time (task time) at the ith security layer. 
TD Total adversary delay time for all security layers on the path (the sum of all relevant Ti 
from the point of detection to target access). 
TR Time required for the response force to interrupt the adversary, given that detection 
occurs at any point before the adversary reaches the target. 
 
Sabotage-Phase Variables 
PS Probability that the sabotage is successful, given that it is attempted. 
TS Adversary time required to accomplish sabotage, given target access. 
TRS Additional time beyond TR required for the response force to interrupt the sabotage event, 
given that the adversary gains access to the target.  This may be necessary because it may 
take longer for the responders to interrupt the adversaries if they are inside a building 
containing the asset compared with a situation where the responders can engage the 
adversaries before access occurs. 
 
Mitigation and Consequence Phase Variables 
PDS Probability that the sabotage event is detected immediately when it occurs. 
PDC Probability that the resultant consequence is detected immediately when it occurs. 
TDS Time to detect the sabotage event, given that it is not detected immediately when it 
occurs. 
TC Time delay between the sabotage event and the occurrence of the resultant consequence. 
TDC Time to detect the onset of consequences, given that consequences are not detected 
immediately when they occur. 
TM Time required to mitigate the sabotage damage or the resultant consequence. 
TRM Time required for the response force to mitigate the sabotage damage or the resultant 
consequence, given that they are present at the sabotage site if there is something that 
they can do that is quicker than TM  
 
Note that for this discussion, each probability is a point estimate value and each time is a 
probability distribution (assumed to be a normal distribution for ease of computation in the EASI 
methodology).  On the basis of this nomenclature, the event tree for the mitigation problem can 
be represented (Figure 40) as an expansion of the EASI event tree (the conditions for the “special 
mitigation tree” will be discussed as an extension in a later section). 
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Figure 40.  Example Event Tree 
In this event tree, the point estimate detection probabilities and the task time probability distri-
butions are as described for the EASI model previously.  The remainder of the event tree model 
compares the remaining barrier delay times with the responder time given that detection takes 
place at a particular security layer.  This delay time comparison is accomplished 
probabilistically, based on convolution of normal distributions for all delay times and responder 
times to determine a resulting probability that the adversaries can get through the last barrier 
before the responders can interrupt them.   
 
The results of this “race” are then combined with the calculated probability of adversary 
detection at exactly the noted layer as derived from the event tree model for detection and non-
detection at particular layers.  The probabilities are then combined to determine the likelihood 
that the adversary will be successful on each event tree path.  These probabilities are finally 
summed to determine the overall probability of adversary success for the modeled scenario.  
Based on this event tree model, the probability of adversary access PAA  (which is but one part of 
the event tree model) can be written as: 
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In this equation, the first sum represents the aggregation over all event tree paths and the product 
represents the cumulative likelihood of nondetection along the path in which detection occurs at 
exactly the ith layer.15  The second sum merely aggregates the barrier delay times for all security 
layers including and after the ith layer, and this cumulative delay is compared with the responder 
interruption time.  This equation assumes that there are (n-1) layers of protection, with the nth 
layer representing the target itself.  By convention, PDn = 1.0 and Tn = 0.0 in order to properly 
capture the situation in which the adversary accesses the target undetected. 
                                                 
15  This formulation assumes that detection occurs at the beginning of the adversary’s task time during the ith layer.  Similar formulae can easily 
be constructed assuming different detection times during the adversary’s activities at the ith protection layer, but this added complexity 
detracts from the remainder of the mitigation analysis discussion, so it is omitted here. 
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One can think of target access as the primary result of the basic EASI methodology.  The method 
can be extended to represent situations in which delayed consequences can occur and mitigation 
is possible.  The first extension simply takes the method to the point of sabotage by modifying 
two terms in the EASI formula.  First, one must consider the time it takes for the adversary to 
accomplish the actual sabotage task, denoted TS.  There is the probability that the adversaries 
succeed in their sabotage task, PS, which is likely to be near unity unless the sabotage task is 
particularly difficult or complex.  Note that the adversaries can begin their sabotage task prior to 
the arrival of the responders, so the above equation can be extended to represent the probability 
of adversary sabotage PAS as: 
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The extension of this equation to consider mitigation can be somewhat more complex, depending 
upon the assumptions one makes regarding the detection of the sabotage.  The simplest assump-
tions mathematically are that the defenders detect the sabotage immediately as it occurs (regard-
less of whether they have detected the adversaries at earlier stages of their attack).  It is further 
assumed that the sabotage mitigation efforts do not begin until the sabotage event occurs.  The 
time from the sabotage event until the consequence is manifest in the system is denoted as TC, 
while the time required for mitigation of the sabotage event is denoted as TM.  If the mitigation 
task can be accomplished before the consequence becomes manifest, then no consequence will 
be seen, otherwise the consequence will occur.  If TC and TM are normally distributed in the same 
manner as the other delay times, the probability that the adversary will produce consequences 
PAC under these assumptions can be written as: 
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The only change in this equation from the previous equation is the addition of the final proba-
bilistic term to consider the race between the mitigation tasks and consequence achievement.  
This equation is valid for all pathways in the access event tree as long as the above assumptions 
are recognized.  The duration of consequences TAC is a distribution formed by the convolution of 
the difference (TM – TC) and retaining only that portion where the difference is greater than zero. 
 
A slightly more complex mitigation analysis can be performed if one does not assume that the 
sabotage is detected immediately.  In this case, a second event tree can be constructed to 
represent the special case where the adversary achieves not only undetected access to the target 
location, but is not detected until some time after the sabotage event actually occurs.  The basis 
for this additional complexity is embodied in the “special mitigation event tree” that was referred 
to above and is now presented in Figure 41.   
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Sabotage from Undetected Access
Detected TM
No: TC > TM
C: TC < TM
Not Detected - TDS
Detected: TC > TDS TM
No C: TC > TDS + TM
C: TC < TDS + TM
Not Detected: TC < TDS
Detected - TM C
Not Detected - TDC, TM C
Special Mitigation Tree Sabotage Immediately Detected?
Detected 
Before Consequence?
Detected at 
Onset of Consequences? Consequences?
Path Consequence Duration
 1 None
 2 TM - TC
 3 None
 4 TM + TDS - TC
 5 TM
 6 TM + TDC
PDS
PDC  
Figure 41.  Second Event Tree; Adversary is Not Detected Until After Sabotage Event 
One may reasonably assume that the sabotage is immediately detected in those situations where 
the adversary is detected and the response force is summoned because the defenders have been 
alerted to the presence of intruders at the site.  Thus, the above equation for PAS is reasonable for 
all cases except where i=n.  This last term must be modified to account for the probability that 
the sabotage is not immediately detected.  Let the probability of immediate sabotage detection be 
PDS, and TDS be a distribution for the time required to detect a sabotage event, given that it is not 
detected immediately when it occurs.  Under these assumptions, the above equation may be 
rewritten as: 
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Under these assumptions, the distribution for the duration of consequences is the same as above 
for everything except the situation in which the sabotage is not immediately detected.  TAC for 
that case is the convolution of the distributions (TDS + TM – TC) and retaining only that portion of 
the distribution where the argument is greater than zero.  If we further assume that the conse-
quences are detected immediately at their onset, this resulting distribution is further limited to set 
all values greater than TM to be equal to TM. 
 
By extending this method, we can consider the possibility that the mere fact of adversary access 
to the target may make the responders’ job of interrupting the adversary more difficult and time-
consuming.  For example, perhaps the target is inside a building, and the adversaries can use the 
security features or construction of the building to defend themselves against the response force, 
or, the characteristics of the target area could require the responders to use less forceful tools and 
tactics against the adversary force lest they actually cause the consequence by their actions taken 
to neutralize the adversaries.  If either or both of these are true, then one should postulate an 
additional time required for the responders to interrupt adversaries that are inside the target 
location, and we denote this time as TRS.   
 
In the most general case, one must evaluate each detection point to determine whether detection 
at that point enables timely response before or after the adversary gains access to the target.  
Since these times are statistically distributed, it is likely that this most general situation can only 
be evaluated using simulation techniques such as Monte Carlo discrete event simulation.  
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However, for situation where the response force is particularly slow (which may be the case for 
many infrastructure analyses), closed form solutions are possible.  If the response force is 
unlikely to arrive before the adversary gains access to the target, a reasonable approximation for 
PAS can be written as: 
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Under these assumptions, an approximation for PAC for the case when sabotage events are 
immediately detected can be written as: 
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while the approximation for PAC when sabotage events are not immediately detected is: 
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The distribution for the duration of consequences unchanged from that presented for the case 
where TRS is not considered. 
 
5.7.2 Methodologies for Evaluating Multiple-Target Cut Sets 
The previous section described how the probabilities for access, sabotage, and consequences can 
be calculated for a single-target cut set using closed-form mathematical formulae under various 
sets of common assumptions.  This assumes that sabotage to a single asset is sufficient to cause 
the consequence of concern.  For multiple-target or multiple-asset cut sets, some of these proba-
bilities are more difficult to evaluate, and most notable among them is the probability that the 
consequence of concern will be realized.  This section describes algorithms that can be used for a 
couple of common sets of assumptions to evaluate multiple-target cut sets in the presence of 
mitigation. 
 
The simplest case to consider is the situation where mitigation is not present, as unrealistic as 
this may be for infrastructure security.  In this case, the correct combination of sabotage events 
will inevitably lead to consequences, and it is only the time of the onset of those consequences 
that is uncertain.  Assuming that the cut sets are minimal,16 all targets must be sabotaged in order 
for the consequence to be realized.  Thus, we are looking at the compound probabilistic event in 
which all sabotage events in the cut set occur.  Probabilistic independence of the events can 
occur under a number of circumstances, such as: 
• The adversary uses multiple attack teams and assigns one team to attack each target in 
the cut set, or 
                                                 
16 That is, each cut set represents one group of sabotage conditions that are necessary and sufficient for realization of the consequences.  Thus, all 
conditions in the cut set must occur for the consequences to be realized, and the consequences must occur if all of the conditions in the cut set 
occur (in the absence of mitigation). 
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• The adversary uses fewer attack teams, but the time required for the defenders to respond 
to each attack is so long that the attackers are likely to have accomplished their goal and 
left before the response force arrives, or 
• The list of possible cut sets is extensive enough that completion of one attack by the 
adversaries does not provide the defenders with enough information to respond 
preemptively to thwart other events in the cut set. 
If independence can be argued for the attacks in the multiple-target cut set, then one can simply 
compute the probability for adversary sabotage PAS for each attack in the cut set and multiply 
them (i.e., combine them using “AND” logic) to estimate the probability for the cut set. 
 
Independence cannot be argued for the events in the cut set when the adversary success 
probability for a subsequent attack in the cut set can change given that another attack in the cut 
set has already been carried out.  In this case, the analyst must examine the events in the cut set 
to determine the order of attacks that would be most advantageous to the adversary.  The analyst 
then computes the independent PAS for the first event and estimates conditional values for PAS for 
subsequent events.  These conditional values may be based on revised response time estimates 
TR that account for either the distraction of the response force caused by the first attack 
(increasing TR) or for the heightened state of alert or preemptive response for the response force 
caused by the attack (decreasing TR).  One may also compute independent values for PAS for each 
attack and use expert judgment to adjust the values for subsequent attacks in the cut set.  When 
the effect of an initial attack on security responders cannot be easily established a priori, 
assuming independence of the various PAS within each cut set can be a useful screening tool. 
 
Adding mitigation to this situation brings forth significant additional complications for the 
analysis process.  Recall that, under the definition of a minimal cut set, all sabotage events 
within the cut set have to be present simultaneously to realize the consequences of concern.  For 
this initial discussion, let us neglect the delayed onset of consequences, which was denoted TC in 
the previous section.  In this case, consequences occur only during the time interval between the 
last sabotage event and completion of the first mitigation event – regardless of which members 
of the cut set they are associated with.  In other words, the first repair, which ends the 
consequence, may be on any of the assets in the cut set.  Therefore, in order to accurately relate 
the probability of consequences for multiple-target cut sets, one must compute outage start times 
and outage end times as distributions for all events in the cut set and compute the appropriate 
maxima and minima during the convolution process.  Such complicated dependencies are 
extremely difficult to represent as closed-form mathematical formulae, but can be accomplished 
readily through Monte Carlo sampling algorithms. 
 
Consider now a situation where parallel simultaneous attacks occur on all assets in a multiple 
target cut set.  The method for constructing the probability of consequence occurrence for the 
overall cut set is as follows: 
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1. Construct a distribution for the time at which the adversary causes sabotage for each 
event/asset in the cut set, denoted as TAS.17  One must also have at hand the existing 
distribution for the duration of the mitigation task for each asset TM. 
2. Randomly draw an observation from the TAS and TM distribution for each asset.  
Determine the time at which the asset will be restored TAR for this observation by adding 
the selected values for TAS and TM.18 
3. Select the largest value of TAS over all assets (TAS, max) and the smallest value of TAR over 
all assets (TAR, min).  If TAR, min < TAS, max, then no consequences occur as one asset in the 
cut set was restored before the last asset was sabotaged.  Otherwise, the consequence was 
realized, and the duration for which consequences are achieved is TAC = TAR, min – TAS, max. 
4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 for a large number of observations.  The fraction of observations in 
which consequences are realized represents PAC, the conditional probability of 
consequences occurring given the fact that all assets in the cut set are successfully 
sabotaged.  The population of TAC across all observations corresponds to a distribution 
for the conditional consequence duration given that consequences occur. 
This method can be easily extended to represent situations in which there is a delay from the 
accomplishment of the final sabotage until the realization of consequences for the case where 
that delay does not depend on the order in which sabotage events occur.  If this consequence 
time is TC, then the inequality in step 3 above becomes TAR, min < ( TAS, max + TC ), and the 
consequence duration is represented as TAC = TAR, min – TAS, max – TC.  These changes simply 
account for the additional delay TC between the accomplishment of the last sabotage and the 
realization of consequences.  TC may be either deterministic or probabilistic, and if it is 
probabilistic, its distribution must also be sampled in step 2 of the above algorithm. 
 
The more general case in which TC varies depending upon the order in which the adversaries 
accomplish their sabotage objectives is beyond the scope of this paper, but can be approximated 
by judicious selection of TC in this simpler case.  If one sabotage event would usually take longer 
or otherwise be the last one accomplished, TC should be selected to correspond to that event/ 
asset.  Otherwise, one should select TC to be the value that corresponds to the shortest time from 
sabotage to consequence, although this does introduce some conservatism into the computations 
of PAC and TAC. 
 
The potential for non-simultaneous attacks introduces an additional complexity to the above 
algorithm.  If the attacks are non-simultaneous but not necessarily sequential, one can postulate 
an adversary delay time TAD for each asset or attack between some arbitrary starting time for the 
overall attack and the beginning of the attack on the specific asset.  In this case, the value 
selected for TAS, max in step 3 above must be the largest value of the quantity ( TAD + TAS ) over all 
                                                 
17 Development of this distribution is nontrivial, and is discussed in the following section. 
18 Note that one cannot simply develop a distribution and use for TAR because the restoration event is not independent of the sabotage event.  
Developing such a distribution could cause the random sampling scheme to produce such nonphysical results as “the asset is restored before 
it is sabotaged,” and will certainly produce an unrealistic distribution of the repair time over the population of random observations used in 
the Monte Carlo analysis. 
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assets, and the value of TAR, min must be the smallest value of the quantity ( TAD + TAS + TM ) as 
computed on an asset by asset basis.  TAD may be different for each asset in the cut set, and may 
be either deterministic or probabilistic.  If it is probabilistic, its distribution must also be sampled 
in step 2 of the above algorithm. 
 
In order to consider sequential attacks, the analyst must either postulate an order in which the 
attacks occur, or assess that the adversary has no preference in attack order and thus select that 
order randomly.  Often the analyst will note specific advantages for the adversary that cause one 
attack order to be preferred over the others, and if this advantage is present, the analyst should 
assume that the adversary will seek to exploit it and order the attacks in that way during the 
analysis.  For sequential attacks, TAD should be interpreted as the time from the completion of 
one sabotage event to the initiation of the next attack.  Also, the astute observer will note that 
using the independent values for TAS in a sequential attack may be significantly conservative in 
that it assumes that the adversary begins to attack each successive asset in an undetected state 
whereas in reality the detection and response at one asset may make detection a foregone 
conclusion at later assets in the attack process (e.g., the responders could arrive just as the first 
sabotage event is completed and actually chase the adversaries to their next target, obviating the 
need for further detection at that target).  Thus, the computations of PAC and TAC from methods 
that use independent values for TAS should be viewed as worst case or upper bound values.  It 
may be possible to obtain more refined estimates for these values from further analyses, but the 
added complexities are large (a new event tree would need to be developed, for example) and 
beyond the scope of this paper.  Furthermore, the results of the simple worst-case analysis should 
be useful for pointing analysts to the particular cut sets that are worthy of more in-depth 
consideration. 
 
The method for assessing sequential attacks is as follows: 
1. Construct a distribution for the time at which the adversary causes sabotage for each 
event/asset in the cut set, denoted as TAS.  One must also have at hand the existing 
distributions TM and TAD for each asset and TC for the cut set.  Determine the order in 
which the cut set assets will be attacked, numbered 1 through n. 
2. Randomly draw an observation from the TAD, TAS and TM distribution for each asset and 
the TC distribution for the system.  Since each of these values is referenced to the start of 
the specific activity, and not to the start of the overall attack scenario, we must compute 
the sabotage time for each asset in the cut set.  The sabotage time for the ith asset will be 
denoted as TSi, and is computed as 
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3. Determine the time at which the asset will be restored TARi for this observation by adding 
the selected values for TSi and TMi. 
4. Select the largest value of TSi (TAS, max) and the smallest value of TARi (TAR, min).  If 
TAR, min < ( TAS, max + TC ), then no consequences occur as one asset in the cut set was 
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restored before the last asset was sabotaged.  Otherwise, the consequence was realized, 
and the duration for which consequences are achieved is TAC = TAR, min – TAS, max – TC. 
5. Repeat steps 2, 3 and 4 for a large number of observations.  The fraction of observations 
in which consequences are realized represents PAC, the conditional probability of 
consequences occurring given the fact that all assets in the cut set are successfully 
sabotaged.  The population of TAC across all observations corresponds to a distribution 
for the conditional consequence duration given that consequences occur. 
The development of the probability of the adversary accomplishing a sabotage event was 
described in the first section of this paper.  It can be represented as a single closed-form 
equation, although the computation of the probability term ( )
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the distributions for Tk, TS, TR and TRS may require Monte Carlo analysis, depending on the form 
of these distributions. 
 
5.7.3 Development of Time for Adversary Sabotage (TAS) 
The computation of the time of the sabotage event itself is far more difficult.  Recall that there 
can be several paths through the event tree that result in a successful sabotage event.  The condi-
tional probability of sabotage for a scenario in which the adversary is detected in exactly the ith 
layer of protection is19  
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The distribution of sabotage times for this situation is a difficult conditional convolution that 
likely requires a Monte Carlo analysis.  For the simple case in which there is no response by the 
defender, the distribution for time of sabotage after the start of the attack on the asset can be 
written as  
S
n
k
kS
n
ik
k
i
k
kAS TTTTTT +=++= ∑∑∑
==
−
= 1
1
1
 
 
where detection occurs at the ith task, so the first sum represents the time spent by the adversary 
prior to detection, and the second sum represents the time spent by the adversary in defeating 
security protection layers after detection.   
 
Most traditional vulnerability analyses are concerned with task times after detection – under the 
assumption that the adversary is trying to complete the task as quickly as possible without fear of 
detection – because the analysis is seeking to determine whether the remaining adversary task 
time is sufficient to allow for a timely reaction of the response force to interrupt the adversary.  
However, when considering sabotage events with consequence mitigation, the element of time 
                                                 
19 Recall that the case where i=n represents the situation where the adversary arrives at the target undetected.  Recall also that all times T in these 
equations are viewed as distributions. 
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can be critical both before and after detection because the mitigation clock starts running upon 
the achievement of the first sabotage event and consequences occur on the completion of the last 
sabotage event.  Thus, the task time before detection can be important for all types of multiple-
target attacks when mitigation is present.20 
 
If one estimates TAS using the formula above and uses task delay times where the adversary is not 
trying to avoid detection, the resulting value for TAS is be conservatively short (maybe 
unrealistically so).  However, developing multiple estimates for each Tk and propagating each 
through the event tree to obtain a realistically weighted value for TAS is a complex and time-
intensive process that may not be worth the effort for the following two reasons: 
 
• The response force arrival times for infrastructures are often so long that an adversary 
may not realistically need to avoid detection for any part of the attack in order for the 
sabotage attack to be successful.   
• For most multiple-target attacks that are non-simultaneous, the adversaries may not seek 
stealth in attacks after the first in the hopes of completing all attacks as quickly as 
possible in order to obtain the maximum possible outage duration from the attack.   
 
Thus, for many multiple-target infrastructure attacks, estimating TAS using the above equation is 
a reasonable approximation.  A more accurate treatment of this variable would be required for 
multiple-target attacks against facilities in which the response force arrives fast enough to have a 
high probability of interrupting the adversary during the attack process. 
 
A reasonable next step toward achieving a more accurate estimate of TAS involves a rudimentary 
treatment of rapid adversary attacks.  While the event tree treatment recognizes the possibility of 
multiple detection points, real attacks are often planned to include a “practical detection point” 
(PDP).  The PDP represents the point in the attack plan before which the adversary believes that 
they will not be detected and after which they will assume that they are detected.  Often, the PDP 
is associated with the first easily detectable event in the attack plan, such as the use of overt 
force or explosives.  As an alternative, many vulnerability analysis methods make use of a 
“critical detection point” (CDP) which represents the last detection point in a facility’s defenses 
for which the response force can likely respond in time to provide timely interruption of the 
adversary’s attack.  These points can be used to estimate TAS as follows.  The sabotage event 
only occurs if the adversary task time after detection is shorter than the response time.  Thus, if 
the PDP or CDP occurs at the beginning of the ith adversary task, and, as before, the adversary 
and responder task times are represented as probabilistic distributions, a distribution for TAS can 
be estimated using the following Monte Carlo approach, as follows. 
                                                 
20  The possible exception to this statement is well-coordinated parallel simultaneous attacks in which the separate adversary teams plan their 
attacks so that they are detected simultaneously rather than being initiated simultaneously.  Such sophisticated attacks are beyond the scope 
of this paper, but may be modeled by neglecting the first sum from the equation for TAS above.  For nonsimultaneous attacks, one must also 
add the delay time between attacks TAD to this equation to obtain an accurate estimate for TAD. 
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1. Randomly draw an observation for the task time for the response times TR and TRS, the 
sabotage time TS, and for each adversary activity Tk (including those activities both 
before and after the PDP or CDP). 
2. Determine whether the sabotage would be successful if these adversary and responder 
times actually occurred.  If S
n
ik
kRSR TTTT +>+ ∑
=
, then sabotage occurs, and this 
observation contributes to the conditional distribution for TAS (recall that TAS represents 
the time at which sabotage occurs given that the sabotage event is successful).  
Otherwise, this observation is neglected because the characteristics associated with this 
observation have already been captured in PS, the probability that the sabotage is 
successful. 
3. For this observation, S
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.  This is the same formula 
used to compute TAS previously, but now it is applied only to those observations where 
timely interruption by the response force does not occur. 
4. Repeat steps 1, 2 and 3 for a large number of observations.  The population of TAS across 
those observations where sabotage occurs (i.e., where timely interruption does not occur) 
corresponds to a distribution for the sabotage time TAS. 
For more complex or highly coordinated attacks, it may be necessary to construct the entire 
attack timeline for a large number of observations using Monte Carlo discrete event simulation 
to obtain an accurate picture of the interactions between the attack timeline, the response force 
timeline, and the mitigation timeline.  Such simulation can be done efficiently based on the event 
trees shown earlier in this section.  In its simplest form, the discrete event simulation produces 
the following results for each Monte Carlo observation: 
• Is sabotage successful (yes or no)?   
• Does a consequence (e.g., outage) occur (yes or no)?   
• If the consequence occurs, what is its duration before it is terminated by mitigation 
actions? 
 
More efficient simulation options are available that produce probabilistic answers to the “yes or 
no” questions posed above should these computations become too time-consuming.  [Wyss and 
Duran 2001, Wyss et al. 2004] 
 
5.8 Conditional Risk Set Developer 
The proposed methodology helps identify why vulnerabilities exist and what causes them.  The 
end goal is a means for determining the most cost-effective options for reducing the “risk” due to 
malevolent attacks that exploit those vulnerabilities.  The Risk (R) is equal to: 
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 CPPR ASA ∗∗= |  
 
In the general case, the Probability of Attack (PA) is either: a) unknown; or b) considered 
“sensitive information” because it may be based on non-public information.  As such, this report 
focuses on the “conditional risk”, which is the risk given that an attack occurs.  In that case, the 
Conditional Risk for a given threat (RC,T) is defined as: 
 
 CPR TASTC ∗= ,|,  
 
PS|A,T is the vulnerability estimate for a given threat (T), which should be determined 
independently of the consequence.  Thus, for a selected asset, three parameters define the 
conditional risk:  adversary capability (or threat), asset vulnerability to this threat, and 
consequence linked to the asset.  A 3-dimensional plot is difficult to utilize because the 
adversary capability would require a continuum descriptor combining both cyber and physical 
attributes.  In addition, the consequence and asset vulnerability ranges estimated by the 
Belief/Plausibility function create a visual challenge for the risk analyst. 
 
The CPSAM software creates a data tree with all of the data elements and risk parameter 
estimates (Figure 42) that can be expanded to assess needed detail at various levels.  The 
CPSAM uses 2-dimensional plots of the asset insecurity and consequence with color bars to 
represent the assigned threats (Figure 43).     
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Figure 42.  Data Tree Showing Risk Parameter Estimates 
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Figure 43.  Example of Conditional Risk Set Visualization 
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6. CPSAM Analyst Software Implementation 
6.1 Architecture of CISOSAM Software 
The software is a standard Java application developed using the NetBeans 5.0 Integrated Devel-
opment Environment (IDE).  The Java 2 Standard Edition 5.0 (J2SE5.0) virtual machine is re-
quired to run the code as the software uses features new to the Java language, such as generics, 
which were not present in earlier versions of Java.  NetBeans is a free product available from 
Sun Microsystems, and NetBeans 5 comes bundled with J2SE5.0. 
 
Figure 44 shows the CISOSAM code in the NetBeans environment.  CISOSAM is a NetBeans 
project that is a Java application.21  The “Files” panel in Figure 44 shows the top-level directory 
structure of the project.  The build.xml file is used by the ant build tool within NetBeans to build 
the project; this file is automatically generated by NetBeans.  The manifest.mf file is used to 
deploy the application as a jar file.  The other files are application-specific files needed by the 
application.  The Examples directory contains saved example data files (saved in xml format) 
that can be opened for use in the application.  The remaining directories—build, dist, nbproject, 
src, and —are automatically generated by NetBeans for a project that is a Java application, as 
follows: 
• “build” contains the .class files for the virtual machine, created by compiling the .java 
source files.   
• “dist” contains the jar’d application.   
• “nbproject” contains files used by NetBeans to manage the project. 
• “src” contains the .java text source files. 
• “test” contains JUnit test files; the JUnit test harness is part of NetBeans.  JUnit tests 
were not created in this application. 
 
Figure 44 also shows the source code for Cisosam.java, which contains the main method that is 
called automatically when the application is run.   
 
Figure 45  shows selected directories and files under dist and source, and the source code for 
manifest.mf.  In manifest.mf the Main-Class, gov.sandia.cisosam.Cisosam, specifies the fully 
qualified name of the class file containing the main method; this is used for ease of executing the 
jar’d application from the java command line.  The Class-Path is “.”, which is the path specified 
by the Java System property System.getProperty(“java.user.dir”); this is the String formatted 
path to the directory from which the Java virtual machine is invoked.  dist contains an executable 
file, jdk-1_5_0_07-windows-i586-p.exe, that will install J2SE5.0 if the client does not already 
have that Java virtual machine.  The datapackage subdirectory under src contains the non-GUI 
part of a code called BeliefConvolution that convolutes numeric variables using the 
                                                 
21 Projects other than applications can be developed in NetBeans, such as: applets, servlets, JavaServerPages (JSP), and webapps. 
LDRD—Critical Infrastructure Systems of Systems Assessment Methodology 
 
 102
belief/plausibility of uncertainty.  [Darby 2006]  The org subdirectory under src contains source 
code for JFreeChart and JGraph, two graphical libraries used in the application.   
 
 
Figure 44.  CISOSAM in NetBeans 5.0 
Since the source code for these two libraries is included, the jar’d CISOSAM application will 
contain these libraries without having to include the jar’d version of each of these libraries in the 
deployment.measure of uncertainty [Darby 2006].  The org subdirectory under src contains 
source code for JFreeChart and JGraph, two graphical libraries used in the application.  Since 
the source code for these two libraries is included, the jar’d CISOSAM application will contain 
these libraries without having to include the jar’d version of each of these libraries in the 
deployment. 
 
The built-in guibuilder in NetBeans was not used to develop the GUI for most of the files used in 
CISOSAM; the GUI code was custom-developed by the developer.  However, the NetBeans gui-
builder was used for specific code used in CISOSAM, such as the DollarDialog JPanel shown in 
Figure 46.  The application has no custom-coded multithreading code beyond that used in 
libraries such as JGraph. 
 
The application saves data by creating an xml file from code objects.  Similarly, the application 
reads (opens) data by parsing a previously saved xml file and creating code objects; the parser is 
a DOM parser, not a SAX parser.  The code for reading/writing xml is in CisosamGUI.java, as 
shown in Figure 47.  
 
Figure 48 shows a top-level, simple unified modeling language (uml) description of the applica-
tion.  The solid arrows indicate association and the dashed arrows indicate dependence. 
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Figure 45.  Structure of dist and src and manifest.mf 
 
Figure 46.  Example of NetBeans GUI Builder 
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Figure 47.  Example of Code to Save in xml 
 
Figure 48. Simple UML Diagram of CISOSAM Application 
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The RiskPanel class calls methods that evaluate the risk.  Figure 49 shows the JFrame gui for the 
application with the RiskPanel selected using the Risk tab.  The major methods of interest for the 
risk calculation are noted on the class diagram for RiskPanel in Figure 48.  EASI() estimates the 
probability that a sufficient number of response force personnel will interrupt the adversary at 
some point before the adversary completes their task.  computeAssetFailureMitigation() 
computes the asset failure mitigation index.   
 
computeCyberPSeffectiveness() computes the cyber protection system effectiveness index.  
NormSDist() computes the probability that the observed value  of a standard normal random var-
iable will be less than or equal to a specified value.  readCPS() creates a HashTable for the cyber 
protection system file.  readPPS() creates a HashTable for the physical protection system file. 
 
 
Figure 49.  CISOSAM GUI JFrame 
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7. Application of CPSAM Analysis Tool 
To test the CPSAM Analysis Tool software, two test cases were formulated based on real-world 
examples.  The first test case is based on a portion of a real US city’s water infrastructure 
system. The second is a fictional high-security facility that resembles NNSA’s domestic high-
security facilities.  The two test cases were selected to exercise the tool as completely as 
possible; the water utility example is intended to demonstrate the tool’s applicability to 
examining cyber and physical security of large, networked infrastructures, while the high-
security facility example shows its usefulness in examining the many high-consequence, high-
security facilities in operation throughout the country. 
 
7.1 Water Utility 
Over the past decade, the Security Systems and Technology Center at Sandia has developed 
several Risk Assessment Methodologies (RAMs) for the assessment of security of critical infra-
structures.  The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) funded the creation and application of 
RAM-W, a methodology geared specifically toward the assessment of the security of municipal 
water systems.  Since its creation, RAM-W has been applied to many city water infrastructures. 
In order to exercise the CPSAM Analysis Tool software, the documentation and reports per-
taining to the application of the RAM-W process to a particular city were examined and used as 
references to model a portion of the real-world municipal system.  For classification reasons, the 
identity of the specific city is not disclosed and the names of the facilities have been altered. 
 
7.1.1 Facilities and Infrastructure System Layout 
Like most networked infrastructures, the city water system examined was very complex and con-
sisted of dozens of facilities, control stations, and access points.  To simplify the first test case of 
the tool, a single “arm” of the system was examined.  This arm consisted of all steps of the water 
system from beginning to end, from ground water collection and storage, to water treatment, to 
storage and eventual distribution of treated water to customers.  To fully incorporate the cyber 
security aspects of the system, the central command and control center for the system was also 
included in the analysis.  A diagram of the system and the four facilities analyzed appears in 
Figure 50.  
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Collection Facility 
Collection and Storage of 
Untreated Water
Treatment 
Plant 
Treatment of water
Reservoir 
Storage of treated Water
to customersProcess Control
Center 
Process and security control
 
Figure 50.  Schematic of Simplified Water Utility Infrastructure 
A notional layout of the four facilities were generated, including the cyber and physical security 
safeguards in place.  These layouts, seen in Figure 51 through Figure 54, could then be used to 
input the necessary information into the CPSAM analysis software. 
 
Collection Facility
Note: layout of facility is “notional”, and not either to scale or the correct orientation.
Six foot chain link fence with 3-strand 
barbed wire outrigger
Reservoir (with metal roof): 
One 10 MGal cell
Gate (with magnetic 
switches)
Hatch (with magnetic switch and 
padlock on outside)
Control Bldg.
Block construction. 
Hollow metal exterior 
doors locked and 
sensored with 
magnetic switches 
14 pumps, 
open to air
(7 gas, 7 
electric)2 surge tanks
Two Electrical 
Transformers
Overhead 
electrical 
lines to pole 
outside 
fence
 
Figure 51.  Notional Layout of Collection Facility 
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Treatment Plant
Note: layout of facility is “notional”, and not either to scale or the correct orientation.
Six foot chain link fence with 3-strand 
barbed wire outrigger
Reservoir (with metal roof): 
one 0.5M gal cell
Gate (with magnetic
switches)
Hatch (with magnetic switch and 
padlock on outside)
Chemical 
storage 3 sided sheet metal
1 side chainlink with 
padlock, no sensor
5,000 to 10,000 
gallons of sodium 
hypochlorite 
9 pumps, covered 
but not enclosed
(6 gas, 3 electric)
Electrical 
Transformer
Overhead electrical lines 
to pole outside fence
 
Figure 52.  Notional Layout of Treatment Plant 
Reservoir
• Note: layout of facility is “notional”, and not either to scale or the correct 
orientation.
Six foot chain link fence with 3-strand 
barbed wire outrigger
Reservoir (with metal roof): 
two 30 MGal cellsInput/Output Lines
Gate (with magnetic 
switches)
Hatch (with magnetic switch and 
padlock on outside)
Control Bldg.
Block construction.
Doors to pump room 
and control room are 
locked and have
magnetic switches. 
Overhead 
electrical 
lines to pole 
outside 
fence
Lines are 
above ground
 
Figure 53.  Notional Layout of Reservoir Facility 
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Process Control Center
Outer perimeter of building and parking 
lot is “unfenced” with no access control, 
building is in downtown area of city
Entrance to 1st floor 
parking garage, no
access control
2nd Floor 
SCADA
Control Room, above garage
Concrete/Brick Building
Guard at 
Front Desk
Keyed 
Elevator to 
2nd floor
1st Floor of 
Admin Building 1st Floor
Parking Garage
Door from street, 
open during day, 
locked at night
Door from garage 
to 1st floor, open 
during day, locked 
at night
Note: layout of facility is “notional”, and not either to scale or the correct orientation.
45-minute 
UPS
Backup
generator
Buried incoming 
electrical line
 
Figure 54.  Notional Layout of Process Control Center 
Finally, the overall network architecture of the SCADA and the cyber-security controls were 
determined using information available in the RAM-W report.  Assumptions based on expert 
opinion were made to fill in any gaps in necessary data.  The cyber security primitives were 
found to be relatively weak, with the best security measures rating only a Category II.  Refer to 
Section 5.6.2.2 for further details on the cyber security primitive category ratings.   
 
The network topology is shown in Figure 55 and the security primitive ratings are described 
below. 
 
Internet
(A,NAC)
Dial-Up Modem
SCADA Controls
(Reservoir)
Wireless Link
(Crypto)
Cyber Network Topology – Water Utility
(NAC)
SCADA Controls
(Collection Facility.)
(Crypto)
SCADA Controls
(Treatment Plant)
Wireless Link
(Crypto)
PPS Control Net 
and SCADA
(Process Control Center)
Business
Network 
(Process Control Center)
 
Figure 55.  Water Utility Network Topology 
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The water utility had relatively poor cyber security at its process control center.  The Authenti-
cation security primitive (password strength) was considered to be Category II which is “weak 
passwords with no periodic changes”.  At the time this scenario was analyzed with the CPSAM 
tool, only the authentication security primitive was available. 
  
The Network Access Control (NAC) security primitives were considered to be a mix of Category 
I and Category II.  There was remote login via password-protected dial-up connections to the 
SCADA LAN at the process control center.  This is NAC Category I for that access path.  
However, there was a firewall between the administrative LAN and the SCADA LAN which was 
likely Category II for that access path.  That category is “remote logins are allowed from the 
Internet but IP address filtering and port blocking is used”. 
 
User Access Control (UAC) security primitive was optimistically modeled as Category II.  In 
that case, physical access in monitored and rights are assigned to individual users.  This is 
somewhat optimistic since the dial-up modem uses a shared account. 
 
The Cryptography security primitive was modeled as Category I because the system used 
plaintext communications over wireless channels.  This is somewhat pessimistic since some of 
the communications between the control center and the PCS devices used VLANs over a private 
Intranet.  Those links would be Category II for this security primitive. 
 
The Data Integrity, Data Aging, and Logging/Monitoring/Auditing security primitives were all 
modeled as Category I, which means that nothing was implemented for these three security 
primitives. 
 
The System Management security primitive was modeled as Category II.  This entails backups 
and current security patches to the operating system and applications. 
 
7.1.2 Consequence Inputs 
The consequences of concern to the water utility, and the resulting approximate economic 
damages, are from the RAM-W report.  The consequences of concern and the primary facilities 
where those concerns are paramount include: 
 
• Interrupt or Reduce Ability to Tap Untreated Water —  Collection Facility 
• Interrupt or Reduce Ability to Treat Water Supply —  Treatment Plant 
• Interrupt or Reduce Ability to Store Treated Water —  Reservoir 
• Interrupt or Reduce Ability to Distribute Water —  Process Control Center 
 
These consequences are not exclusive to particular sites; the damaging or disabling of any site 
will likely have consequences in all four areas.  In addition, the consequences are described in 
relative categories of “High”, “Medium”, or “Low”, depending upon the length of the outage, the 
number of customers impacted, resulting health impacts, and the damage to the overall system.  
Figure 56 shows the inputs for the consequence: “Medium Loss in Ability to Store Treated 
Water”.  Based on available information, this consequence ranges between $1 million and $10 
million.  The monetary cost is the only information available, however, so there is no evidence to 
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assign greater weight to any particular portion of that spectrum.  As such, the degree of evidence 
across the range is equivalent at 1.0.  Also, there is no need to “Set Willingness to Pay” because 
this consequence is already measured in dollars.  These features are, however, used in the High-
Security Facility example described in Section 7.2. 
 
 
Figure 56.  Water Utility Consequence Screen Inputs 
A subset of the consequences analyzed for this test case is listed in Table 22.  This list is merely 
a small group of the overall possible consequences; the consequences listed are in terms of eco-
nomic damage, but the analysis could also be conducted by converting native units such as the 
duration of the outage or the number of water system users impacted to dollars using the 
Willingness to Pay feature on the Consequence input screen. 
Table 22.  Water Utility Consequences Analyzed 
Consequence ID Min value Max value 
High loss of ability to store treated water $10 million $100 million 
Medium loss of ability to store treated water $1 million $10 million 
Low loss of ability to store treated water $1 thousand $1 million 
High loss of ability to distribute water supply $10 million $100 million 
Low loss of ability to tap untreated water supply $1 thousand $1 million 
Medium loss of ability to treat water supply $1 million $10 million 
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7.1.3 Cyber Inputs 
The information on the physical and cyber security systems in the diagrams above, taken from 
the RAM-W report, were then input into the CPSAM software.  The first step on the Facility in-
put tab is to input the Cyber Location information, i.e., the cyber network topology and security 
primitive categories.  To input this information into the CPSAM software, a graph similar to the 
one in Figure 55 is created, and the security primitive categories are attached to the network 
links. 
 
 
Figure 57.  Water Utility Cyber Location Screen Inputs 
In the case shown in Figure 57, the authentication primitive (passwords) is the only one utilized 
between the networks.  The links from the Internet and the Business Network to the SCADA 
Control Network are given Category II ratings (weak passwords, no periodic changes), while the 
links from the SCADA Control Network to the SCADA networks at the individual facilities have 
Category I authentication (no passwords).  A cyber attack need only breach the central SCADA 
Control Network, via the Internet and/or Business Network and weak passwords, to gain access 
to the SCADA and security controls of all the sites.  This model follows the RAM-W report, 
which shows the relatively antiquated SCADA and security control network of the water utility.  
 
7.1.4 Physical Inputs 
The physical protection features of each facility – including locks, doors, access controls and 
intrusion sensors – are input into the Facility/Physical Location screen.  Each facility can be 
input multiple times with slight variations to the Physical Location screen inputs to show the 
result on security effectiveness of degradation or upgrades to physical protection features.  Also, 
changes can be made to show how effective the security system is if the adversary starts at 
different points in the facility, such as an insider having access to bypass the first layer of 
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security but not the second.  The software tool has the potential to handle hundreds of these 
variations on a single facility or set of facilities.  
 
An example screenshot of the Reservoir facility, modeled from the adversaries starting outside 
the perimeter fence and with all parameters from Figure 53, is seen in Figure 58. 
 
 
Figure 58.  Physical Location Screen Input for Reservoir Control Room Access 
Each physical security feature can be tied to a particular cyber network feature that can control 
it. In the figure above, the Interior Sensor – Door/Window BMS is controlled by the PPS Control 
Net through the Reservoir SCADA.  This means that if the adversaries have sufficient cyber-
skills to break into the PPS Control Net they can disable that Door BMS (balanced magnetic 
switch) sensor.  By turning off this sensor, a cyber-enabled physical attack would likely have a 
greater chance of succeeding because the detection value of the sensor is lost.  
 
Also on this screen, the user inputs the travel time between layers and the characteristics of the 
response force.  In this example, the travel times between the first layer and the second layer is 
45 seconds, while the travel time between the second layer and the target is 30 seconds.  The 
response force characteristics are set to the probable response times stipulated in the RAM-W 
report, which is a city police patrol of two officers, armed with standard sidearms, arriving 15 
minutes after the first alarm. 
 
7.1.5 Asset Inputs 
The asset input screen allows the user to combine all the necessary information inputted at prior 
screens – a physical location, a cyber location, a consequence, and a total task time – to define a 
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target asset.  The physical location selection is the physical path the adversary must take to reach 
the asset – and the physical security safeguards that must be bypassed or overcome with physical 
or cyber means.  The cyber location selection lists all the cyber locations previously specified on 
the cyber input screen.  If the target asset is not cyber-controlled (i.e., the consequence of 
concern for the target asset cannot be accomplished through cyber means alone), the cyber 
location selection is left as N/A.  Finally, a consequence must be associated with a successful 
attack on the asset and the total task time it would require to successfully complete the attack 
task once the adversaries have gained access to it.  All of this information is then saved as an 
“asset”.  A large list of assets can be made based on the many permutations and combinations of 
physical locations, cyber locations, consequences, and task times.  These assets are compared to 
the threats defined on the next screen to determine the security effectiveness of the facility.  
Figure 59 shows an example of one of the assets defined for the water system.  
 
 
Figure 59.  Asset Input Screen, Attack on Reservoir Control Building 
Table 23 shows the list of assets input for the sample analysis.  Many additional assets are 
possible; only a small group was selected to simplify the analysis and results.  Also, a standard 
600-second (10-minute) task time was selected for each asset as a starting point for the analysis. 
For this analysis, each cyber location is given a value of “N/A”, meaning that the asset is not 
cyber-controlled and a consequence of concern cannot be caused by cyber means alone. 
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Table 23.  List of Defined Assets for Water Utility 
Asset Name Physical Location Cyber 
Location 
Consequence Task time 
(sec) 
Process Control 
Facility – main 
control room 
Process Control Facility 
– outside to inside 2nd 
floor control room 
N/A High loss of ability to 
distribute water 
supply 
600 
Collection Facility – 
pump access inside 
control room through 
gate 
Collection Facility – 
outside gate to inside 
control building 
N/A Low loss of ability to 
tap untreated water 
supply 
600 
Collection Facility – 
pump access inside 
control room through 
fence 
Collection Facility – 
outside fence to inside 
control building 
N/A Low loss of ability to 
tap untreated water 
supply 
600 
Treatment Plant – 
attack on chemical 
storage area 
Treatment Plant – 
outside gate to inside 
chemical storage 
N/A Medium loss of ability 
to treat water supply 
600 
Reservoir – attack on 
controls in control 
room thru gate 
Reservoir – outside gate 
to inside control building 
N/A High loss of ability to 
store treated water 
600 
Reservoir – attack on 
controls in control 
room thru fence 
Reservoir – outside 
fence to inside control 
building 
N/A High loss of ability to 
store treated water 
600 
Reservoir – attack on 
outside of reservoir 
itself 
Reservoir – outside 
fence to inside reservoir 
itself 
N/A Medium loss of ability 
to store treated water 
600 
Reservoir – attack 
inside reservoir hatch 
Reservoir – outside 
fence to inside reservoir 
itself 
N/A Medium loss of ability 
to store treated water 
600 
 
7.1.6 Threat Inputs 
Four threats are defined using the threat input screen seen in Table 24.  These represent a 
categorical grouping of the threats that may be expected of a water utility target.  Representing 
the most sophisticated attacks, the “high-level terrorist” threat combines a high level of physical 
attack expertise, equipment, and automatic weapons with a moderate amount of cyber skills.  
(See Figure 60 for an input screen of the high-level terrorist threat.)  The “low-level terrorist” 
threat represents a smaller group of individuals, with less equipment, expertise, few cyber skills, 
and handguns.  The “disgruntled employee” threat incorporates the lowest physical-only attack, 
with a single individual’s equipment limited to power tools, no cyber skills, and no weapons.  
Finally, the “Lone Hacker” represents a fairly skilled hacker with very little inclination to physi-
cally attack a facility.  
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Table 24.  Threats Analyzed for Water Utility 
Threat name Number of Adversaries Tools Cyber Threat Weapon 
High-level terrorists 4 Vehicle Category III Automatic 
Low-level terrorists 2 Power tools Category VI Hand Gun 
Disgruntled employee 1 Power tools Category VI None 
Lone hacker 1 Hand tools Category IV None 
 
 
 
Figure 60.  Threat Input Screen, High-level Terrorist Input 
7.1.7 Mitigation Inputs 
The RAM-W report did not include information on the mitigation of consequences after a 
successful attack.  As such, this feature was not included in the initial test-case analysis. 
 
7.1.8 Risk Results 
Using the inputs described above, the risk to the municipal water infrastructure facilities was 
analyzed.  The results are conditional risk, and the assumed probability of attack is equal to 1.0.  
 
Figure 61 shows the Conditional Risk Plot for the Process Control Facility – main control room 
asset.  The plot shows graphically what the Data Trees tab shows numerically: the cyber and 
physical security systems are largely effective against the Lone Hacker and Disgruntled 
Employee threats.  The Asset Insecurity for each of these two threats is 0.17 (conversely, the 
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System Effectiveness for each is 0.83).  The plot shows that the system effectiveness for the low- 
and high-level terrorist threats is much less, with asset insecurity for the low-level terrorists at 
0.68 and the asset insecurity for the high-level terrorist threat at 0.95. 
 
 
Figure 61.  Conditional Risk Plot for Process Control Facility 
Similar numerical and plot output for the other assets allows analysts and decision-makers to 
determine which assets are least secure when attacked with combined physical and cyber 
methods, and which have the greatest consequences associated with them. 
 
Information of potential value to decision-makers gleaned from this simple analysis includes: 
 
• Protecting against the highest-level threat, high-level terrorists, may not be possible and 
may require acceptance of that risk by decision-makers, and a subsequent review of the 
facility’s mitigation plans.  The Asset Insecurity for all assets against this threat ranges 
from 0.95 to 1.0.  Even when the adversaries are detected and the response force arrives 
in time, such as with the Process Control Facility asset, the responding police patrol does 
not have sufficient weaponry or staffing to stop the well-armed adversaries from accom-
plishing their task. 
• As currently designed, the system is not very effective against low-level threats, such as 
the Disgruntled Employee.  While having little to no cyber skills and no inclination 
toward violence, this threat is able to enter most facilities and complete the task because 
the response times to most of the remote, unmanned facilities are very lengthy.  At the 
two facilities with shorter response times, the Treatment Plant and the Process Control 
Facility (5 minutes and 2 minutes respectively), this low-level threat was largely 
ineffective in its task.  Decreasing the response time to the other facilities, or dramatically 
increasing the task time necessary to cause a consequence of concern, will have similar 
propitious effects, as the software tool can show. 
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• As currently modeled – with assumptions based on best available information – CoCs 
cannot be caused by cyber means alone, which stymies the Lone Hacker threat, because 
they cannot accomplish their goals through only cyber means.  However, if certain CoCs 
can be caused via the computer network, increased cyber security protections should be 
installed to prevent the Lone Hacker threat from successfully causing a consequence.  
• With additional combinations of threats, the tool shows that a skilled hacker working in 
concert with a moderately skilled, non-violent physical attack team may be just as 
successful at attacking the water infrastructure as a full-blown, highly skilled and violent 
terrorist team.  With a skilled hacker being able to turn off most of the physical intrusion 
detection sensors, an individual or team could enter the unmanned sites without risk of 
detection and spend as much time as necessary to complete their task.  The only facilities 
where this is not true are those that are manned 24 hours a day, such as the Process 
Control Facility.  This shows that cyber-enabled physical attacks can be a concern for 
facility providers even if a cyber-only attack cannot directly cause a consequence of 
concern. 
 
7.2 High-Security Facility 
The Sample Uranium Reprocessing Facility (SURF) is a fictional high-security facility that 
stores, handles, and processes highly enriched uranium.  The facility layout and security 
safeguards are loosely based upon those present in real-world, high-security facilities of a similar 
nature.  However, because the facility is fictional, more flexibility is given to test various inputs 
to the CPSAM software tool.  Assumptions and inputs were changed based upon the circum-
stances that would most fully exercise the tool. 
 
7.2.1 Facility Layout 
Like most high-security facilities, the SURF has “defense-in-depth” of concentric rings of 
security layers.  As shown in the figures below, SURF has essentially three layers of protection: 
the Limited Area, the Protected Area, and the Material Access Area.  The first layer, the Limited 
Area, is surrounded by an eight-foot-high, barbed wire-topped, chainlink fence.  The fence does 
not have sensors, but the Limited Area has random guard patrols at all times and several gates 
with identification (ID) checks during operational hours.  The gates are locked at night and have 
balanced magnetic switch (BMS) detection and vehicle barriers in place when not in use.  
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Limited Area
Shipping / Receiving
Personnel
Motor Pool
Lab
Lab
Lab Medical Cafeteria Shop
Steam Plant
CAS
Foundry
Chemical
Recovery
Lab
Fire 
Dept
EOC
Lab
Water 
tank
Fuel 
tank
Hazmat 
storage
Beam Lab
Gate 1
Gate 2
Gate 3
Gate 4
Limited Area
Protected Area
8 ft high chain link, 3 strand barbed wire outrigger
Guard at each gate checking badges 
of workers in vehicles during 
operational hours, random patrols all 
hours, LA gate guards and patrols 
armed with pistols and duress but not 
protected
Gate 1 open 24/7, Gates 2-4 locked down at nightNo detection on fence, locked gates have vehicle 
barriers in place and BMS detection  
Figure 62.  SURF Limited Area Layout 
Inside the Protected Area (shown in Figure 63), another layer of defense exists around several 
critical buildings.  The Protected Area is surrounded by a double PIDAS fence, which consists of 
an isolation zone with various intrusion detection technologies.  Entry and exit to the Protected 
Area is accomplished through a personnel portal.  Occasional official vehicles requiring access 
to the area are screened in a nearby vehicle portal.  All personnel and vehicles are subjected to 
various tests for explosives, metals, and special nuclear material (SNM). 
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Foundry
Chemical
Recovery
Analytic Lab
8 ft high chain link, 3 strand barbed wire outrigger, double fence, 30 ft PIDAS
Cameras
Protected Area
Transformers
Microwave and buried coax cable in PIDAS, 
taut-wire on inner fence
Vehicle Portal
Storage 
bunkers
Sensor 
boxes
Personnel 
Portal
Two guards at PA portals, small arms 
protected w/ duress
Material Access Area
Protected Area
Metal & explosives detection, badge 
swipe and PIN, SNM detection on exit
No personal vehicles in PA, only 
authorized official vehicles
 
Figure 63.  SURF Protected Area Layout 
Finally, certain buildings within the Protected Area are given another layer of protection.  Figure 
64 shows the Material Access Area (MAA) of the Chemical Recovery Building.  The doors and 
access points to the MAA have sensors, with guards and further identification verification at the 
entry point.  A fortified vault is also present for storage of the special nuclear material (SNM) 
during non-operational hours. 
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MAA Portal, two guards at post, 
small arms protected, w/ duress
MAA EMX
EMX
MAA
EMX
MAA
EMX
SNM Vault
Main Entrance
Processing Area
Offices
O
ffi
ce
s Material Access 
Area
Material Access Area
Chemical Recovery Building
BMS on all doors, crash bars on EMXs
2’ thick concrete block walls with rebar
All doors locked down at night, main 
entrance open during day
All MAA workers and security forces 
are enrolled in HRP
MAA access requires 
exchange badge and 
badge/PIN swipe
In emergency, MAA and PA workers are told to 
gather in a specified area within the PA and are 
checked for SNM before leaving or returning to work
Standard vault 
construction 
and vault door
 
Figure 64.  SURF Material Access Area Layout 
With the physical layout of the SURF established, the cyber layout was examined.  In most high-
security facilities, the networks controlling classified information and processes, the security 
control network, and the open Internet or business networks are completely separate.  With no 
physical or cyber connections between the networks, they are “air-gapped”.  The cyber network 
topology shown in Figure 65 shows no connections between the three networks present at the 
SURF. 
 
Internet
PPS Control Net 
(CAS and SAS)
Classified Network
 
Figure 65.  SURF “Air-gapped” Network Topology 
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Air-gapped systems enhance cyber security because an adversary must gain physical access to 
the security network – usually only possible from within the facility – to alter or bypass physical 
security safeguards controlled by the network.  But, if an insider adversary were to gain access to 
the security network, or simply bridge the network such that the “air gap” was bridged and the 
security network could be accessed from outside the facility, a cyber-enabled physical attack 
could be devastating.  Figure 66 shows a simple diagram of the compromised insider-bridged 
SURF networks. 
 
Internet
PPS Control Net
(CAS and SAS)
Classif ied Netw ork
 
Figure 66.  SURF Insider-bridged Network Topology 
Each of these cases was analyzed to examine how the security effectiveness would change given 
partial or full cyber-access to the entire security control network. 
 
7.2.2 Consequence Inputs 
The possible consequences of an attack on a facility such as SURF are numerous and widely 
varied.  Consequences could include theft of classified documents/material, theft of various 
forms of SNM, employee health impacts or deaths, contamination of facilities or surrounding 
populations from radiological dispersal device (RDD) detonations, political and social impacts to 
the nation, and more.  Many of these consequences are not direct economic damage or recon-
struction costs and cannot be easily defined in units of dollars.  The CPSAM software helps elicit 
from the user the information needed to convert the more nebulous, qualitative consequence 
units into dollars.  
 
For the SURF test case described, the two consequences of concern modeled are RDD 
detonation inside the facility and RDD detonation outside the facility.  Two likely goals of an 
adversary attacking a facility like SURF would be to acquire SNM and either detonate it within 
the building – thus contaminating the building and requiring extensive cleanup – or take it 
outside the building to detonate an RDD and contaminate much of the site and perhaps the 
surrounding countryside and population. 
 
In this model, cleanup costs of a detonation within the building can be quantified fairly easily in 
terms of dollars: a minimum value of cleaning up a single, lightly contaminated room all the way 
up to a maximum value of removing and replacing the entire contaminated building.  Because 
the adversary team would have to hand-carry the explosives needed into the building, it is 
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considered more likely that they would only be capable of accomplishing a small RDD. This 
information is translated into the software tool via the “Degree of Evidence” inputs.  A greater 
degree of evidence is given to the lower end of the scale than the higher as seen in Figure 67. 
 
 
Figure 67.  Degree of Evidence Inputs for RDD Inside Consequence 
Total costs for an RDD detonated outside a building are more difficult to quantify. Perhaps 
easier to quantify are the number of people affected by the contamination.  As modeled, the 
detonation would likely affect between 50 (the number of people working in the immediate 
vicinity of the Protected Area onsite) and 5,000 (the number of people working on the entire site 
plus the civilian population living in the immediate vicinity of the SURF).  Again, it is deemed 
more likely that the number of people affected would be at the lower end of this scale, so the 
Degree of Evidence is set higher for the lower end.  But because the unit of measure used for this 
consequence is people, the “Set Willingness to Pay” feature must be used to convert to dollars. 
This conversion would likely be hotly debated with a discussion between many stakeholders; for 
this analysis, a set of somewhat arbitrary numbers was used to make a conversion graph (Figure 
68) that would likely be similar to real-world numbers. 
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Figure 68.  Willingness to Pay Conversion Plot for RDD Outside Consequence 
7.2.3 Cyber Inputs 
The inputs for the Cyber Location screen are based upon information described in Figure 65 and 
Figure 66.  For the air-gapped cyber topology, the boxes representing the different networks are 
kept unlinked.  For the insider-bridged topology, a link is established between the Internet access 
point and the PPS Control Net.  A fairly high cyber security posture is established between the 
two, as it will require significant resources – either the recruitment/placement of one or more 
insiders, or stealth/subterfuge to access the facility – to successfully bridge the networks.  This 
will obviously require adversaries to have a very high level of cyber security expertise to 
accomplish, and may limit the effectiveness of adversaries with lesser cyber skill.  
 
7.2.4 Physical Inputs 
Three physical locations are defined for the SURF analysis. All final target locations are within 
the Chemical Recovery Building’s MAA, though different adversary paths are taken to reach it. 
The first defined physical location starts with the adversaries already within the Limited Area, 
with the assumption made that they could bypass the relatively light security surrounding the 
Limited Area.  In this case, the adversaries must still negotiate the security of the Protected Area 
and MAA layers by proceeding through the PIDAS fence and an emergency exit door, 
respectively.  The second case requires the adversaries to go through the same portions of the PA 
and MAA security layers, while starting outside the Limited Area fence.  These two will be 
compared to see how much value the Limited Area security is adding to the system.  Finally, the 
third physical location defines an adversary path from outside the entire facility to within the 
MAA by first traversing the outer fence, the PIDAS, and then breaching the wall of the MAA. 
The second and third case will allow a comparison on MAA breaching methods.  
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7.2.5 Asset Inputs 
With two consequences and three physical locations defined, a total of six assets were modeled. 
It was decided that no consequence could be caused by cyber-means alone, so the Cyber 
Location for all assets is N/A. Task times were based on the consequence selected: the RDD 
inside the building would likely take less time to construct and accomplish and is given a task 
time of five minutes (300 seconds) while an RDD detonated outside the building would 
necessarily take more effort to successfully accomplish and is given a task time of 10 minutes 
(600 seconds).  
Table 25  List of Defined Assets for SURF 
Asset Name 
(SNM Sabotage) Physical Location Cyber Location 
Consequence:  
RDD Detonation Task time (sec) 
Enter through EMX – 
RDD outside 
Enter MAA 
through EMX 
N/A Outside facility 600 
Enter through wall – 
RDD outside 
Enter MAA 
through wall 
N/A Outside building 600 
Enter through EMX – 
RDD inside 
Enter MAA 
through EMX 
N/A Inside building 300 
Enter through wall – 
RDD inside 
Enter MAA 
through wall 
N/A Inside building 300 
Adv inside LA – Enter 
thru EMX – RDD 
outside 
Adv inside LA – 
Enter MAA 
through EMX 
N/A Outside building 600 
Adv inside LA – Enter 
thru EMX – RDD 
inside 
Adv inside LA – 
Enter MAA 
through EMX 
N/A Inside building 300 
 
7.2.6 Threat Inputs 
The threats analyzed for the SURF (Table 26) are similar to those analyzed for the Water Utility, 
but because the facility is hardened the adversary teams are given greater numbers.  
Table 26  Threats Analyzed for SURF 
Threat Name Number of Adversaries Tools Cyber Threat Weapon 
High-level terrorists 8 Vehicle Category III Automatic 
Low-level terrorists 4 Explosives Category VI Hand Gun 
Anti-nuclear Activists 2 Power tools Category VI None 
Lone hacker 1 Hand tools Category IV None 
 
7.2.7 Mitigation Inputs 
Mitigation was not included in the test-case analyses. 
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7.2.8 Risk Results 
First, an assessment of the value of the Limited Area protection layer to the overall security 
system was made.  By comparing the “Adv inside LA – Enter thru EMX – RDD outside” asset 
and the “Enter thru EMX – RDD outside” asset, it was seen that there was no significant change 
in the final risk results when the adversaries started from outside the Limited Area or within the 
Limited Area.  Because the Limited Area had so little detection value, its layer of security was 
providing no benefit to the final security effectiveness. 
 
Also, an evaluation was made of the effect of the adversary path going through the wall of the 
MAA versus through the Emergency Exit (EMX).  It was found that this only affected the lower 
level threats.  The Anti-nuclear Activists and Lone Hacker threats had relatively low Asset 
Insecurity values of 0.02 when going through the EMX; when forced to go through the wall of 
the MAA, this value dropped to zero.  This is likely because the equipment available to these 
threats, i.e., power tools and/or hand tools, are not sufficient to breach the wall.  
 
The risk for the SURF was also analyzed against two cyber security configurations: air-gapped 
and insider-bridged.  On the air-gapped configuration, the cyber skills of the adversary meant 
very little; only the physical attack attributes were important to the final result.  Accordingly, the 
system is very effective against the Lone Hacker and Anti-nuclear Activists threats – which have 
very little physical capability – as seen in Figure 69.  The terrorist threats with much greater 
physical assault capability are much more effective at defeating the security system. 
 
 
Figure 69.  SURF Air-gapped Cyber Configuration Results 
When the insider-bridged cyber-security topology is analyzed, the threats with significant cyber-
skills should be more successful in penetrating the overall security system.  Figure 70 shows the 
same asset and threats as the previous figure, but with an insider-bridged link between the Inter-
net and the PPS Control Net.  This link is given a Category 4 authentication protection to simu-
late the difficulty in accomplishing this bridge.  The only threat that has appreciably improved its 
chance of success in attacking the target is the Lone Hacker, which has increased from a 0.02 
asset insecurity to a 0.43.  The low-level terrorists and Anti-nuclear Activists do not have the 
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requisite cyber capabilities to take advantage of a potential insider-bridged cyber topology to 
shut down elements of the PPS.  
 
Interestingly, the high-level terrorist threat results do not change between the two scenarios, 
remaining constant at 0.92.  This result shows that this high-level threat does not rely upon its 
considerable cyber skills to accomplish its mission; it is just as successful at defeating the 
security system through purely physical assault as with a combined cyber and physical attack.  
 
 
Figure 70.  SURF Insider-bridged Cyber Configuration Results 
Figure 71 shows the results if an asset is modified to be cyber-controlled and the insider-bridged 
cyber topology is kept.  It shows that the Lone Hacker threat now has the greatest chance of 
successfully causing a consequence through cyber-only means.  Because the mathematics used 
by the software to calculate asset insecurity of cyber-only attack is based on belief and 
plausibility, the asset insecurity result is now an interval instead of a point estimate.  And, 
because the cyber-only interval covers higher values than the point estimate for a physical-only 
and cyber-enabled physical attack (see Figure 71), the cyber-only attack is the best option for the 
Lone Hacker. 
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Figure 71.  SURF Cyber-controlled Consequence Results 
 
8. Summary and Next Steps 
Security assessment methods, engineering failure analysis methods and risk assessment methods 
all have similar purposes that seek a better understanding of system failures that cause significant 
consequences.  Physical-security assessment methods and cyber-security assessment methods 
also share this same purpose.  However, differing historic approaches to achieve these purposes 
provided significant challenges to develop a risk assessment methodology that supports analysis 
of integrated physical and cyber security elements within critical infrastructure systems. 
 
Analytic methods for engineering failure analysis provide a foundation for what system 
components and sequences of events must fail to cause a specific consequence.  Yet, security 
assessments require additional steps to understand whether an adversary capability can overcome 
security systems that protect critical components.  Physical security analysis uses a “detect, delay 
and respond” method to evaluate physical system effectiveness; however, cyber security analysis 
typically uses “best practices” or “red team engagements” to evaluate cyber system 
effectiveness. When path-based approaches (e.g., attack graphs) are used to evaluate cyber 
protection systems [Lippmann and Ingols, 2005; Amenaza Technologies], those analyses 
typically lack the quantitative details found in PPS analyses.  Risk analysis requires integration 
of consequence and vulnerability estimates to gauge the potential impacts to critical 
infrastructure.  Integrating select aspects from each of these methods was the key to achieve the 
project goal. 
 
Through this LDRD project, the physical security and cyber security team members researched 
historical approaches, retained valuable aspects of those approaches, and developed a truly 
integrated cyber/physical security assessment methodology.  Within this report, we have 
attempted to communicate the most important outcomes of this work, which were 
y to achieve a better understanding of the cyber/physical interfaces and implications for 
unidentified vulnerabilities, and  
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y to provide a tool for decision makers that shows integrated and comprehensive risk 
results for “blended” security systems that can contain both cyber and physical 
elements.   
 
The project team recognized that not all security systems are of similar sophistication, nor should 
they be.  Security systems for low consequence impacts or where mitigation might provide 
adequate risk management could be evaluated with a best practices or screening analysis method. 
A best practices questionnaire analysis tool (CICSTART) was developed to evaluate both 
physical and cyber security practices.  Conversely, high consequence impacts or difficult to 
mitigate risks often have more sophisticated security systems, which require functional or 
engagement style security systems analysis.  This project created a functional style security 
assessment method (CPSAM) that integrates cyber and physical security systems as a software 
application.  
 
The CPSAM functional risk assessment methodology combines the fundamentals of physical 
protection systems (e.g., detect, delay and respond) with cyber protection system primitives that 
are based on opportunistic pathway analysis.  The methodology begins with a fundamental risk 
principle where the analysis selects specific consequences of concern (CoC) so resources are not 
wasted looking at inconsequential impacts.  Specific key asset failures that could lead to those 
consequences are identified by external analysis methods as these are often tailored to the 
complexities of the specific infrastructure.  The capabilities of the adversary attacking the facility 
are contrasted with the protective features at the facility to estimate the likelihood of adversary 
success.  The key cyber-physical security integration step occurs in the portion of the 
vulnerability assessment model, where the performance of protection elements that are cyber-
controlled are turned off to account for the likelihood that an attacker could penetrate the cyber 
protection system.  Since there is insufficient data to support a probabilistic approach to cyber 
security assessment, a novel application of a broader mathematical tool (Belief and Plausibility) 
was developed to support vulnerability estimates for attacks that include cyber elements.   
 
While the CPSAM is an operational alpha-version software product, additional developments of 
the methodology and software features are needed in the following areas:   
• Develop user interfaces to efficiently elicit the data needed to apply the model. 
• Develop graphics to display risk values for different types of attacks and different 
consequences of concern. 
• Formalize the application of the methodology to multiple targets. 
• Automate the identification of target sets using appropriate engineering process models 
for various types of infrastructures.  
• Develop an improved method for assessing mitigation effectiveness. 
• Improve the techniques used to evaluate the effectiveness of the cyber protection 
systems. 
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Appendix A: 
Belief as Measure of Uncertainty  
This appendix summarizes the mathematics of the belief/plausibility measure of uncertainty and 
also summarizes belief/plausibility for fuzzy sets.  The information in this appendix is excerpted 
from a Sandia technical report.  [Darby 2006]  
 
The axioms for belief require that the number of focal elements (defined later) for a universe of 
discourse be countable.  Sections A.2 and A.3 of this report address discrete sets.  Section A.4 
discusses intervals of real numbers. 
 
A.1  Value and Uncertainty 
A random variable is a real-valued function defined on a sample space.  [Dougherty 1990]  The 
values for a random variable can be represented as a set of all possible numerical values; for 
example, X = {x | x an element of [0,1]}.22  The uncertainty for a random variable can be 
expressed by assigning a “likelihood” to events in its set.  Therefore, a complete description of 
the random variable consists of two parts: (1) the set of all possible values and (2) an uncertainty 
measure on that set.  A random vector is a combination of random variables and the random 
vector has a set of values (tuples).  The name convolution is used to denote the combination of 
uncertainties of random variables into an uncertainty for a function defined on the random 
vector. 
 
Consider two discrete random variables with ranges defined as follows: 23 
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where x and y are real numbers.  The random vector is the Cartesian product X x Y. 
A subset of the Cartesian product X x Y is called a relation.  In the remainder of this discussion, 
reference to the random variable X means the range for X. 
 
We are interested in a function defined on a random vector that maps to the set of real numbers, 
f:X x Y→Reals.  For example we may wish to perform addition, X + Y, or multiplication X * Y.24 
 Let f(x,y) = z.  The mapping f produces the solution: 
                                                 
22  To be precise, X is the range for its corresponding random variable; see Section A.4.  The set contains all possible unique outcomes for the 
random variable.  The elements of the set are mutually exclusive.  
23  <> denotes a tuple whereas {} denotes a set; a tuple is an ordered collection and elements can be repeated, a set is an unordered collection and 
elements cannot be repeated. Uppercase is used for a random variable and lowercase is used for a value of the random variable; for example, 
X is a random variable and x is a specific value for X. 
24  Let E and F be events and let P(E) and P(F) be the probability (frequency) for these events.  P(E) and P(F) can be considered as random 
variables over [0, 1] and the probability (frequency) for combinations of these events must be evaluated using the axioms of a probability 
measure.  For union of E and F, P(E U F) = P(E) + P(F) – P(E ∩ F).  If E and F are mutually exclusive P(E ∩ F) = 0; if X and Y are 
independent P(E ∩ F) = P(E)*P(F). 
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Note that more than one <x, y> can have the same z.  For example, if f is X + Y then  
<2, 3> and <1, 4> both have z = x + y = 5. 
 
Equation A-2 provides the values for the function of interest.  We also need to generate a 
measure of uncertainty for each of these values by convoluting the uncertainties for X and Y.  As 
subsequently discussed, there are measures of uncertainty besides probability, and we will use 
the name uncertainty to denote a general measure of which probability is one special case.25  The 
mathematics for the convolution depends on the measure selected for uncertainty. 
 
An uncertainty distribution is associated with each random variable; the uncertainty distribution 
specifies a “likelihood” for each value of the random variable.   
 
Denote the power set of X as Pow(X).  Pow(X) is defined as the set of all subsets X including the 
null set.  For example, the power set of  
X = {a, b, c} is Pow(X) = {null, {a}, {b}, {c}, {a, b}, {a, c}, {b, c}, {a, b, c}}.  For a finite set 
with n elements the power set has 2n elements.  A general measure of uncertainty, U, is a 
mapping on the power set: U:Pow(X)→[0, 1].  Using the mathematics for the uncertainty 
measure, a likelihood can be calculated for each event in X. 
 
A.2  Types of Uncertainty and Measures of Uncertainty 
A.2.1  Ambiguity and Belief/Plausibility 
Let A be a subset of X.  A is also called an event for the random variable.  The elements of X are 
unique values (mutually exclusive).  In general events are not mutually exclusive, since subsets 
of X can have common elements.26   
 
Since the sample space has unique elements, and the random variable is a mapping of the sample 
space to the reals, the value of a random variable will be unique, but there is uncertainty as to 
this value.  This type of uncertainty is called Ambiguity.  A measure of ambiguity is called a 
fuzzy measure in the literature.  Ambiguity is the uncertainty in predicting the outcome of a 
future occurrence, such as the ultimate intensity and point of landfall for a hurricane forming in 
the Gulf of Mexico. 
 
The most general fuzzy measure of interest for our evaluation of risk is Belief, which can be 
explained by considering degrees of evidence assigned to the elements of Pow(X).  Let m denote 
a degree of evidence.  m is a function defined as follows: 
 
                                                 
25  To be technically correct, what we call uncertainty here is a fuzzy measure.  See section B.2.1. 
26  For example let X = {a, b, c} and let event A = {a, b} and event B = {b, c}.  A and B are not mutually exclusive since both contain b.  A 
subset with only one element is called a singleton.  Singleton events are mutually exclusive. 
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 (Eqn. A-3) 
 
The elements of Pow(X) for which m is greater than 0 are called the focal elements of X.  The 
focal elements of X are the subsets (events) of X on which the evidence focuses. 
 
In terms of degrees of evidence, Belief (Bel) and its dual fuzzy measure Plausibility (Pl) are 
defined as follows for any A and B in Pow(X): 
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 (Eqn. A-4) 
 
m(A) represents the evidence that the value of the random variable is exactly in A (in A only).  
Bel(A) represents the evidence that the value of the random variable is in A or any subset of A.  
Pl(A) represents the evidence that the value of the random variable is in A, in any subset of A, or 
any set that overlaps (is not disjoint) with A.   
 
Bel(A) is a measure of the amount of  information that implies AC is false, where AC is the 
complement of A.  Pl(A) is a measure of the amount of information that implies A is true (i.e., 
does not negate A is true). 
 
One useful interpretation is that Bel(A) is a measure of the degree to which A will happen, and 
Pl(A) is a measure of the degree to which A could happen. 
 
The collection of all the focal elements with non-zero degrees of evidence form the body of 
evidence.  
 
The ambiguity type of uncertainty is completely specified by the body of evidence. 
 
Two types of ambiguity are of interest.  Strife (or Discord) is present if there is more than one 
focal element.  Nonspecificity is present if a focal element is not a singleton. 
 
With a belief/plausibility distribution a random variable X has an expected value interval [E*(X), 
E*(X)] given by: 
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where Ai is an element of Pow(X) and m is a degree of evidence.27  
 
As an example of Belief and Plausibility consider X = {a, b, c} with the body of evidence given 
in Figure A-1. 
 
 
Figure A-1.  Example Body of Evidence for Belief and Plausibility 
The body of evidence for Figure A-1 is: {a} with m = 0.2, {a, b} with m = 0.7, and {b, c} with m 
= 0.1.  This body of evidence exhibits both Strife and Nonspecificity. 
 
Using equation A-4, Bel and Pl can be evaluated for any element in Pow(X).  Of specific interest 
to us are these fuzzy measures for the singletons: Bel({a}) = 0.2, Bel({b}) = 0,  
Bel({c}) = 0, Pl({a}) = 0.9, Pl({b}) = 0.8, and Pl({c}) = 0.1.  Figure A-2 shows the uncertainty 
distribution for this case. 
 
Let a = 8, b = 1, and c = 6.  Using Equation A-5, the expected value interval [E*(X), E*(X)] is 
[2.4, 7.8].  
 
                                                 
27  For a finite set sup (supremum, or least upper bound) is max, and inf (infimum, or greatest lower bound) is min. 
a               b               c 
m=0.2 m=0.7 m=0.1 
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Figure A-2.  Uncertainty Distribution for Body of Evidence  
A.2.2  Strife and Probability 
Probability is a special case of Belief.  If the focal elements are singletons, then both Belief and 
Plausibility reduce to a common fuzzy measure, Probability.  For a discrete sample space, a 
probability measure assigns a degree of evidence to the elements of X (the singletons of Pow(X)), 
and the degree of evidence for an element, m, is called the probability, p, of the element.  The 
degrees of evidence (probabilities) sum to 1.0.28   
 
The expected value, called the mean, of X is: 
 
 ∑ ∗=
xall
xpxX )(  (Eqn. A-6) 
 
Equation A-6 is a special case of equation A-5 where E*(X) = E*(X); that is, the expected value 
interval is a point value.  
 
Figure A-3 is an example body of evidence where probability is the appropriate metric for 
uncertainty for X = {a, b, c}. 
 
                                                 
28  As discussed earlier, here we are dealing with discrete sets.  A probability measure requires that the probability of two disjoint events be the 
sum of the probabilities of each event.  Since the elements of the set are mutually exclusive outcomes the probability of any event defined on 
the set is the sum of the probabilities of its constituent outcomes.  Events are in general not mutually exclusive since they can share outcomes 
and are therefore not disjoint. 
X
Belief 
(lower) to 
Plausibility 
(upper) 
Interval 
0
1
a cb
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Figure A-3.  Example Body of Evidence for Probability 
Using either Equation A-4 or Equation A-5 where Bel and Pl are both denoted as Prob: Prob(a) 
= 0.5, Prob(b) = 0.3, and Prob(c) = 0.2.  Figure A-4 shows the uncertainty distribution for this 
case. 
 
Let a=4, b=13, and c=7. Using either Equation A-5 or Equation A-6, the expected value of the 
random variable is 7.3.  
 
Figure A-4.  Uncertainty Distribution for Body of Evidence in Figure A-3 
Probability is a special case of Belief/Plausibility where there is no Nonspecificity.  Probability 
considers Strife but does not consider nonspecificity, so it is an inappropriate measure of 
uncertainty where there is significant nonspecificity. 
 
Probability is well suited to problems where the uncertainty is aleatory (random) such as tossing 
a cubical die known to have 1 to 6 dots on each side.  Probability is not well suited to problems 
where the uncertainty is epistemic (state of knowledge) such as a case where we do not know 
how many dots are on each face of the die or even that the die is a cube. 
a               b               c 
m=p=0.5 m=p=0.3 m=p=0.2 
X
Probability 
0
1
a cb
*
*
*
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A.2.3  Coherent Evidence and Possibility  
Belief/Plausibility become Necessity/Possibility, respectively, if the focal elements are nested.  
The nested requirement means that for any two focal elements A and B either A is a subset of B 
or B is a subset of A.  Possibility is applicable to situations where the body of evidence is 
coherent; that is, where nonspecificity dominates over strife.  This is in contrast to a situation 
where a probability metric is applicable for which the evidence is precise but contradictory.  It is 
important to note that necessity/possibility never reduce to probability, but belief/plausibility 
both reduce to probability for specific evidence.  
 
A possibility distribution can be produced based on the degrees of evidence, and the Possibility 
and Necessity for any element of the power set can be calculated from the possibility 
distribution. The possibility distribution π is a mapping on the sample space X: π:X→[0,1].29  
Let x denote an element of X.  Let П denote the Possibility of any event A a subset of X and let 
N denote the Necessity:  
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 (Eqn. A-7) 
 
where Ac denotes the complement of A. 
 
A simple way to generate the possibility distribution from the degrees of evidence is to order the 
focal elements by increasing level of nesting; that is if the focal elements are {Ai | i = 1, 2, …, n} 
reorder and renumber the focal elements such that nAAA ...21 ⊂⊂ . 
 
With this rearrangement: 
 
 ∑
=
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n
ik
ki Amx )()(π  (Eqn. A-8) 
 
where i denotes a focal element and xi is any x that is a member of Ai.  [Klir and Yuan] 
 
For any function f:X→Reals, using the Lebesgue-Stieltjes integrals the expected interval for f is: 
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 (Eqn. A-9) 
 
[E*(X), E*(X)] is obtained using f(x) = x in Equation A-9. 
                                                 
29  If we have defined a random variable on the sample space, the random variable can be viewed as transforming the sample space to the reals, 
and the range of the random variable can serve as a surrogate sample space.  [Dougherty, Probability]  Therefore, X can be a random variable 
(a sample space on the reals) for which π specifies a possibility distribution for the values of the range of the random variable. 
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For a probability distribution the expected value is a point estimate given in Equation A-6.  A 
necessity/possibility distribution (and a belief/plausibility distribution) has an expected value 
interval, [E*(X), E*(X)] instead of a point estimate expected value.  This is not surprising since 
the probability distribution over a random variable represented as a discrete set is a set of points 
as indicated in Figure A-4 while a necessity/possibility distribution (and a belief/plausibility 
distribution) over a random variable is a set of intervals as subsequently indicated in Figure A-6 
for a possibility distribution (and previously indicated in Figure A-2 for a belief distribution). 
 
As an example of Possibility and Necessity consider the body of evidence in Figure A-5 on X = 
{a, b, c}. 
 
 
Figure A-5.  Example Body of Evidence for Possibility and Necessity 
Using Equations A-7 and A-8: П(a) = 1.0,  П(b) = 0.6, П(c) = 1.0, N(a) = 0, N(b) = 0,  
N(c) = 0.  Figure A-6 shows the uncertainty distribution for this case. 
a               c               b 
m=0.4  
π=1.0   
m=0.6 
π=0.6 
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Figure A-6.  Uncertainty Distribution for Body of Evidence 
Let a = 3, b = 8, and c = 2.  Using either Equation A-5 or A-9, the expected value interval [E*(X), 
E*(X)] is [2, 6].  
 
Consider the assignment of uncertainty for the frequency of an attack using a possibility metric.  
Using the random vector presented earlier in Section A.2.2, FA = {0, 10-5, 10-4, 10-3, 10-2, 10-1, 
1}.  Since there are on the order of a million targets and on the order of 1 attack per year, for a 
generic target the body of evidence justifies assignment of a degree of evidence of 1.0 to the 
subset {0, 10-5}.  (A generic target is one for which specific evidence of adversary intent is not 
available.)  If there is evidence based on intelligence that a specific target is more likely to be 
attacked, then a body of evidence such as that given in Figure A-7 can be produced, where the 
possibilities are calculated using Equation A-8. 
 
 
Figure A-7.  Example Possibilistic Model for Threat Frequency 
0   10-5  10-4      10-3   
m=0.65  
π=0.7   
m=0.05 
π=0.05 
m=0.30  
π=1.0   
X
Necessity 
(lower) to 
Possibility 
(upper) 
Range 
0
1
a cb
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A.2.4  Vagueness and Fuzzy Sets 
Sections A.2.1 through A.2.3 discussed various measures of uncertainty that address ambiguity; 
such measures are called fuzzy measures.  This section addresses another type of uncertainty, 
Vagueness. 
 
Whereas ambiguity deals with the uncertainty related to which value of a random variable is 
likely to occur, Vagueness deals with the uncertainty of how to categorize a known value of a 
random variable.  Vagueness can be modeled using the concept of fuzzy sets.  Note that a fuzzy 
measure is a different concept from a fuzzy set; a fuzzy measure addresses ambiguity while a 
fuzzy set addresses vagueness. 
 
A fuzzy set extends the concept of a traditional set, called a crisp set, to include partial member-
ship.  For example for the variable X = {a, b, c} a crisp subset is A = {a, b}.  Each element in X is 
either completely in A or not; a and B are in A and c is not in A.  A fuzzy set can have members 
with partial membership, for example F = {1/a, 0.3/b} is a fuzzy subset of X for which element 
has a total membership and element b has partial membership of degree 0.3.  Fuzzy sets are 
useful for modeling linguistic concepts.  For example, consider the random variable for the 
frequency of an attack FA = {0, 10-5, 10-4, 10-3, 10-2, 10-1, 1} and consider the following fuzzy 
sets for FA: “unlikely”, “credible”, and “likely”.30  Figure A-8 provides a possible definition of 
these fuzzy sets. 
 
Defender Fuzzy Sets for Threat
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Figure A-8.  Fuzzy Sets for Frequency of Attack 
                                                 
30  “unlikely” is a set since it is a subset of FA and it is a fuzzy set since not every element in “unlikely” has degree of membership of 1.0; for 
example 10-4 has degree of membership of 0.5 in “unlikely”.  Similarly, “credible” and “likely” are fuzzy sets of FA.  
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A.2.5  Probability of a Fuzzy Set 
As developed in Section A.2.2 probability is a fuzzy measure that addresses a special type of 
ambiguity called strife.  Probability can be extended to address vagueness and such an extension 
will be called fuzzified probability. 
 
For a set X let p(x) be the probability of element x in a discrete set X.  Let F be a fuzzy set 
defined on X by the degree of membership µF(x).  The probability of the fuzzy event F is: 
 
 ∑
∈
=
Xx
F xxpFP )(*)()( µ  (Eqn. A-10) 
 
Equation A-10 weights the probability of x by the degree of membership of x in the fuzzy set of 
interest, F. 
 
A.2.6  Possibility of a Fuzzy Set 
As developed in Section A.2.3 possibility is a fuzzy measure that addresses ambiguity when the 
body of evidence is coherent.  Possibility can be extended to address vagueness and such an 
extension will be called “fuzzified” possibility. 
 
For a set X let π(x) be the possibility for element x in X.  Let F be a fuzzy set defined on X by the 
degree of membership µF(x).  The possibility of the fuzzy event F is: (Dubois and Prade 1988) 
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=Π  (Eqn. A-11) 
 
Equation A-11 is an extension of Equation A-7 to fuzzy sets; it weights the possibility for x by 
the degree of membership of x in the fuzzy set of interest, F. 
 
A.2.7  Belief for a Fuzzy Set 
The development in this section follows the approach discussed by Yager. [Yager 1986]  Given 
fuzzy sets A and B for a universe of discourse X, the possibility for fuzzy set B given fuzzy set A 
is: 31 
 
 )]}(),({min[max)|( xxAB BA
Xx
µµ
∈
=Π  (Eqn. A-12) 
 
where µA(x) is the degree of membership of the element x in the fuzzy set A. 
                                                 
31 If A and B are crisp, “given A” means event A occurs, so П(A) = 1 and N(A) = 1.  П(B|A) = 1 if A and B are not disjoint, otherwise П(B|A) = 0. 
 N(B|A) = 1 if B is a subset of A, otherwise N(B|A)  = 0.   
 If A and B are fuzzy, “given A” means that the possibility distribution is determined by the degrees of membership of A; specifically, π(x) = 
μ A(x) for all x in the universe of discourse X and: ( ) max ( ), ( ) min (1 ( ))A Ax Xx XA x and N A xµ µ∈∈Π = = − .  For a normalized fuzzy set (one 
with at least one element with a degree of membership of 1), П(A) = 1 and N(A) = 1 since the fuzzy event A is the sure event.  П(B|A) is 
evaluated as the overlap between fuzzy event B and the sure fuzzy event A using Equation A-12.   [Dubois and Prade, Sections 1.4 and 1.7]  
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The necessity for B given A is 1 – П(Bc|A) where 
 
Bc is the fuzzy complement of B; that is, Bc ≡ 1 – B.  This necessity can be expressed as: 
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 (Eqn. A-13) 
 
where µBc(x) has been taken as 1 - µB(x). 
 
For “fuzzy focal elements” (fuzzy sets with evidence) Ai over X and for any fuzzy set B in X: 
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Equation A-14 reduces to Equation A-4 if the focal elements Ai and B are crisp sets. 
 
If the focal elements Ai are crisp and B is fuzzy, Equation A-14 reduces to: 
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A.3  Convolution 
Section A.2 summarized various metrics for uncertainty, specifically: Belief/Plausibility, 
Necessity/Possibility, Probability, Fuzzy Sets, Fuzzified Probability, and Fuzzified Possibility. 
 
As discussed in Section A.1, it is necessary to convolute the uncertainty measures for random 
variables to produce an uncertainty measure for a function defined on a random vector.  Sections 
A.3.1 through A.3.4 assume crisp sets; Sections A.3.5 and A.3.6 address fuzzy sets. 
 
A.3.1  Probabilistic Convolution 
As presented in Section A.2, the values for a function f:X x Y→Reals defined on the random 
vector X x Y are given in Equation A-2 repeated here: 
 
 },,),(|{ YyXxzyxfzZ ∈∈==  (Eqn. A-2, repeated) 
 
Where f(x,y) = z.  Let p(x) and p(y) be probability distributions over X and Y, respectively.  The 
probability distribution p(z) is:32 
 
                                                 
32  Since the x elements are mutually exclusive and the y elements are mutually exclusive the <x,y> tuples are mutually exclusive and the 
probabilistic sum is an algebraic sum as indicated in the equation.  As previously stated, this section deals with sets of discrete elements. 
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where p(x,y) is the joint probability distribution over X and Y.  If X and Y are independent 
random variables than p(x,y) = p(x) * p(y). 
 
A.3.2  Possibilistic Convolution 
As presented in Section A.2, the values for a function f:X x Y→Reals defined on the random 
vector X x Y are given in equation A-2 repeated here: 
 
 },,),(|{ YyXxzyxfzZ ∈∈==  (Eqn. A-2, repeated) 
 
where f(x,y) = z.  Let π(x) and π(y) be possibility distributions over X and Y, respectively.  The 
possibility distribution π(z) is: 
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where π (x,y) is the joint possibility distribution over X and Y.  If X and Y are non-interactive 
random variables (in the possibilistic sense) then π (x,y) = min[π (x), π (y)].  This is the “min” 
definition of noninteraction. 
 
A.3.3  Convolution for Belief 
As presented in Section A.2, the values for a function f:X x Y→Reals defined on the random 
vector X x Y are given in Equation A-2 repeated here: 
 
 },,),(|{ YyXxzyxfzZ ∈∈==  (Eqn. A-2, repeated) 
 
For the random vector X x Y each degree of evidence can be considered a binary relation R.33  
That is, R is a subset of X x Y with non-zero m.  
 
Using Equation A-18 belief and plausibility for z = f(x, y) are: 
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 (Eqn. A-18) 
 
Following Equation A-5, the expected value interval for f is: 
 
                                                 
33  A binary relation is defined as a subset of the Cartesian product X x Y.  For example, if X = {a, b} and Y = {p, q} then X x Y = {<a, p>, <a, 
q>, <b, p>, <b, q>} and R = {<a, p>, <a, q>, <b, q>} is a binary relation on X x Y. 
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Let C denote any subset of X x Y.  Using Equation A-4: 
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For each R, let RX denote the projection of R on X and let RY denote the projection of R on Y. 
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Define the marginal degrees of evidence mx, the projection of m on X, and my, the projection of m 
on Y as: 
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where R|A=RX means all relations R such that the projection of R onto X (RX) is equal to A. 
 
For any focal elements A and B in X and Y, respectively, the marginal bodies of evidence are said 
to be noninteractive if and only if:  
 
 m(A x B) = mx(A)*mY(B), and  
 m(R) = 0 for all R ≠ A x B.34  
 
This is the “product” definition of noninteraction. 
 
The “min” definition of  possibilistic noninteraction discussed in Section A.3.2 is not a special 
case of  the “product” definition of noninteraction.  Even if the focal elements of X and Y are 
nested, if X and Y and are noninteractive using the product definition, the focal elements of X x Y 
may not be nested.  That is, the product definition of noninteraction does not preserve nesting of 
focal elements.  [Klir and Yuan, Section 7.3] 
                                                 
34  The requirement that m(A x B) = mx(A)*mY(B) means that for any focal elements A in X and B in Y, there is a focal element in X x Y formed 
by A x B with degree of evidence equal to mx(A)*mY(B).  The requirement that m(R) = 0 for all R ≠ A x B means that any focal element in X 
x Y is a Cartesian product of focal elements in X and Y.  
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Probabilistic independence is a special case of the product definition of noninteraction.  For a 
probability measure, a degree of evidence is a probability for an element of the sample space, so 
any focal elements A and B are singletons of X and Y (call them a and b) and A x B has one 
element {<a, b>} with a probability P(a)*P(b). 
 
In this report, unless stated otherwise noninteraction means the product definition of 
noninteraction. 
 
Independence and noninteraction are discussed at length in a report by Ferson, et al.  [Ferson et 
al. 2004]   
 
As an example of convolution for belief/plausibility let X = {x1, x2} and Y = {y1, y2, y3}.   
Assume the bodies of evidence for X and Y given in Figure A-9. 
 
 
 
Figure A-9. Bodies of Evidence for X and Y 
The random vector X x Y = {<x1,y1>, <x1,y2>, <x1,y3>, <x2,y1>, <x2,y2>, <x2,y3>}.  The binary 
relations and the projections of those relations for the focal elements of X x Y are given in Table 
A-1. 
Table A-1.  Binary Relations and Projections for X x Y for Figure A-9 
R RX RY 
R1 = {<x1,y1>, <x1,y2>} R1X = {x1} R1Y = {y1, y2} 
R2 = {<x1,y2>, <x1,y3>} R2X = {x1} R2Y = {y2, y3} 
R3 = {<x2,y1>, <x2,y2>} R3X = {x2} R3Y = {y1, y2} 
R4 = {<x2,y2>, <x2,y3>} R4X = {x2} R4Y = {y2, y3} 
 
The marginal degrees of evidence are given in Table A-2. 
Table A-2.  Marginal Degrees of Evidence 
y1               y2          y3 
m=0.2 m=0.8 
x1               x2  
m=0.6 m=0.4 
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A an element of 
Pow(X) mX(A) 
B an element of 
Pow(Y) mY(B) 
null 0   
{x1} m(R1) + m(R2)   
{x2} m(R3) + m(R4)   
{x1, x2} 0   
  null 0 
  {y1} 0 
  {y2} 0 
  {y3} 0 
  {y1, y2} m(R1) + m(R3) 
  {y1, y3} 0 
  {y2, y3} m(R2) + m(R4) 
  {y1, y2, y3} 0 
 
Assuming the bodies of evidence for X and Y are noninteractive: 
 
 m(R1) = m({x1})*m({y1, y2}) = 0.12 
 m(R2) = m({x1})*m({y2, y3}) = 0.48 
 m(R3) = m({x2})*m({y1, y2}) = 0.08 
 m(R4) = m({x2})*m({y2, y3}) = 0.32 
 
and the body of evidence for X x Y is: 
 
 m({<x1, y1>, <x1, y2>}) = 0.12 
 m({<x1, y2>, <x1, y3>}) = 0.48 
 m({<x2, y1>, <x2, y2>}) = 0.08 
 m({<x2, y2>, <x2, y3>}) = 0.32 
 
Using this body of evidence with Equation A-4, the belief and plausibility distributions for each 
element of X x Y can be calculated as summarized in Table A-3. 
Table A-3.  Belief and Plausibility for Elements of X x Y 
Element Belief Plausibility 
<x1,y1> 0 0.12 
<x1,y2> 0 0.60 
<x1,y3> 0 0.48 
<x2,y1> 0 0.08 
<x2,y2> 0 0.40 
<x2,y3> 0 0.32 
 
Note that unlike degrees of evidence or probability, Plausibility and Belief over the elements do 
not have to sum to 1.0. 
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Assume that x1 = 1, x2 = 2, y1 = 4, y2 = 3, and y3 = 2.  Let the function of interest on the random 
vector X x Y be z = f(x, y) = x + y.  Table A-4 lists the <x, y> tuples and f(x, y) for each tuple. 
Table A-4.  Tuples and Functional Values 
<x, y> z = x + y 
<x1, y1> = <1, 4> 5 
<x1, y2> = <1, 3> 4 
<x1, y3> = <1, 2> 3 
<x2, y1> = <2, 4> 6 
<x2, y2> = <2, 3> 5 
<x2, y3> = <2, 2> 4 
 
The belief and plausibility for each element of f (each unique z in Table A-4) can be calculated 
using Equation A-14 with the body of evidence previously calculated.  Since none of the R is a 
subset of any <x, y> tuple, Bel(z) = 0 for all z.  For z = 5, the pertinent tuples are <x1, y1> and 
<x2, y2>.   <x1, y1>  has non-null intersection with R1 and   
 
<x2, y2> has non-null intersection with R3 and R4.  So from Equation A-14: 
 
 Pl(x + y = 5) =  m(R1) + m(R3) + m(R4) = 0.12 + 0.08 + 0.32 = 0.52.  Similarly,  
 Pl(x + y = 3) = m(R2) = 0.48, Pl(x + y =4) = m(R1) + m(R2) + m(R4)  = 0.92,  
 Pl(x + y + 6) = m(R3) = 0.08.   
 
Table A-5 summarizes the functional values, and the belief and plausibility for each value of the 
function f. 
Table A-5.  Values, Belief , and Plausibility 
f(x, y) = x + y Belief Plausibility 
3 0 0.48 
4 0 0.92 
5 0 0.52 
6 0 0.08 
 
The uncertainty distribution for the function of interest is summarized in Figure A-10. 
 
The body of evidence for f:X x Y is: 
 
 m({f(x1, y1), f(x1, y2)}) = m(5, 4) = 0.12 
 m({f(x1, y2), f(x1, y3)}) = m(4, 3) = 0.48 
 m({f(x2, y1), f(x2, y2)}) = m(6, 5) = 0.08 
 m({f(x2, y2), f(x2, y3)}) = m(5, 4) = 0.32 
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so,  
 
 m(5, 4) = 0.12 + 0.32 = 0.44 
 m(4, 3) = 0.48 
 m(6, 5) = 0.08 
 
Using Equation A-5, the expected value interval for f:X x Y can be calculated. 
 
 E*( f(x, y) ) = 4(0.44) + 3*(0.48) + 5(0.08) = 3.6, and 
 E*( f(x, y) ) = 5(0.44) + 4(0.48) + 6(0.08) = 4.6. 
 
 
Figure A-10.  Uncertainty Distribution for Example Problem 
Belief and Plausibility can be calculated for subsets on the functional values.  Consider the 
subset “values of the function f:X x Y greater than 3” for the example problem.  The tuples of X x 
Y that form this subset are: <x1, y1>, <x1, y2>, <x2, y1>, <x2, y2>, and <x2, y3>.  Using Equation 
A-20, C = {<x1, y1>, <x1, y2>, <x2, y1>, <x2, y2>, <x2, y3>}, and: 
 
 Bel(A) = m(R1) + m(R3) + m(R4) = 0.52 
 Pl(A) = m(R1) + m(R2) + m(R3) + m(R4) = 1.0. 
 
For the subset “all values of f:X x Y” belief and plausibility are both 1.0 as expected. 
 
f(x, y) = x + y
Belief 
(lower) to 
Plausibility 
(upper) 
Range 
0
1
3 54 6
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A.3.4  Expectation Value for a Function of a Random Vector  
The previous sections discussed the convolution process for generating the uncertainty 
distribution for the values of a function on a random vector, f:X x Y→Reals, for different metrics 
for uncertainty.   
 
The process for calculating the expected interval of a random variable was also summarized, and 
for a probability metric the expected value interval simplifies to a point value, the mean.  
 
This section discusses some conditions for which the expected value for the values of the 
function can be directly calculated from the expected values for the constituent random 
variables. 
 
For a probability measure with f(x, y) = x + y it can be shown that the expected value for  
X + Y is the sum of the expected values for X and Y, even if X and Y are not independent.  That 
is, E[X + Y] = E[X] + E[Y] in all cases. 
 
For a probability measure with f(x, y) = x·y it can be shown that the expected value for 
X·Y is the product of the expected values for X and Y, if X and Y are independent.  That is, 
E[X·Y] = E[X] ·E[Y] if X and Y are independent. 
 
As proven in section A.3.4.1, using a belief measure for noninteractive X and Y,  
E*[X + Y] = E*[X] + E*[Y], and 
E*[X + Y] = E*[X] + E*[Y].  Furthermore, if the domain of X and Y are the non-negative reals, 
then E*[X·Y] = E*[X] ·E*[Y], and E*[X ·Y] = E*[X] ·E*[Y]. 
 
A.3.4.1  Expectation Value for Noninteractive X and Y  
A.3.4.1.1  E(X+Y), X and Y Noninteractive, X and Y Real Numbers 
Consider random variables X and Y whose values are real numbers, with X and Y noninteractive 
as defined in Section A.3.3.  Under these conditions, it is asserted that: 
E*(X + Y) = E*(X) + E*(Y) and E*(X + Y) = E*(X) + E*(Y). 
 
The proof of this assertion follows. 
 
Consider f(x, y) = x + y.  Following the development in Section A.3.3: 
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 (Eqn. A-23) 
 
where Ai and Bj are the focal elements of X and Y, respectively; that is, Ai and Bj are elements of 
the power set of X and Y with non-zero degrees of evidence.  Ai x Bj is a relation on X x Y.  
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“sup” is supremum, least upper bound, and “inf” is infimum, greatest lower bound.35  mX(Ai) and 
mY(Bj) are the projections of m(Ai x Bj) onto X and Y, respectively.  Noninteraction means that 
m(Ai x Bj) = mX(Ai)·mY(Bj). 
 
Let ai inf, bj inf, ai sup, and bj sup be defined as follows: 
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 (Eqn. A-24) 
 
For any real numbers, positive or negative: 
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and Equation A-23 can be written as: 
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Equation A-26 can be written: 
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Equation A-27 can be written: 
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Since it is required that: 
 
                                                 
35  Since this section is dealing with discrete sets, inf is equivalent to min and sup is equivalent to max.  The conclusions in Section A.3.4.1 are 
valid for focal element that are intervals of real numbers as well as for focal elements that are sets of discrete numbers. 
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Equation A-28 simplifies to: 
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Equation A-30 shows that E*(X+Y) = E*(X) + E*(Y) and E*(X+Y) = E*(X) + E*(Y). 
 
Therefore, if the domain of X and Y are the reals and X and Y are noninteractive, E*(X + Y) = 
E*(X) + E*(Y) and E*(X + Y) = E*(X) + E*(Y). 
 
A.3.4.1.2  E(X·Y), X and Y Noninteractive, X and Y Non-negative Real Numbers 
Consider random variables X and Y whose values are non-negative real numbers, with X and Y 
noninteractive as defined in Section A.2.3.  Under these conditions, it is asserted that: 
 
 E*(X·Y) = E*(X)·E*(Y) and E*(X·Y) = E*(X)·E*(Y). 
 
The proof of this assertion follows. 
 
Consider f(x, y) = x·y.  Following Section A.3.3:   
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Let ai inf, bj inf, ai sup, and bj sup be as defined in Equation A-24. 
 
Since we are dealing with non-negative real numbers36, 
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and Equation A-31 can be written as: 
 
                                                 
36  Equation A-32 is not valid if we allow negative numbers in the domain for X or Y. 
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Equation A-33 can be written: 
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Equation A-34 can be re-written as: 
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Equation A-35 shows that E*(X·Y) = E*(X) ·E*(Y) and E*(X·Y) = E*(X) ·E*(Y). 
 
Therefore, if the domain of X and Y are the non-negative reals and X and Y are noninteractive, 
E*(X·Y) = E*(X) ·E*(Y) and E*(X·Y) = E*(X) ·E*(Y). 
 
A.3.4.1.2  Examples 
A.3.4.1.2.1  Examples with X and Y Non-Negative 
For the example in Section A.3.3, the expected value interval [E*(X + Y), E*(X + Y)] was 
calculated to be [3.6, 4.6].  Since X and Y satisfy the requirements for the assertions, the 
expected value interval can be calculated as [E*(X) + E*(Y),  E*(X) + E*(Y)].   
 
Specifically,  
 
 E*(X) = 1·0.6 + 2·0.4 = 1.4 
 E*(X) = 1·0.6 + 2·0.4 = 1.4 
 E*(Y) = min(4, 3)·0.2 + min(3, 2) ·0.8 = 2.2 
 E*(Y) = max(4, 3)·0.2 + max(3, 2) ·0.8 = 3.2 
     and [E*(X) + E*(Y),  E*(X) + E*(Y)] =  [3.6, 4.6]. 
 
Similarly, for the example in section 4, the expected value for (1 - PE) is a probabilistic mean: 
0.02·0.3 + 0.03·0.2 + 0.90·0.1 + 0.05·0 = 0.102 and the expected value for C is a probabilistic 
mean: 0.03·102 + 0.05·103 + 0.80·104 + 0.10·105 + 0.02·106 = 3.80 × 104.  The expected value 
interval for fA is: 
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E*( fA) = min(0, 10-5)·0.70 + min(0, 10-5, 10-4, 10-3) ·0.15 +  
min(0, 10-5, 10-4, 10-3, 10-2) ·0.15 = 0 
E*( fA) = max(0, 10-5)·0.70 + max(0, 10-5, 10-4, 10-3) ·0.15 +  
max(0, 10-5, 10-4, 10-3, 10-2) ·0.15 = 1.657 x 10-3. 
[E*(1 - PE) * E*(C) * E*(fA) ,  E*(1 - PE) * E*(C) * E*(fA)] =  [0, 6.4]. 
 
By convolution, as summarized in Section A.3.3  
 
 [E*( fA *(1 - PE)*C), E*( fA *(1 - PE)*C)] = [0, 6.4]. 
 
A.3.4.1.2.1  Example with X and Y having Negative Values 
Consider X = {-2, 1, 4} and Y = {-6, 0, 5}.  Let the focal elements of X be: 
 {-2, 1} with m = 0.6 
 {1, 4} with m = 0.4 
Let the focal elements of Y be: 
 {-6, 0} with m = 0.8 
 {-6, 0, 5} with m = 0.2. 
E*(X) = 0.6(-2) + 0.4(1) = -0.8 
E*(X) = 0.6(1) + 0.4(4) = 2.2 
E*(Y) = 0.8(-6) + 0.2(-6) = -6.0 
E*(Y) = 0.8(0) + 0.2(5) = 1.0. 
 
Consider X + Y. 
E*(X) + E*(Y) = -6.8 
E*(X) + E*(Y) = 3.2 
Using the BeliefConvolution code, E*(X+Y) = -6.8 and  
E*(X+Y) = 3.2, so E*(X+Y) = E*(X) + E*(Y) and E*(X+Y) = E*(X) + E*(Y). 
 
Consider X·Y. 
E*(X) ·E*(Y) = 4.8 
E*(X)·E*(Y) = -0.8 
E*(X) ·E*(Y) = -13.2 
E*(X) ·E*(Y) = 2.2. 
 
Using the BeliefConvolution code,  
E*(X·Y) = -13.68 and E*(X·Y) = 8.8, so  
E*(X·Y) ≠ E**(X) ·E**(Y) and E*(X·Y) ≠ E**(X) ·E**(Y) where E** denotes either E* or E* to 
account for the product of two negative numbers being positive. 
 
A.3.5  Convolution with Fuzzy Sets 
The discussion of convolution in Sections A.3.1 through A.3.4 assumed crisp sets.  Convolution 
can also be performed with fuzzy sets. The following discussion is from the paper by Yager, for 
convolution using the belief/plausibility measure given evidence on fuzzy sets defined by 
degrees of membership on the reals. [Yager 1986]  
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Let OP denote any arithmetic operation on real numbers (addition, subtraction, multiplication, 
division, exponentiation) .  Let Z = X OP Y and let S be a subset of Z. 
 
Let Ai and Bj denote the ith and jth focal elements of X and Y, respectively, and assume the focal 
elements are noninteractive: 
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If Ai and Bj are fuzzy sets, OP is defined as 
 
 ji BOPAZ =  (Eqn. A-37) 
 
where for any real number z 
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For the special case of Ai and Bj crisp: 
 
 }|{ ji ByandAxforyOPxZ ∈∈=  (Eqn. A-39) 
 
The paper by Yager also addresses operations that are not arithmetic. [Yager 1986] 
 
A.3.6  Linguistic Convolution 
This section summarizes a technique for the evaluation of purely linguistic information using a 
belief measure. 
 
In this approach, X and Y are modeled to a level of detail consistent with the fidelity of the 
information available.  For example if X is the number of deaths from a terrorist attack, we may 
chose to bin X into subsets such as “Minor,” “Moderate,” “Major” and “Catastrophic.”  Also, we 
may not have a precise definition of each set; for example, “Major” may be defined as “between 
about 500 and about 5000 deaths.”  Given fuzzy sets defined with degrees of membership over 
the reals, the techniques of Section A.2.7 can be used to evaluate belief/plausibility for any fuzzy 
set of concern, and the techniques of Section A.3.5 can be used to evaluate belief/plausibility for 
arithmetic operations on fuzzy sets defined over the reals.   
 
However, as discussed in Section 1, for our application we have variables whose fuzzy sets are 
purely linguistic, such as the variable Y being “Damage to National Security” modeled with, for 
example, the fuzzy sets “Not Much,” “Of Concern,” and “Yes.”  These fuzzy sets are purely 
linguistic and do not have degrees of membership defined over the reals. 
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In the linguistic model, X and Y do not have to be expressed using numbers, and the fuzzy sets 
for X and Yare purely linguistic, not defined by degrees of membership over numerical values of 
X and Y.  That is, the fidelity of the model is at the fuzzy set level.  A random vector Z = X x Y 
is also described by purely linguistic fuzzy sets, and a function for Z is defined by an 
approximate reasoning rule base.    
 
Evidence is over the fuzzy sets in X and Y.  A focal element for X is of the form [Ai, m(Ai)] 
where Ai is an element of the fuzzy power set of X,37 m(Ai) is the evidence assigned to Ai, and i 
ranges over all the focal elements for X.  Similarly, a focal element for Y is of the form [Bj, 
m(Bj)] where Bj is subset of the set of all fuzzy sets of Y, m(Bj) is the evidence assigned to Bj, 
and j is over all the focal elements for Y.  Assuming noninteraction, m(Ai x Bj) = mX(Ai)·mY(Bj). 
 
From the rule base, a given fuzzy set for Z, call it Cm, is of the form },{
,
><= ji
rulesperji
m GFC U  
where Fi and Gj are fuzzy sets of X and Y, respectively, and <> denotes a tuple.   
 
Both the evidence and the rules are at the fuzzy set level; all the Ai, Bj, and Cm are comprised of 
fuzzy sets from the fuzzy sets of X and Y. Since we are reasoning at the fuzzy set level without 
definitions for degrees of membership for the fuzzy sets, the mathematics of Section A.2.7 
cannot be used in the evaluation of rules.  The standard Equation A-4 for belief/plausibility is 
used; that is, the fuzzy sets are fuzzy in the assignment of evidence, but are treated as crisp in the 
evaluation of the rule base. 
 
A.4  Belief for Focal Elements as Intervals of Real Numbers 
The previous sections of this appendix focused on evaluation of uncertainty for a variable that 
has a discrete number of values.  A similar approach can be used for a variable whose value is 
any real number over an interval, if degrees of evidence are assigned to a finite number of 
intervals within the domain of the variable.  Oberkampf and Helton discuss this approach.  
 
If the intervals to which degrees of evidence are assigned are point values (degenerate intervals) 
then both belief and plausibility reduce to probability. 
 
A.5  Summary of Techniques  
The material previously provided discussed the modeling of uncertainty using a set of values and 
an uncertainty distribution over that set.  Two types of uncertainty were discussed: ambiguity 
and vagueness.  A general measure for ambiguity was presented: belief/plausibility.  For 
ambiguity involving strife with no nonspecificity, belief/plausibility both become probability.  
For a consonant body of evidence, belief/plausibility become necessity/possibility, respectively. 
 
                                                 
37 For example if the fuzzy sets for X are “bad” and “good”, the fuzzy power set for X is { {null}, {“bad”}, {“good”}, {“bad”, “good”}}, and 
one possible Ai is {“bad”, “good”}.  
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Convolution of random variables using the following measures was discussed: probability, 
possibility, and belief.  Linguistic convolution using an approximate reasoning rule base was 
also discussed. 
 
The concept of fuzzy sets for vagueness was discussed.  Extension (“fuzzification”) of 
probability, possibility, and belief to also include vagueness were summarized. 
 
A.6  Java Tools: BeliefConvolution and LinguisticBelief  
Two Java codes were written to effect convolution of numeric or linguistic variables using the 
belief/plausibility measure. The codes were written in Java 1.5 using the netbeans 4.1 Integrated 
Development Environment (IDE).  Features of Java 1.5, such as generic classes with 
parameterized types, were used in the coding so the codes will not compile or execute in 
versions of Java earlier than 1.5.  
 
BeliefConvolution performs convolution of random variables with evidence assigned to intervals 
of real numbers.  LinguisticBelief performs convolution of linguistic variables with evidence 
assigned to fuzzy sets. 
 
Both codes assume that the variables are non-interacting. 
 
A.6.1  BeliefConvolution 
BeliefConvolution implements the mathematics of belief discussed earlier for algebraic 
combinations of random variables with evidence assigned to intervals of real numbers.  Two 
aspects of BeliefConvolution are documented here: aggregation of evidence and the ability to 
evaluate belief for fuzzy sets given evidence on crisp sets.  
 
A.6.1.1  Aggregation of Evidence   
The aggregation approach used in the code is similar to the aggregation technique for discrete 
probability distributions discussed by Kaplan. [Kaplan]  The code allows for aggregation of 
degrees of evidence for any variable, using linear or logarithmic binning.  Aggregation is a 
process by which the degrees of evidence are reduced by mapping the variable into bins and 
assigning a point estimate, the midpoint of the bin, to any value of the variable in that bin.  The 
need for aggregation is to reduce the numbers of degrees of evidence from the convolution of a 
large number of variables. For example, suppose that each variable has 3 degrees of evidence.  A 
convolution of 10 such variables results in a variable with 310 or about 60,000 degrees of 
evidence and this is a manageable number.  But a convolution of 20 such variables results in a 
variable with 320 or about 3.4 × 109 degrees of evidence and this is a not manageable number.   
 
Unfortunately, convolution using belief/plausibility requires combining the degrees of evidence 
even if the variables are noninteractive.  For two variables X and Y with A a subset (event or 
interval) of X and B a subset (event or interval) of Y, Bel(A x B) <= min[Bel(A), Bel(B)] where 
Bel is belief, so we cannot accurately calculate the belief for subsets of X x Y using belief for 
subsets of X combined with belief for subsets of Y.  However, if X and Y are noninteractive we 
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can combine degrees of evidence, m, as m(A x B) = mX(A)·mY(B) where mX and mY are 
marginal degrees of evidence, and using the m(A x B) for all A and B that are focal elements the 
Bel(A x B) can be calculated from the focal elements of X x Y.38 
 
Consider a variable X that is the set of all reals in [min, max].  The binning process involves 
defining a number of bins that partition X and considering every number within a bin to map to a 
single number, the value of the midpoint of the bin. 
 
For linear binning into n bins the width of a bin is (max-min)/n and the n bins are taken as: 
 
 [min, bin 1 max], (bin 1 max, bin 2 max], (bin 2 max, bin 3 max], … 
 (bin n-1 max, max]. 
 
For log binning over the range 0 to 1028 the following bins are used: 
 
 [0, 5 × 10-6], (5 × 10-6, 1 × 10-5], (1 × 10-5, 5 × 10-5], …  
 (5 × 1027, 1 × 1028].   
 
Each degree of evidence over X is a value assigned to an interval [low, high] in X.  The mapping 
of the degrees of evidence to the binned values of X is as follows.  Low maps to the point value 
of the bin i where low is within (bin i low, bin i high].  High maps to the point value of the bin j 
where high is within (bin j low, bin j high].  So the mapped degree of evidence applies to the 
interval [bin i point value, bin j point value].  The mapping is not one-to-one since more than one 
unique [low, high] has the same [bin i point value, bin j point value]. In fact, the degrees of 
evidence reduce, or aggregate, precisely because the mapping is not one-to-one.  Each 
aggregated interval is assigned a degree of evidence equal to the sum of the degrees of evidence 
for each original interval that mapped into that aggregated interval.  Figure A-11 graphically 
illustrates the aggregation process. 
 
                                                 
38  For probability, if A and B are independent P(AxB) = P(A) ·P(B) where P is probability.  For possibility, even if A and B are dependent 
Pos(A + B) = max[Pos(A), Pos(B)] where Pos is possibility and the ‘+’ in Pos(A + B) is the cartesian co-product; if A and B are noninterative 
in the possibilistic sense, it is also true that Pos(A x B) = min[Pos(A), Pos(B)].  The references provide more detailed information, 
specifically [Dubois and Prade, Possibility Theory]. 
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Figure A-11.  Aggregation Process 
For example let the variable XX be [4, 100] with the following degrees of evidence: 
 
 0.2 for [4, 11] 
 0.4 for [4, 45] 
 0.3 for [8, 20] 
 0.1 for [27, 51] 
 
Using linear binning with 4 bins the bins are: 
 
 [4, 28] with midpoint 16 
 (28, 52] with midpoint 40 
 (52, 76] with midpoint 64 
 (76, 100] with midpoint 88 
 
The mapping of the degrees of evidence is as follows: 
 
 [4, 11] → [16, 16] with evidence 0.2 
 [4, 45] → [16, 40] with evidence 0.4 
 [8, 20] → [16, 16] with evidence 0.3 
 [27, 51] → [16, 40] with evidence 0.1 
 
The final aggregated degrees of evidence are: 
 
 [16, 16] with evidence 0.5 
 [16, 40] with evidence 0.5 
 
 
* 
Center Values of Bins
Intervals with degrees of 
Evidence 
Degrees of Evidence Aggregated 
using bin center values 
Variable values
Bins
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Aggregation is useful when the number of degrees of evidence for a variable in the chain of 
algebraic operations becomes so large that further convolution would increase the number of 
degrees of evidence to an unmanageable number.  The number of bins must not be set too large 
or aggregation causes too much loss of fidelity.  For our security application, the variable 
min/max values are such that log aggregation may be better than linear aggregation.  For 
example, a consequence variable may range from 0 to 107 deaths so consequences within about a 
factor of 10 are essentially identical for this scale. 
 
The BeliefConvolution Java code allows for either linear or log aggregation at any step in the 
convolution. 
 
Figure A-12 shows linear aggregation of evidence in BeliefConvolution for the variable XX just 
discussed. 
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Figure A-12.  Aggregation of Evidence in BeliefConvolution Java Code 
Simple 
Aggregation 
Example
Without Aggregation  
With Linear Aggregation  
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A.6.1.2  Belief/Plausibility for a Fuzzy Set 
The ability to calculate belief/plausibility for fuzzy sets allows results to be summarized as 
linguistic variables (e.g., Minor, Moderate, Major, Catastrophic) and each linguistic variable is a 
fuzzy set over the appropriate numeric variable.  For cases with crisp focal elements, 
BeliefConvolution calculates the belief/plausibility for a fuzzy set using Equation A-15. 
 
BeliefConvolution requires that the shape of the fuzzy sets be trapezoids (or triangles, or 
rectangles which are crisp sets).  The tuple <lower, lowerCrisp, upperCrisp, and upper> specifies 
a fuzzy set.  For example, the fuzzy set <4, 15, 27, 48> is shown in Figure A-13. 
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Figure A-13.  Example Trapezoidal Fuzzy Set  
Degenerate cases are <15, 15, 27, 27> (the crisp set shown in Figure A-14), and the triangular 
shaped fuzzy sets <4, 15, 15, 27> and <4, 4, 4, 27> shown in Figures A-15 and A-16. 
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 Crisp Set
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Figure A-14.  Example Crisp Set  
 Triangular Fuzzy Set
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Figure A-15.  Example Triangular Fuzzy Set 
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 Triangular Fuzzy Set
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Figure A-16.  Example Triangular Fuzzy Set 
The fuzzy set is divided into three portions: lower fuzzy portion, crisp portion, and upper crisp 
portion.  For the fuzzy sets shown above the portions are: 
 
 For <4, 15, 27, 48> 
  Lower fuzzy portion is [4, 15) 
  Crisp portion is [15, 27] 
  Upper fuzzy portion is (27, 48] 
 
 For <15, 15, 27, 27> 
  Lower fuzzy portion is not present 
  Crisp portion is [15, 27] 
  Upper fuzzy portion is not present 
 
 For <4, 15, 15, 27> 
  Lower fuzzy portion is [4, 15) 
  Crisp portion is not present 
  Upper fuzzy portion [15, 27] 
 
 For <4, 4, 4, 27> 
  Lower fuzzy portion is not present 
  Crisp portion is not present 
  Upper fuzzy portion is [4, 27] 
 
Not that each fuzzy portion has an area ½ of the area if that fuzzy portion were crisp; see Figure 
A-17 for example. 
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Figure A-17. Area Example 
As an example of the calculation of belief for a fuzzy set, consider the fuzzy set  
<4, 15, 27, 48> shown in Figure A-18. 
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Figure A-18.  Crisp Evidence with a Fuzzy Set 
Assume the degrees of evidence over the crisp intervals indicated in Figure A-18 are as follows: 
 
 Interval A [7, 36] has degree of evidence 0.15 
 Interval B [4, 18] has degree of evidence 0.23 
 Interval C [25, 40] has degree of evidence 0.07 
 Interval D [3, 11] has degree of evidence 0.49 
 Interval E [33, 48] has degree of evidence 0.06 
 
Using BeliefConvolution, the belief and plausibility for this fuzzy set can be calculated: 
 
            // report fuzzy set belief example input 
            Variable reportFuzzySet = new Variable("ReportFuzzySet", 1, 50, false); 
            reportFuzzySet.addEvidenceInterval(new EvidenceInterval(reportFuzzySet.getName(), 7, 36, 0.15)); 
            reportFuzzySet.addEvidenceInterval(new EvidenceInterval(reportFuzzySet.getName(), 4, 18, 0.23)); 
            reportFuzzySet.addEvidenceInterval(new EvidenceInterval(reportFuzzySet.getName(), 25, 40, 0.07)); 
            reportFuzzySet.addEvidenceInterval(new EvidenceInterval(reportFuzzySet.getName(), 3, 11, 0.49)); 
            reportFuzzySet.addEvidenceInterval(new EvidenceInterval(reportFuzzySet.getName(), 33, 48, 0.06)); 
             
            reportFuzzySet.printOverallResults(); 
            reportFuzzySet.printBelPlForFuzzySet("Example Fuzzy Set", 4, 15, 27, 48); 
            reportFuzzySet.printBelPlForCrispSet(9.5, 37.5); 
 
RESULTS FOR: ReportFuzzySet 
Minimum value: 1.00000E+00   Maximum value: 5.00000E+01 
Expected value interval for Variable ReportFuzzySet is: [7.17000E+00, 2.06100E+01] 
    Intervals and Degrees of Evidence follow 
Number of focal elements (intervals with non-zero degree of evidence): 5 
Sum of degrees of evidence for all focal elements: 1.00000E+00 
For Variable named ReportFuzzySet [3.00000E+00, 1.10000E+01] has evidence 4.90000E-01 
For Variable named ReportFuzzySet [4.00000E+00, 1.80000E+01] has evidence 2.30000E-01 
For Variable named ReportFuzzySet [7.00000E+00, 3.60000E+01] has evidence 1.50000E-01 
For Variable named ReportFuzzySet [2.50000E+01, 4.00000E+01] has evidence 7.00000E-02 
For Variable named ReportFuzzySet [3.30000E+01, 4.80000E+01] has evidence 6.00000E-02 
    Exceedance likelihoods follow 
Number of discrete steps in the exceedance results: 10 
For Variable named ReportFuzzySet Exceedance result for greater than 3.00000E+00 up to and including 5.00000E+01 is Belief 
5.10000E-01 and Plausibility 1.00000E+00 
For Variable named ReportFuzzySet Exceedance result for greater than 4.00000E+00 up to and including 5.00000E+01 is Belief 
2.80000E-01 and Plausibility 1.00000E+00 
For Variable named ReportFuzzySet Exceedance result for greater than 7.00000E+00 up to and including 5.00000E+01 is Belief 
1.30000E-01 and Plausibility 1.00000E+00 
For Variable named ReportFuzzySet Exceedance result for greater than 1.10000E+01 up to and including 5.00000E+01 is Belief 
1.30000E-01 and Plausibility 5.10000E-01 
For Variable named ReportFuzzySet Exceedance result for greater than 1.80000E+01 up to and including 5.00000E+01 is Belief 
1.30000E-01 and Plausibility 2.80000E-01 
For Variable named ReportFuzzySet Exceedance result for greater than 2.50000E+01 up to and including 5.00000E+01 is Belief 
6.00000E-02 and Plausibility 2.80000E-01 
For Variable named ReportFuzzySet Exceedance result for greater than 3.30000E+01 up to and including 5.00000E+01 is Belief 
0.00000E+00 and Plausibility 2.80000E-01 
For Variable named ReportFuzzySet Exceedance result for greater than 3.60000E+01 up to and including 5.00000E+01 is Belief 
0.00000E+00 and Plausibility 1.30000E-01 
For Variable named ReportFuzzySet Exceedance result for greater than 4.00000E+01 up to and including 5.00000E+01 is Belief 
0.00000E+00 and Plausibility 6.00000E-02 
For Variable named ReportFuzzySet Exceedance result for greater than 4.80000E+01 up to and including 5.00000E+01 is Belief 
0.00000E+00 and Plausibility 0.00000E+00 
 
For Variable named ReportFuzzySet the fuzzy set Example Fuzzy Set with {lower, lowerCrisp, upperCrisp, upper} of 
{4.00000E+00, 1.50000E+01, 2.70000E+01, 4.80000E+01} has Belief 6.75758E-02 and Plausibility 8.04675E-01 
 
For the example problem, the fuzzy set has Belief/Plausibility of 0.068/0.80. 
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The fuzzy set can be approximated by the crisp set <9.5, 9.5, 37.5, 37.5> and for this crisp set the 
code calculates: 
 
For Variable named ReportFuzzySet the crisp set [9.50000E+00, 3.75000E+01] has Belief 0.00000E+00 and Plausibility 
1.00000E+00 
 
This crisp set has Belief/Plausibility of 0/1.0. 
 
A.6.2  LinguisticBelief 
LinguisticBelief implements the mathematics of belief discussed earlier for rule based 
combinations of linguistic variables with evidence assigned to fuzzy sets. For a variable formed 
from a rule base, no more than three input variables are allowed. 
 
Figure A-19 shows a screen capture of the LinguisticBelief code in the netbeans IDE. 
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Figure A-19.  LinguisticBelief in the netbeans IDE 
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Based on the mapping of input fuzzy sets to output fuzzy sets per the rule base, there is an 
automatic “aggregation” of focal elements performed in the LinguisticBelief code.  (As 
discussed in Section A.1, for convolution of numeric variables using BeliefConvolution, 
aggregation requires user-specified binning.) 
 
This aggregation is best discussed by an example.  First the example is presented, then the 
process of aggregation is discussed using this example.   
 
Consider a simple purely linguistic example where we wish to reason on Quality of Life based 
on Health and Wealth.  For “Health” we will use the fuzzy sets “Bad,” “Moderate,” Excellent.”  
Uncertainty is reflected by the assignment of degrees of evidence to appropriate combinations of 
these fuzzy sets.  For example, based on the information available for a specific individual 
named “John” we may assign the following evidence for the “Health” of “John”:  
 
 0.8 to {“Bad,” “Moderate”}, and  
 0.2 to {“Moderate,” “Excellent”} 
 
Assume we model “Wealth” with the fuzzy sets “Poor,” “Middle Class,” and “Rich.”  Based on 
the evidence available we assign evidence for the “Wealth” of “John” as:  
 
 0.3 to {“Middle Class”}, and   
 0.7 to {“Poor,” “Middle Class”} 
 
We wish to reason on the linguistic “Quality Of Life” based on combining “Health” and 
“Wealth” using the rule base for “Quality Of Life” is provided in Table A-6. 
Table A-6.  Rule Base for Quality of Life 
Health 
Quality of Life 
Wealth 
Bad Moderate Excellent 
Poor Not So Good Not So Good Good 
Middle Class Not So Good Not So Good Good 
Rich Not So Good Good Good 
 
The rule base implies that “Quality Of Life” “Not So Good” is formed from: 
 
{<”Bad”, “Poor”>, <”Bad”, “Middle Class”>, <”Bad”, “Rich”>, <”Moderate”, “Poor”>, 
<”Moderate,” “Middle Class”>}, 
 
and that “Quality Of Life” “Good” is formed from: 
 
{<”Moderate”, “Rich””>, <”Excellent”, “Poor”>, <”Excellent”, “Middle Class”>, 
<”Excellent,” “Rich”>}. 
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Using the evidence provided for “Health” and “Wealth” for “John” and the rule base for “Quality 
Of Life”, and assuming that “Health” and “Wealth” are non-interactive, we obtain the following 
focal elements (here focal elements are evidence for combinations of fuzzy sets) for “John”: 
 
{<”Bad,” “Middle Class”>, <”Moderate,” “Middle Class”>} with evidence 0.24 
 
{<”Bad,” “Poor”>, <”Moderate,” “Poor”>, <”Bad,” “Middle Class”>, <”Moderate,” 
“Middle Class”>} with evidence 0.56 
 
{<”Moderate,” “Middle Class”>, <”Excellent,” “Middle Class”>} with evidence 0.06 
 
{<”Moderate,” “Poor”>, <”Excellent,” “Poor”>, <”Moderate,” “Middle Class”>, 
<”Excellent,” “Middle Class”>} with evidence 0.14. 
 
The combinatorics involved in evaluating a rule base are straightforward but tedious; the author 
wrote a Java computer code called LinguisticBelief to perform convolution of linguistic 
variables with fuzzy sets using belief/plausibility.   
 
For the single simple rule base for “Quality Of Life” for “John” a manual evaluation is 
instructive.   
 
The belief/plausibility for Not So Good is calculated using Equation A-4.  The following two 
focal elements of Health x Wealth are a subset of Not So Good: 
  
 {<Bad, Middle Class>, <Moderate, Middle Class>}, and 
 {< Bad, Poor>, <Moderate, Poor >, < Bad, Middle Class >, <Moderate, Middle Class >}, 
  
so Bel(Not So Good) = 0.24 + 0.56 = 0.80.   
 
All the focal elements of Health x Wealth have non-null intersection with Not So Good, so 
Pl(Not So Good) = 1.0.  
 
Similarly for Good, Bel(Good) = 0 and Pl(Good) = 0.06 + 0.14 = 0.20.   
 
In summary, using the mathematics of belief/plausibility, we obtain the following results for 
“Quality Of Life” for “John”: 
 
 “Not So Good” has a belief/plausibility interval of 0.8/1.0 
 “Good” has a belief/plausibility interval of 0/0.2. 
 
Figure A-20 shows these results. 
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Figure A-20.  Happiness for John 
The rule base can be extensive.  For example, we can combine “Quality Of Life” with “Outlook 
On Life” to evaluate ”Happiness.”  Let the fuzzy sets for “Outlook On Life” be “Pessimist” and 
“Optimist” and let the fuzzy sets for ”Happiness” be “Depressed,” “Accepting,” and “Very 
Happy.”  Form “Happiness” using the following rule base: 
Table A-7.  Rule Base for Happiness 
Outlook On Life 
Happiness 
Quality Of Life 
Pessimist Optimist 
Not So Good Depressed Accepting 
Good Accepting Very Happy 
 
Assume the following evidence for “Outlook On Life” for “John”: 
 
 {“Pessimist”} with evidence 0.02, and 
 {“Pessimist,” “Optimist”} with evidence 0.98. 
 
Using the LinguisticBelief  code, the results for  for “Happiness” for “John” are:   
 
 Very Happy has a belief/plausibility interval of 0 / 0.196 
 Accepting has a belief/plausibility interval of 0 / 0.984 
 Depressed has a belief/plausibility interval is: 0.016 / 1.0. 
 
Figure A-21 illustrates the results graphically. 
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Belief/Plausibility for Linguistic Happiness
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Figure A-21.  Happiness for John 
The utility of the linguistic technique using belief/plausibility is that it focuses the argument on 
the rules for how we evaluate the result of a combination of many very different variables each 
with considerable epistemic uncertainty, rather than focusing on a precise numerical estimate of 
the result given little information. 
 
To show how aggregation is performed for the linguistic calculation, selected output from the 
LinguisticBelief Code for the evaluation of the prior example follows. 
 
Quality of Life Focal Elements 
 
For RuleLinguistic Quality of Life a FocalElement with degree of evidence 2.4000e-01 is:     
    Bad_&_Middle Class 
    Moderate_&_Middle Class 
 
For RuleLinguistic Quality of Life a FocalElement with degree of evidence 5.6000e-01 is:     
    Bad_&_Poor 
    Bad_&_Middle Class 
    Moderate_&_Poor 
    Moderate_&_Middle Class 
 
For RuleLinguistic Quality of Life a FocalElement with degree of evidence 6.0000e-02 is:    
    Moderate_&_Middle Class 
    Excellent_&_Middle Class 
 
For RuleLinguistic Quality of Life a FocalElement with degree of evidence 1.4000e-01 is:     
    Moderate_&_Poor 
    Moderate_&_Middle Class 
    Excellent_&_Poor 
    Excellent_&_Middle Class 
 
Quality of Life Rule Base 
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For RuleLinguistic Quality of Life the fuzzy sets from union of rules with output FuzzySet Not So Good 
are:  
    Bad_&_Poor 
    Moderate_&_Poor 
    Bad_&_Middle Class 
    Moderate_&_Middle Class 
    Bad_&_Rich 
 
For RuleLinguistic Quality of Life the fuzzy sets from union of rules with output FuzzySet Good are:  
    Excellent_&_Poor 
    Excellent_&_Middle Class 
    Moderate_&_Rich 
    Excellent_&_Rich 
 
Quality of Life Belief / Plausibility Intervals 
 
For BasicLinguistic Quality of Life For fuzzy set Not So Good Belief / Plausibility interval is: 8.00000e-01 / 
1.00000e+00 
For BasicLinguistic Quality of Life For fuzzy set Good Belief / Plausibility interval is: 0.00000e+00 / 
2.00000e-01 
 
Outlook on Life Belief / Plausibility Intervals 
 
For BasicLinguistic Outlook On Life For fuzzy set Pessimist Belief / Plausibility interval is 2.0000e-02 , 
1.0000e+00 
For BasicLinguistic Outlook On Life For fuzzy set Optimist Belief / Plausibility interval is 0.0000e+00 , 
9.8000e-01 
 
To evaluate “Happiness” using the rule base, its focal elements need to be expressed in terms of 
the fuzzy sets of its input variables. This is accomplished by aggregation. 
 
For example, before aggregation the focal elements for “Happiness” are: 
 
(1) For RuleLinguistic Happiness a FocalElement with degree of evidence: 4.8000e-03 is     
    Bad_&_Middle Class_&_Pessimist 
    Moderate_&_Middle Class_&_Pessimist 
 
(2) For RuleLinguistic Happiness a FocalElement with degree of evidence: 2.3520e-01 is     
    Bad_&_Middle Class_&_Pessimist 
    Bad_&_Middle Class_&_Optimist 
    Moderate_&_Middle Class_&_Pessimist 
    Moderate_&_Middle Class_&_Optimist 
 
(3) For RuleLinguistic Happiness a FocalElement with degree of evidence 1.1200e-02 is:      
    Bad_&_Poor_&_Pessimist 
    Bad_&_Middle Class_&_Pessimist 
    Moderate_&_Poor_&_Pessimist 
    Moderate_&_Middle Class_&_Pessimist 
 
 
(4) For RuleLinguistic Happiness a FocalElement with degree of evidence 5.4880e-01 is:     
    Bad_&_Poor_&_Pessimist 
    Bad_&_Poor_&_Optimist 
    Bad_&_Middle Class_&_Pessimist 
    Bad_&_Middle Class_&_Optimist 
    Moderate_&_Poor_&_Pessimist 
    Moderate_&_Poor_&_Optimist 
    Moderate_&_Middle Class_&_Pessimist 
LDRD—Critical Infrastructure Systems of Systems Assessment Methodology 
 
 173
    Moderate_&_Middle Class_&_Optimist 
 
(5) For RuleLinguistic Happiness a FocalElement with degree of evidence 1.2000e-03 is:    
    Moderate_&_Middle Class_&_Pessimist 
    Excellent_&_Middle Class_&_Pessimist 
 
(6) For RuleLinguistic Happiness a FocalElement with degree of evidence 5.8800e-02 is:     
    Moderate_&_Middle Class_&_Pessimist 
    Moderate_&_Middle Class_&_Optimist 
    Excellent_&_Middle Class_&_Pessimist 
    Excellent_&_Middle Class_&_Optimist 
 
(7) For RuleLinguistic Happiness a FocalElement with degree of evidence 2.8000e-03 is:     
    Moderate_&_Poor_&_Pessimist 
    Moderate_&_Middle Class_&_Pessimist 
    Excellent_&_Poor_&_Pessimist 
    Excellent_&_Middle Class_&_Pessimist 
 
(8) For RuleLinguistic Happiness a FocalElement with degree of evidence 1.3720e-01 is:      
    Moderate_&_Poor_&_Pessimist 
    Moderate_&_Poor_&_Optimist 
    Moderate_&_Middle Class_&_Pessimist 
    Moderate_&_Middle Class_&_Optimist 
    Excellent_&_Poor_&_Pessimist 
    Excellent_&_Poor_&_Optimist 
    Excellent_&_Middle Class_&_Pessimist 
    Excellent_&_Middle Class_&_Optimist 
 
The rule base for “Happiness” is: 
 
For RuleLinguistic Happiness the fuzzy sets from union of rules with output FuzzySet Very Happy are:  
    Good_&_Optimist 
 
For RuleLinguistic Happiness the fuzzy sets from union of rules with output FuzzySet Accepting are:  
    Not So Good_&_Optimist 
    Good_&_Pessimist 
 
For RuleLinguistic Happiness the fuzzy sets from union of rules with output FuzzySet Depressed are:  
    Not So Good_&_Pessimist 
 
The focal elements for “Happiness” contain “Quality Of Life” in terms of the fuzzy sets of its 
input variables “Health” and “Wealth”, but the rule base for “Happiness” is expressed in terms of 
the fuzzy sets for “Quality Of Life.”  The focal elements for “Happiness” must be aggregated to 
be expressed in terms of the fuzzy sets of “Quality Of Life” instead of being expressed in terms 
of the fuzzy sets for the input variables for “Quality Of Life.” 
 
Aggregation is performed in two steps.  First, for any given focal element, its constituent input 
fuzzy sets are mapped to the appropriate output fuzzy set per the rule base.  For “Happiness” this 
results in the following focal elements: 
 
(1) For RuleLinguistic Happiness a FocalElement with degree of evidence 4.8000e-03 is:     
    Not So Good_&_Pessimist 
 
(2) For RuleLinguistic Happiness a FocalElement with degree of evidence 2.3520e-01 is:     
    Not So Good_&_Pessimist 
    Not So Good_&_Optimist 
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(3) For RuleLinguistic Happiness a FocalElement with degree of evidence 1.1200e-02 is:    
    Not So Good_&_Pessimist 
 
(4) For RuleLinguistic Happiness a FocalElement with degree of evidence: 5.4880e-01 is    
    Not So Good_&_Pessimist 
    Not So Good_&_Optimist 
 
(5) For RuleLinguistic Happiness a FocalElement with degree of evidence 1.2000e-03 is:   
    Not So Good_&_Pessimist 
    Good_&_Pessimist 
 
(6) For RuleLinguistic Happiness a FocalElement with degree of evidence 5.8800e-02 is:    
    Not So Good_&_Pessimist 
    Not So Good_&_Optimist 
    Good_&_Pessimist 
    Good_&_Optimist 
 
(7) For RuleLinguistic Happiness a FocalElement with degree of evidence 2.8000e-03 is:     
    Not So Good_&_Pessimist 
    Good_&_Pessimist 
 
(8) For RuleLinguistic Happiness a FocalElement with degree of evidence 1.3720e-01 is:     
    Not So Good_&_Pessimist 
    Not So Good_&_Optimist 
    Good_&_Pessimist 
    Good_&_Optimist 
 
Second, focal elements resulting from step one containing identical fuzzy sets are combined by 
adding the degrees of evidence, resulting in the following focal elements for “Happiness”.    
 
(A) For RuleLinguistic Happiness a FocalElement with degree of evidence 1.6000e-02 is:     
    Not So Good_&_Pessimist 
 
(B) For RuleLinguistic Happiness a FocalElement with degree of evidence 7.8400e-01 is:     
    Not So Good_&_Pessimist 
    Not So Good_&_Optimist 
 
(C) For RuleLinguistic Happiness a FocalElement with degree of evidence 4.0000e-03 is:   
    Not So Good_&_Pessimist 
    Good_&_Pessimist 
 
(D) For RuleLinguistic Happiness a FocalElement with degree of evidence 1.9600e-01 is:     
    Not So Good_&_Pessimist 
    Not So Good_&_Optimist 
    Good_&_Pessimist 
    Good_&_Optimist 
 
This two-step aggregation operation reduced the number of focal elements for “Happiness” from 
eight to four. 
LDRD—Critical Infrastructure Systems of Systems Assessment Methodology 
 
 175
References 
 
Amenaza Technologies, SecurITree software, http://www.amenaza.com/  
ANSI T1A1.2 Working Group on Network Survivability Performance, “A Technical Report on 
Network Survivability”, Report No. 24A, Alliance for Telecommunications Industry 
Solutions, 1997. 
ASME, 2004.  Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection:  General Guidance. 
 Draft.  American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Washington, DC.  July 30, 2004. 
ATIS 1997a, Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions Committee T1, “Technical 
Report on Enhanced Analysis of FCC-Reportable Service Outage Data,” T1A1.2/97-001, 
Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions, Red Bank, NJ, 1997. 
ATIS 1997b, Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions Committee T1, “An Outage 
Index for the Wireline Industry Segment,” T1A1.2/97-001, Alliance for 
Telecommunications Industry Solutions, Red Bank, NJ, 1997. 
Bennett, H.A. The EASI Approach to Physical Security Evaluation, SAND76-0500, Sandia 
National Laboratories, Albuquerque NM, 1977. 
Biringer, Betty E., Richard D. Brown, Michael Ford, and William K. Paulus, Survey of Security 
System Design and Analysis Tools, SAND2000-0717, Sandia National Laboratories, 
Albuquerque NM, May 1999. 
Campbell, P.L., and J.E. Stamp,  A Classification Scheme for Risk Assessment Methods, Sandia 
National Laboratories Report SAND2004-4233, Albuquerque NM, August 2004. 
Campbell, Philip L. and Bryan J. Smith, Automating Quickstart ViaThe Sandia Quickstart 
Baseline Tool (SQBT), Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque NM, January 2006. 
Campbell, Philip L., “Proposed Sandia Customizations to the Sandia Quickstart Baseline Tool 
(SQBT) for SCADA Customers”, Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque NM,  
February 21, 2006. 
COBIT Quickstart ©2003 IT Governance Institute (ITGI).  All rights reserved. 
Cramond, W.R., et al., Probabilistic Risk Assessment Course Documentation, SAND85-1495, 
NUREG/CR-4350, 7 volumes.  Prepared by Sandia National Laboratories for the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, 1985. 
Darby, John, Evaluation of Risk from Acts of Terrorism: The Adversary/Defender Model using 
Belief and Fuzzy Sets, SANDOC 2006-5777, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque 
NM, 2006. 
Depoy, J., et al., “Risk Assessment for Physical and Cyber Attacks on Critical Infrastructures,” 
IEEE MILCOM 2005, contributed by Sandia National Laboratories, October 2005. 
LDRD—Critical Infrastructure Systems of Systems Assessment Methodology 
 
 176
Devooght, J., and Smidts, C., “Probabilistic Reactor Dynamics – I: The Theory of Continuous 
Event Trees,” Nuclear Science and Engineering 111:229-240, 1992a. 
Devooght, J., and Smidts, C., “Probabilistic Reactor Dynamics – III: A Framework for Time-
Dependent Interaction Between Operator and Reactor During a Transient Involving Human 
Error,” Nuclear Science and Engineering 112:100-113, 1992b.  
Dougherty, Edward R., Probability and Statistics for the Engineering, Computing, and Physical 
Sciences, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1990. 
Dubois, Didier and Henri Prade, Possibility Theory, An Approach to Computerized Processing of 
Uncertainty, Plenum Press English Translation, 1988. 
Duggan, D., Generic Threat Profiles, SAND Report 2005-5411, Sandia National Laboratories, 
Albuquerque NM, July 2005 
Eisenhawer, Steve, Terry Bott and D.V. Rao, 2003.  Assessing the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism 
Using Logic Evolved Decision Analysis.  American Nuclear Society Annual Meeting, San 
Diego, CA.  June 1-4, 2003.  LA-UR-03-3467. 
Engi, D., “GAIA: Global Approaches to Infrastructure Assurance, a Work in Progress,” 
SAND2000-2543, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque NM, October 2000.   
Engi, D., and C. P. Harlan, “Brief Adversary Threat Loss Estimator (BATLE) User’s Guide,” 
NUREG/CR-1432, SAND80-0952, Sandia National Laboratories, May 1981. 
Engi, Dennis, and Jessica Glicken-Turnley, The Vital Issues Process : Strategic Planning For A 
Changing World, SAND95-0845, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New 
Mexico, 1995. 
Engi, Dennis, The Vital Issues Process: Managing Critical Infrastructures In The Global Arena, 
SAND97-1451, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1997. 
“EPANET 2.0, Water Supply and Water Resource (WSWRD) Risk Management Research 
NRMRL OSD US EPA,” www.epa.gov/ORD/NRMRL/wswrd/epanet.html 
Ferson, Scott, Roger B. Nelson, Janos Hajagos, Daniel J. Berleant, Jianzhong Zhang, W. Troy 
Tucker, Lev R. Ginzburg, and William L. Overkampf, Dependence in Probabilistic 
Modeling, Dempster-Shafer Theory, and Probability Bounds Analysis, Sandia National 
Laboratories, Albuquerque NM, SAND2004-3072, October, 2004. 
Garcia, M. L., The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems, Butterworth-
Heinemann, 2001. 
Gordon, K. A. and G. D. Wyss, Comparison of Two Methods to Quantify Cyber and Physical 
Security Effectiveness, SAND2005-7177, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, 
November 2005. 
 
LDRD—Critical Infrastructure Systems of Systems Assessment Methodology 
 
 177
Greenberg, H.R., and Cramer, J.J., editors, Risk Assessment and Risk Management for the 
Chemical Process Industry, Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York, 1991. 
Information Design Assurance Red Team (IDARTTM) at Sandia National Laboratories.  
http://www.sandia.gov/idart. 
IT Governance Institute® (2004). Control Practices.  United States of America: ITGI. 
Jae, M., and Apostolakis, G.E., “The Use of Influence Diagrams for Evaluating Severe Accident 
Management Strategies,” Nuclear Technology 99:142-157, August 1992. 
Jansma, Roxanna M., Sharon K. Fletcher, Martin D. Murphy, Judy J. Lim, Gregory D. Wyss, 
Risk-Based Assessment of the Surety of Information Systems, SAND96-2027, Sandia 
National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, July 1996. 
Joint Publication 1-02 “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” 
August 31, 2005, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict. 
Kaplan, Stanley and B. John Garrick, “On the Quantitative Definition of Risk”, Risk Analysis, 
Vol. 1 No. 1, 1981 pp 11-27. 
Kaplan, Stanley, “On the Method of Discrete Probability Distributions in Risk and Reliability 
Calculations-Application to Seismic Risk Assessment”, Risk Analysis, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1981 
pp189-196. 
Klir. G., and B. Yuan, Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Logic, Theory and Applications, Prentice Hall PTR, 
Upper Saddle River NJ, 1995. 
R. P. Lippmann and K. W. Ingols, “An Annotated Review of Past Papers on Attack Graphs”, 
Technical Report ESC-TR-2005-054, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, MA, 2005. 
McCormick, N.J., Reliability and Risk Analysis: Methods and Nuclear Power Applications, 
Academic Press, New York, 1981. 
Meyer, M, and J. Booker, Eliciting and Analyzing Expert Judgment: A Practical Guide, ISBN 
0124932304, Academic Press, San Diego, 1991. 
NRIC, Network Reliability and Interoperability Council Steering Committee, NRIC Cyber 
Security Best Practices. http://www.nric.org, 2006 
Oberkampf, W. L., and Helton, J.C., “Evidence Theory for Engineering Applications”, Chapter 
10 of Engineering Design Reliability Handbook, Nikolaides, E., Ghiocel, D.M., and 
Singhal, S., eds., CRC Press, 2005. 
PHPSurveyor, http://www.phpsurveyor.org/index.php 
RAM-W:  Risk Assessment Methodology for Water Utilities, Second Edition.  Awwa Research 
Foundation.  Denver, CO.  2001 
LDRD—Critical Infrastructure Systems of Systems Assessment Methodology 
 
 178
Rees, Daniel C. and K. I. Rubin, 2003.  Managing and Protecting Infrastructure Assets.  
Proceedings of IMECE 2003:  2003 ASME International Mechanical Engineering Congress 
and RD&D Expo.  Washington, D.C., November 15-21, 2003. 
Roberts, N.H., W.E. Vesely, D.F. Haasl, and F.F. Goldberg, Fault Tree Handbook, NUREG-
0492, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, 1981. 
Saaty, Thomas L., Decision Making For Leaders: The Analytic Hierarchy Process for Decisions 
In A Complex World, ISBN 0962031704, Expert Choice, Inc., 1988. 
Saaty, Thomas L., Multicriteria Decision Making : The Analytic Hierarchy Process; Planning, 
Priority Setting, Resource Allocation, ISBN 0962031712, RWS Publications, Pittsburgh, 
PA, 1990. 
Smitds, C., and Devooght, J., “Probabilistic Dynamics: A Numerical Comparison Between a 
Continuous Event Tree and DYLAM-Type Event Tree,” from the Proceedings of PSAM II, 
G.E. Apostolakis and J.S. Wu of the University of California at Los Angeles, editors, San 
Diego, California, March 20-25, 1994. 
SNAC, Systems and Network Attack Center, National Security Agency (NSA). “The 60 Minute 
Network Security Guide (First Steps Towards a Secure Network Environment).”  Updated 
July 12, 2002, http://www.nsa.gov/snac/support/sixty_minutes.pdf. 
Stamp, J. and M. Berg, Fundamental Security Practices for Control and Automation Systems in 
Electric Power, SAND Report, SAND2005-7784J, Sandia National Laboratories, 
Albuquerque NM, 2005. 
Stamp, Jason and Dominique Kilman, Framework for SCADA Security Policies, Sandia National 
Laboratories Report SAND2005-1002C, Albuquerque, New Mexico 2005. 
Tidwell, V., J. A. Cooper, C. J. Silva, and S. Jurado, 2004.  Threat Assessment of Water Supply 
Systems Using Markov Latent Effects Modeling.  Sandia National Laboratories Report 
SAND2004-0818C, Albuquerque, New Mexico. 2004. 
“VSAT:  Vulnerability Self Assessment Tool”,  http://www.vsatusers.net/  
Wyss, G.D., and Durán, F.A., OBEST: The Object-Based Event Scenario Tree Methodology, 
SAND2001-0828, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, March 2001. 
Wyss, G.D., Craft, R.L., and Funkhouser, D.L., The Use of Object-Oriented Analysis Methods in 
Surety Analysis, SAND99-1242, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, May 
1999. 
Wyss, G.D., Felicia A. Durán And Vincent J. Dandini, “An Object-Oriented Approach to Risk 
and Reliability Analysis:  Methodology and Aviation Safety Applications,” SIMULATION, 
80(1):33-43 (January 2004) 
Yager, R. “Arithmetic and other operations on Dempster Shafer structures,” International 
Journal of Man-Machine Studies, 25: pp 357-366, 1986. 
LDRD—Critical Infrastructure Systems of Systems Assessment Methodology 
 
 179
Young, Mary Louise, Robert A. Jung, Bryan J. Smith, Richard L. Craft, Frank Joseph Jr. 
Schelling, Lee Shyr, Miriam Minton, Michael J. Berg, "Optimal allocation of terrorist 
countermeasures using risk-based systems analyses" by Sandia National Laboratories, 
Albuquerque, NM, SAND2004-4675, September 2004, OUO (Exemption 2) 
 
 
 
 
LDRD—Critical Infrastructure Systems of Systems Assessment Methodology 
 
 180
Distribution 
 
 
2  LDRD Office 
 
 
1 MS 0782 William G. Rhodes, III, 06418 
6  0782 James Phelan, 06418 
1  1368 Jennifer Depoy, 05615 
1  0762 S. Jordan, 06407 
1  0762 M. Bradley Parks, 06410 
1  0672 Robert L. Hutchinson, 05616 
1  0672 Peter Sholander, 05616 
1  1361 John Matter, 06957 
1  1361 G. Bruce Varnado, 06957 
1  0757 Carla Ulibarri, 06442 
1  0757 Gregory D. Wyss, 06442 
1  0757 John Darby, 06442 
1  0757 Andrew Walter, 06442 
 
 
2 MS 9018 Central Technical Files, 08944 
2  0899 Technical Library, 04536 
 
 
 
